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The idea of this thesis was originally suggested by Professor Edelmayer 
during my studies in Alcalá de Henares, Spain. I was interested in researching the 
various aspects of Spanish journalistic coverage of the process of Czechoslovak 
separation for various reasons. One, important, was to see how the Spanish 
printed media responded to the dissolution of a country, with which Spain had 
relatively little in common. Both countries never had particularly close economic 
or cultural ties, a fact that has not changed substantially during the existence of 
independent Slovak Republic.   
This thesis seeks to analyze the coverage of the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia in the Spanish press. One of the key points of research was to see 
how the separation process of former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was 
covered in major Spanish newspapers. These included El Pais, ABC and La 
Vanguardia; these newspapers and their reporting is analyzed in detail, whereas I 
have not presented a detailed survey of articles published by EL MUNDO, due to 
its relative insignificance and more “trivial” nature; additionally, it lacked, unlike 
other Spanish periodicals, much of the independent or autonomous lines of 
journalistic coverage. Additionally, some basic facts are provided concerning 
Spanish minorities periodicals such as El Periódico de Catalunya, El Diario Vasco, and 
DEIA. Instances of their coverage of the topics are given in the annexed 
Chronology of Events on pages 93 – 140. 
In addition to the risks/advantages of the separation for the Czech 
Republic and for Slovakia and from a general European perspective, another 
aspect discussed here is the way the Spanish press relates to the separation process 
in the light of Spain’s own political separatism, notably of Basque and Catalan. In 
this respect, it will be argued the process of Czechoslovak separation produced a 
kind of interest in Spanish press that went beyond general coverage of 
international news and topics, addressing particular issues and producing 
particular reactions as the Spanish press saw certain parallels with its domestic 
affairs. 
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When analyzing and commenting the newspapers’ coverage, I have made 
extensive use of available Czech and Slovak literature on the subject, which, 
perhaps surprisingly, is rather modest in volume. The magisterial Rozpad 
Československa: Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989-1992 (The Break-Up of Czechoslovakia: 
Czecho-Slovak Relations 1989-1992), by the Czech historian Jan Rychlík contains 
an enourmous wealth of detail on the separation process. Among others, an 
important point of reference is the diploma thesis (!) Rozdělení Československa: 
Nejvyšší představitelé HZDS a ODS v procesu rozdělováni ČSFR: Česko-slovenské soužití 
v letech 1989-1993 by Vladimír Srb and Tomáš Veselý published in Slovakia, which 
provides useful and interesting insights by major protagonists of the separation 
process; this work has received much critical acclaim among professional 
historians in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia for its unbiased, strictly 
objective approach.. 
Further chapters include the portrayals of main protagonists of the 
separation process, namely Václav Havel, Vladimír Mečiar and Václav Klaus, and 
their particular perception by major Spanish newspapers. This, a more 
personalized framework, is significant to the extent that the process was, to 
a considerable degree, a convergence of their individual efforts, in which they 
acted, at times, as antagonists and, at times, as “peacemakers”. Against these 
individual efforts, desires of the population of both states are discussed, with 
particular respect to the absence of a referendum on the issue. 
Finally, two major international aspects of the separation are highlighted in the 
analysis, as their importance was so seen by the Spanish press: the issue of 
Slovakia’s Hungarian minority and the impact of the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia. Somehow inevitably, the Spanish press found ample ground for 
speculating on the status of Slovak Hungarians against the background of its own 
policies in Catalonia and the Basque Country. This specific feature of the Spanish 
perception of nationalist politics has reverberations also in the use of Yugoslav 
catastrophic scenarios by the Spanish press, which repeatedly failed to see their 
inherent incompatibility with the Czech and Slovak “condition”, and, ultimately, 
highly appreciated the peaceful and bloodless “velvet divorce”. 
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2. Basic Facts about Spanish Newspapers 
 
Main aim of this work is to present the newspapers in Spain and their 
orientation. It should help us to understand the way they showed the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia to the people of Spain. As the Spanish philosopher Ortega y 
Gasset said: “We all are just me and my circumstances.” Also these media have 
their own history and ideology that influenced the way how are / were some 
things represented. This chapter shows the history of ideology of some Spanish 
newspapers. 
  Almost all Spanish newspapers did not have any permanent 
correspondents in Prague or Bratislava. However, even before 1989, the main 
newspapers had well established and prestigious correspondents based in Vienna 
who covered all of Central and Eastern Europe (Hermann Terstch from El País; 
Ricardo Estarriol from La Vanguardia; Francisco Eguiagaray and Ramiro 
Villapadierna from ABC). These correspondents traveled frequently to Prague and 
Bratislava during the events leading up to and after the separation and had the 
opportunity to interview the main political actors in both capitals. 
The newspapers that had no correspondents in the region used only 
information provided by the news agencies and only occasionally published an 
opinion article or an editorial reflecting the political views of the newspaper. 
In general terms, a parallelism can be found between the positions taken 
by Spanish newspapers regarding the separation of Czechoslovakia and their 
positions in the domestic debate regarding the “nationalistic” tendencies in some 
regions of Spain (especially, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). 
Newspapers based in Madrid, that support the permanent unity of the Spanish 
nation (El País, El Mundo, ABC), usually saw more disadvantages than benefits in 
the process of separation of Czechoslovakia, while the newspapers based in 
Bilbao or Barcelona, in different degrees, were much less opposed to the 
“friendly” separation. However, because the emergence of Slovakia as a new State 
was eventually not opposed by Prague and was considered not fully democratic in 
the absence of a referendum, this process could not be viewed exactly as a 
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precedent by Spanish “nationalists”, who knew that the authorities in Madrid 
would always try to prevent the separation of any part of Spain.  
In any case, the respective positions of the two biggest newspapers, El 
Mundo and El Pais appear very similar, both sharing many of the following views: 
the nationalist Mečiar was presented as being ultimately responsible for the 
separation; “Czechoslovakia” was presented as a very successful period of both 
nations; stress is put on the peaceful character of the separation, yet pointing out 
the absence of a referendum; they concluded that the separation would have more 
disadvantages than benefits, especially for Slovakia; the Czech Republic could lose 
the “dead weight” of Slovakia; there were risks for the Hungarian minority; there 
could be a risk of “balkanization” of Central Europe if a resurgence of 
nationalism took place. However, the articles from the correspondent of El Mundo 
appeared to be more neutral than the chronicles of the correspondents of El País 
that were mostly “pro-Czech”.  
   
2. 1. El País1 
 
“El País (Spanish for "The Country") is the most widely-circulated daily 
newspaper in Spain. According to the 2005 Estudio General de Medios (General 
Media Study), it has about 2.1 million readers. El País is often referred to as “the 
newspaper of record” in Spain, along with its fellow Madrid morning dailies El 
Mundo and ABC. Politically and ideologically it is connected with social 
democrats.” 
“It was first published on May 4, 1976, during the early stages of the 
Spanish transition to democracy. Founder José Ortega Spottorno based it on the 
model of France's Le Monde. El País has had four chiefs: Juan Luis Cebrián (until 
1988), Jaoquin Estefania (until 1993), Jesus Ceberio (until 2006), nowadays it is 
Javier Moreno.” 
 
                                                 
1 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Pa%C3%ADs> , last visited on September 27, 2008. 
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These newspapers are considered to be left-oriented. In these times, 
special reporters were sent to Prague and Bratislava:  
Vivianne Schnitzer 
Nilda Navarrete  
Herman Tertsch  
Ilona Kovaríková (former agent of the Communist State Security according the 
Cibulka’s public documents)2 
J. M. Martí Font ( enviado especial)    
Manuel Azcarate (artículo de opinión en El País) 
Ángel Santa Cruz.  
 
2. 2. El Mundo3 
 
“ El Mundo (Spanish for "The World", full name El Mundo del Siglo 
Veintiuno, "The World of the 21st century") is the second largest daily newspaper 
in Spain, and one of the newspapers of record in this country, with a circulation 
topping over one million newspapers. It first appeared on October 23, 1989, 
founded by Alfonso de Salas, Pedro J. Ramírez (who still serves as publisher and 
editor), Balbino Fraga and Juan González. It has maintained a self-defined liberal 
(in the sense of classical liberalism) editorial line, generally supporting the 
conservative Peoples Party.” 
  “It has its headquarters in Madrid, but maintains several news bureaus in 
outlying cities and different editions are printed for regions such as Andalusia, 
Valencia, Castile and Leon, the Balearic Islands, Bilbao, etc. Unlike other Spanish 
newspapers, its editor, Pedro J. Ramirez, is a very prominent public figure who 
has become totally identified with the paper in the eyes of the public.” 
                                                 
2 <http://www.cibulka.com/cgi-bin/osoby.exe?code=W>, last visited on September 27, 2008. 
On the webside    <http://osz.cmkos.cz/CZ/Z_tisku/Bulletin/03_2002/index.html>, there is a 
note that Ilona Kovarikova died on the February 25, 2002. She was 54 years old and until her 
death she was a special correspondent for ČTK.     
3 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Mundo_(Spain)> , last visited on September 26, 2008.  
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      During the splitting-up of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, El 
Mundo did not have any correspondents in Prague or in Bratislava. It used mostly 
news from agencies and from its special reporters. This paper was critical to 
national tendencies and the articles about dissolution were mostly negative. 
Although El Mundo is now the second most important newspaper, that was 
probably not the case in the early 1990s.  
The correspondents in the period of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia: 
Freddy Valverde 
Charo F. Cotta 
Jaime Pastor 
 
2. 3. ABC 4 
 
“ABC is a Spanish national daily newspaper founded in Madrid on January 
1, 1903, by Torcuato Luca de Tena y Alvarez-Ossorio. ABC started as a weekly 
newspaper until it turned daily in June 1905. Today, ABC is the third largest 
general-interest newspaper in Spain, and the oldest newspaper still appearing in 
Madrid. ABC is often referred to as a newspaper of record from Spain, along with 
El País and El Mundo. ABC is known for generally supporting conservative 
political views and defending the Spanish monarchy, and was seized in 1936 by 
the Popular Front (Frente Popular) when the Spanish Civil War started.”  
“During the civil war, ABC was famously published in two different 
versions, the Madrid edition supporting the Republic and the Seville edition 
supporting the Nationalist side. When the war was over, ABC in Madrid returned 
to its legitimate owners and once again became the largest newspaper in Spain. It 
later moved from its historic landmark offices in Madrid by Paseo de la 
Castellana.”   
The break-up of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was covered by a 
correspondent that had in Vienna. Ramiro Villapandierna was also a 
correspondent for ABC during this process. He had a good understanding of 
                                                 
4 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ABC_(newspaper)>, last visited on September 26, 2008. 
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Czech and Slovak issues; his coverage of the issues is balanced and matter-of-fact. 
The reporters, who wrote about the situation in Czechoslovakia: 
Ramiro Villapadierna 
Alejandro Muñoz-Alonso  
Francisco Eguiagaray 
 
2. 4. El Periódico de Catalunya 5 
 
“El Periódico de Catalunya is a morning daily newspaper based in Barcelona, 
Catalonia, Spain and owned by Grupo Zeta. El Periódico is actually two 
newspapers, publishing separate editions in Spanish (with a red nameplate) and in 
Catalan (distinguished with a blue nameplate). The two editions combined sell 
more than 150,000 copies per day, making El Periódico the region's second-
highest circulation daily.”  
“The paper was founded in 1978 by Antonio Asensio Pizarro, to offer a 
progressive, Catalonian paper unconnected with Catalonian separatism and 
nationalism. Following the example of USA Today, El Periódico later began to 
emphasize graphics and the use of color. Today, it prints every page in color and 
makes liberal use of charts and photos. It began a Catalan-language edition in 
mid-1990s, gaining access to substantial regional government subsidies. 
Previously, it was only published in Spanish.” 
     During the break-up process of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, El 
Periódico presented huge and usually magnified headlines and economic or 
geographical statements. It supported the idea of splitting-up, particularly, the 
peaceful way of making it. In fact, their only ever correspondent in the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic was during the break-up process Juan González Yuste. 
 
                                                 




2. 5. El Diaro Vasco6 
 
“The ideology of this daily newspaper corresponds with the important 
newspapers that were refusing the nationalistic tendencies. The information was 
mostly taken from news agencies. Its ideology is moderately right-oriented and 
supportive of the Spanish constitution.” 
Their coverage of the split-up of Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was 
realistic and without any hint to suggesting the Basque roots of these newspapers; 
the reporter was Mario García. 
 
2. 6. Deia 7 
“The Basque newspaper DEIA (in the Euskadi language it means 
challenge) was established in 1977 as representative of Basque nationalistic 
ideology even though it was and still is issued in Spain. This daily is close to the 
Basque nationalistic party and was established for this reason.”  
DEIA is spread mostly in the territory of Basques, however not as popular 
as El Diaro Vasco. Because of the nationalistic ideas, descriptions of the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia were not as catastrophic as in other newspapers. 
For descriptions of the situation the semantics and terminology from Spain was in 
general, the articles were in favor of creating two new states. This newspaper did 
not have any correspondents in Central Europe and practically relied on news 
agencies. The articles were written by José Luis Arriaga and they tended to 




                                                 
6 < http://www.diariovasco.com/>last visited on September 2ž, 2008.  
7 < http://www.deia.com/es/> last visited on September 26, 2008. 
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2. 7. La Vanguardia 8 
 
“La Vanguardia's newspaper history began on February 1, 1881, when two 
businessmen from Igualada, Carlos and Bartolomé Godó, first published the 
paper. It was defined as a Diario de los Políticos de avisos y notícias (Political 
Newspaper of Announcements and News), intended as a means of 
communication for a faction of the Liberal Party that wanted to gain control over 
the Barcelona city council.” 
  “On December 31, 1887, the paper published its last edition as a party 
newspaper and on the next day, January 1, 1888, the first day of the Universal 
Exposition of Barcelona,  it presented a new, politically independent format with a 
morning and an afternoon edition.” 
“Although the newspaper's articles are only in Castilian Spanish, letters 
submitted in Catalan are left untranslated and run next to the Spanish ones. 
Another unusual trait for a Spanish-language newspaper is its practice of always 
referring to Catalonia as Catalunya (the Catalan name) rather than the Spanish 
Cataluña; the name of Catalan institutions are also left untranslated (such as 
Govern instead of the Spanish Gobierno for the regional Government or 
consoler instead of consejero for its councilors). Interviews made in Catalan are 
frequently left untranslated, too.”  
Concerning the articles in La Vanguardia, not suprisingly, there are very 
good analyses of the realities in Slovakia and central Europe. Following the 
articles by dates, it can be seen that many times on of the authors succeeds in 
advancing what is going to happen in a few months time.  
Correspondents for La Vanguardia were Ricardo Estarriol and Lluís Foix. 
Despite having correspondents in all important cities, Ricardo Estarriol informed 
about the situation in Prague and Bratislava from Vienna. With rather good 
knowledge of the two nations, he was interested in their separation. Accordingly, 
his articles were gentle, without any obvious preference for either side. Still, 
                                                 
8 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Vanguardia> last visited on September 26, 2008. 
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different shifts in this process were reported. In the “Opinon” section, articles 
were featured about new borders in Europe, highlighting the peaceful course of 





























3. THE SITUATION BEFORE AND AFER THE DISSOLUTION 
IN SPANISH NEWSPAPERS 
 
This chapter concerns the articles describing the situation inside 
Czechoslovakia before the dissolution. Not only is the political and economic 
background of the problem shown, but also the attitude of people in the dissolute 
states. All this information is taken from the Spanish newspapers and is compared 
to the real situation in the state. 
This is one of the article reffering to the communist background of 
Czechoslovakia, entitled “Archivos Rojos.”9 Things are just like before ten years 
during the communism in post – soviet countries. Maybe the people there try to 
change something, like names of streets and squares, also some McDonalds are in 
towns, but many artifacts from communist history are still there. For example, the 
sculptures of Lenin and Stalin, pictures, red flags and so on. People are not 
prepared for such a big change and the mark of Communism will not leave these 
countries so early. On the other hand, in this article, the good relationship 
between Spain and Russia is discussed.10 
This quotation, as well, is a reaction to the fact that things had changed in 
1989. In November 1989 the Communist system was overthrown by Czech and 
Slovak people, who later formed the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence 
Movements.11 “In June 1990, the first free elections were held in Czechoslovakia. 
                                                 
9 El  País, 13 April, 1992, p. 14. 
10 “El PSOE aparece en escena en 1974, y es entonces también cuando el panorama se ensancha al 
conjunto de la situación española. Los centros de información son primero las embajadas 
soviéticas en Europa, y, a partir de 1976 la delegación comercial soviética en España, reemplazada 
pronto por la propia Embajada en Madrid. Esta se convierte en el eje de las relaciones políticas, 
apoyada por las de otros países socialistas, en los contactos con políticos de la izquierda española y 
con los dirigentes de un PCE puesto siempre en tela de juicio, en especial tras la publicación de 
Eurocomunismo y Estado, en 1977.“ Ibid., p. 14. 
11 “This indicates, a division line between two societies. Each part had to have their own 
component, or different party.” For a detailed discussion and immediatey related issues see in: 
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They were at both the regional and the federal levels, and the Civic Forum and 
Public Against Violence won in their respective Czech and Slovak districts. On 
the one hand, the coalition won these elections.” Although the coalition won 
these elections, its victory was based on its opposition to Communism, and not 
upon some coherent vision of the future in Czechoslovakia; it ran on the vague 
platform of “democratic and pluralistic values.12 The coalition was basically a 
marriage of convenience based on the combined Czech and Slovak celebration of 
the defeat of communism.13 
“Economic reforms were the first issue to be discussed on both the 
Slovak and Czech side. The main purpose of this step was to prove the strength 
of the new governing coalition. Czech liberal economic agenda started to be 
implemented through the policies of the central government almost immediately. 
The Communist system had required the centralization of the economic agenda. 
The economic reforms fell under the guidance of Vaclav Havel, the President of 
Czechoslovakia, and Vaclav Klaus, the Prime Minister.14 A program of large scale 
privatization began through the “coupon method”.15 “This method was based on 
                                                                                                                                 
Seiller, Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998), p. 58. 
12 Kirschbaum, Stanislav J., A History of Slovakia, The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin, (1995), p. 253 For a detailed discussion and immediatey related issues see in: 
Seiller, Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of 
theVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998), p. 58. 
13 Wolchik, Sharon, “The Repluralization of Politics in Czechoslovakia.” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, (1993), 26, 4, pp.412-431. For a detailed discussion and immediatey related 
issues see in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty 
of theVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998), p. 64. 
14 “While Petr Pithart was named the Prime Minister of the Czech regional government, Vladimir 
Mečiar became the Prime Minister of the Slovak National Council until ousted and replaced by Ján 
Čarnogurský in April 1991.” Directly taken from Wolchik, 1994; Havel, Klaus, and Pithart, 1996. 
For a detailed discussion and immediatey related issues see in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A 
State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of theVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, (1998), p. 64. 
15 Olson, David M., “Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in 
Czechoslovakia.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 26, 3, (1993), p. 304. For a detailed 
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the opportunity for individuals to buy shares in factories that the state was selling. 
However, the shares were quite cheap and foreign corporations had a special 
liking for buying the controlling interests. According to statistics compiled in the 
Czech and Slovak lands from 1990 through 1992, these economic reforms created 
a greater “shock” in the Slovak regions, especially concerning unemployment.”16 
For a comparison see Table 1.  
 
Table 1: An Economic trends in the Czech and Slovak Republics (annual 
percentage change)“17 
 
Czechoslovakia 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Inflation 10.0 57.9 11.8   
Unemployment   1.7   6.6   5.5 
GDP Growth               -0.4       -16.4  -7.2  
Industrial Growth  -3.7 -23.1 -10.0 
 
Czech Republic 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
                                                                                                                                 
discussion and immediatey related issues see in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived 
Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 
(1998), p. 64. 
16 “The differing inflation rates indicate that prices are rising faster in the Slovak areas as compared 
to the prices in the Czech regions, for two out of the three years covered. The higher inflation 
rates can be due to a number of causes, some of which include a shorter supply of Western goods 
or the less competitive nature of the goods produced in the region.” See table 1. 
17“Deutsche Bank; OMRI Daily Digest; Foreign Broadcast information service, Daily Report on 
Eastern Europe; World Bank, World Tables 1994 (John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 580-
583; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developement, OECD Economic Surveys: The 
Czech and Slovak Republics ( Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developement, 
Center for Cooperation with the Economies in Transition, 1994); Federal Statistics Office report, 
reprinted in Smena, August 19, 1992, PlanEcon Reports. Directly taken from Leff, Carol Skalnik. 
The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. Boulder: Westview. Mamatey, Victor (1997) 
„Economic Transition“, p. 183.. 
22 
Inflation 9.9 56.6 12.7 20.00 10.7 
Unemployment 1.1   4.4   2.6   3.5        3.5 
GDP Growth -1.9  -14.5 -7.1 -0.5  2.5    
Industrial Growth    -  -25.00 -10.6 -0.2          2.8   
  
Slovak Republic 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Inflation 10.3 61.2 10.0 23.2 11.7 
Unemployment 2.4 11.8 10.4 14.0        14.3 
GDP Growth -2.0 -15.8 -7.0   -4.6   4.2   
Industrial Growth -2.7  -24.9 -13.7 -13.5   6.4 
 
There is also an article “Los checoslovacos acudirán a las urnas con el 
destino del país en juego“18 by Nilda Navarrete that informs about the situation in 
Czechoslovakia before the elections for the first time in El País. It focuses on the 
voters in Czechoslovakia. The correspondent writes that Slovak voters are 
confused, even though more than 70% of people wanted to take part in 
elections.19 On the other hand, he presented an opinion that one third of Slovaks 
did not know which party to vote for, however, without producing any evidence. 
It was well-known that the result could cause the dissolution of the country 
because it was predicted that Czechs would vote for Klaus’s party and most 
Slovaks for Mečiar’s party.20 The article states, correctly, that Havel encouraged 
                                                 
18 EL País, May 25, 1992, p. 12. 
19 “No obstante, las encuestas más recientes indican que alrededor del 70% de la población se 
dispone a hacer uso de su derecho al voto los próximos días 5 y 6 de junio, comicios en los que 
podría producirse un resultado que provocara la ruptura de la federación.“ Ibid.p.12. 
20 “En la parte checa de la República, el triunfo correspondería al Partido Democrático Cívico, 
cuyo líder es el actual ministro de Finanzas, Václav Klaus, ultraconservador y padre de la llamada 
terapia de choque.En Eslovaquía probablemente ganaría el Movimiento por Eslovaquia 
Democrática, de Vladimír Mečiar, un carismático dirigente que ha pregonado a los cuatro vientos 
su intención de declarar la soberanía de Eslovaquia después de las elecciones, adoptar una 
Constitución puramente eslovaca, introducir la figura de un presidente eslovaco y convocar 
enseguida un referéndum.“ Ibid., p. 12. 
23 
the citizens to velvet divorce, which he wanted to be arranged in constitutional 
and peaceful manner.21 Interestingly, the article shows that president Havel was 
not a die-hard federalist even before the June 1992 elections but a rather 
controversial figure in the disintegration process, at a point rather well established 
among politicians and Czech and Slovak historians.22 Unlike their situation in the 
First Republic, dissatisfied Slovaks in the 1990s had the political power to express 
their displeasure with the government’s economic agenda, and they did so by 
pushing for greater autonomy to implement their own economic agenda. 
Although the Communists had not completely federalized the government, the 
Slovaks possessed enough power in the legislature for their consultation and 
consent to be mandatory in the adoption of a new constitution. As the deadline 
for the 1992 elections drew near, it was clear that most Czechs and Slovaks had 
different and incompatible visions of the future. These visions involving the 
structure of the government and its economic policies were reflected in 
specifically Czech or Slovak party platforms. 
When the population elected these parties to the parliament, it signed the 
death certificate of the common state.23 As for Havel and his attitude to 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, he was against this step of “his” country. But the 
information about the splitting up of Czechoslovakia is not truthful. In May 1992 
the election campaign had started. It was predicted that Slovaks and Czechs would 
vote for two totally different candidates.24 It was quite probable that in this case 
                                                 
21 Las ideas de Meciar parecen tan verosímiles que el presidente, Vaclav Hável, en la alocución con 
que abrió la campaña llamó a los checoslovacos a que, llegado el momento, produzcan una 
"división de terciopelo", es decir, que lo hagan de forma "constitucional y pacífica".  EL País, May 
25, 1992, p. 12. 
22 See especially Srb Vladimír and Tomáš Veselý, Rozdelení Československa, Nejvyšší představitelé 
HZDS a ODS v procesu rozdělování ČSFR: česko – slovenské soužití v letech 1989 - 1993, 
Bratislava, Karpaty – Infopress, (2004), pp. 98 –101. 
23 Leff, Carol, Skalnik., The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. Boulder, Colorado 
and London, in ”National identity and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia“, (1997), p. 131. 
24 Roháčová, Irena. Chronicles 1992, article: The election campaign has started in ČSFR. 
Bratislava: Fortuna Print spol. s. r. o., (1993), p. 54. 
24 
the dissolution would be the only viable solution. Apparently, in the prediction of 
the separation of Czechoslovakia, Havel saw no point in appealing to the people 
for velvet divorce.  
 “One of the problems in Czechoslovakia was the new constitution. The 
legislature of Czechoslovakia was inherited from the Czech and Slovak 
communist past and consisted of two Chambers: the Chamber of People and the 
Chamber of Nations. Somewhat similar to the system in the United States, one 
Chamber of People was elected on the basis of population, while the other was 
divided between the Czechs and the Slovaks (Chamber of Nations)”25. “Since a 
new constitution had to pass through both chambers, it was impossible for either 
the Czechs or the Slovaks to create a new constitution without consulting the 
representatives of the other nation. Between the elections of 1990 and 1992, the 
coalition consisting of the Public Against Violence and the Civic Forum 
attempted to adopt a new constitution. Nevertheless, no acceptable version was 
found. The members, whose ideology was against Communism and for economic 
reform and restructuring of the government in theory, did not agree on the 
paradigm of the new state. So when the parties actually tried to govern and 
address the issues, there were problems. While the Slovak members advocated 
greater autonomy for the Slovak regions, the priority of the Czechs was 
privatization.”26 The new constitution was a big problem for the new government 
because of diversity in policy of the Czech and Slovak leaders. Their ideas and 
                                                 
25 Olson, David M. “Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in 
Czechoslovakia.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies. (1993), pp. 301-314, For a detailed 
discussion and immediatey related issues see in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived 
Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 
(1998). 
26 Wolchik, Sharon. “The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia.” East 
European Politics and Societies, (1994), p. 153. For a detailed discussion and immediatey related 
issues see in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty 
of theVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998), For a detailed discussion and 
immediatey related issues see in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis 
submitted to the Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998).  
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‘dreams’ about their state were incommensurable and for this reason it was 
predicted that Czechoslovakia would break up.  
A little bit different is an article “Havel teme que el resultado de las 
elecciones en Checoslovaquia desestablice Europa Central“27 from these 
newspapers written by J. M. Martí Font. It is concentrating on Havel’s opinion on 
the result of these elections. According to this reporter Havel was afraid of the 
elections, because the result could change relations in Central Europe.28 On the 
other hand, the reporter writes about also such dummies like The Party of Friends 
of Beer (Strana priateľov piva) or Independent Erotic Initiative (Nezávislá 
erotická inicitíva) 29. Participation in the elections and high number of parties (42) 
is another theme of this article. More interesting is a part about the new 
constitution, which was promised by Vladimír Mečiar. The set down of the 
legislative power in the country and the constitution would not be approbated 
without his agreement. He wanted to set up the new constitution and announced 
the Slovak sovereignty.30 Havel is against the dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
because this step would be a bad choice for Slovakia. According to Havel, the 
                                                 
27 EL País, June 6, 1992. 
28 “Los checoslovacos acudieron ayer en gran número a las urnas en unas elecciones cuyo 
resultado, según su presidente Václav Havel, "puede desestabilizar la totalidad de Europa Central". 
Mientras que en las tierras checas -Bohemia y Moravia- todo apunta a un triunfo del Partido 
Democrático Cívico (ODS) del actual ministro de Finanzas, el ultraliberal Václav Klaus, en 
Eslovaquia parece clara la victoria del líder del Movimiento para una Eslovaquia Democrática 
(HZDS), el populista VIadimir Meciar, partidario de la ruptura en dos del país.“ Ibid. EL País, 
June 6, 1992. 
29 Roháčová, Irena. Chronicles 1992, article: The first step to the elections in ČSFR. Bratislava: 
Fortuna Print spol. s. r. o., (1993), p. 46. 
30 “Las leyes deben ser aprobadas por la Cámara del Pueblo y los Consejos de las dos Repúblicas, 
pero la Cámara de las Naciones puede paralizar el proceso legislativo, y esto es lo que sucederá si 
los nacionalistas eslovacos de Meciar consiguen un buen resultado. Meciar y los líderes más 
importantes de su partido no se presentan a la Asamblea Federal, sino al Consejo Nacional 
eslovaco, desde el que pretenden redactar una nueva Constitución eslovaca y proclamar 
directamente la soberanía, según Meciar, "sin preguntárselo a nadie, ni siquiera al presidente". 
"Estamos en nuestro derecho", dice. EL País, June 6, 1992. 
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Czech Republic would be accepted as a country of Western Europe and Slovakia 
would have still a mark of Soviet Union. In addition to this, the Slovak Republic 
was too weak to compete together with Western countries. For Czechs, according 
to this article, the main danger was a big number of political parties. However, 
both new states would be diminished in many ways.31 The reporter also mentions 
the problem with ethnic groups (Hungarians, Ukrainians, Roma) in Slovakia and 
the Czech fear of Germans.32 Otherwise this article is from the same newspapers 
as the clause above, it gives different information about Havel’s opinion on the 
dissolution of the country. Font reports that in the election take part 42 parties, 
but this fact is not truthful. Only 41 parties took part in the election. Under the 
number 20, there was not any party because of misprint. However, the fact is that 
a participation of the parties was very high.  
“Profundas grietas en la federación“33 (The Deep Divisions in the 
Federation) was a headline of an article which was published after the elections in 
Czechoslovakia. From the Table two below we can see the results of elections. Ján 
Čarnogurský and his Christian Democratic Movement were totally defeated and 
they decided to join the opposition. In accordance to this article, the victory of 
Vladimír Mečiar and his Movement of Democratic Slovakia would weaken the 
strength of the federation, social and economic situation in Slovakia would be 
                                                 
31 “La posibilidad de una victoria de Meciar lo suficientemente amplia como para forzar la división 
del país, supondría para Havel que "Eslovaquia sería percibida inmediatamente como parte del 
Este y las tierras checas como parte del Oeste". Según el presidente checo, Ia ruptura de 
Checoslovaquia sería entendida como la incapacidad de Occidente para coexistir con Oriente". Si 
esto sucede en Eslovaquia, en la República Checa el peligro está en la excesiva fragmentación del 
voto, en parte resultado de la división del Foro Cívico, que podría llevar a una situación polaca. 
Ibid.  
32 “Lo cierto es que, la división del país centroeuropeo debilitaría enormemente a las dos 
repúblicas resultantes. Eslovaquia, ya de por sí más pobre, tendría que enfrentarse con los 
problemas causados por sus minorías, tanto la húngara como la ucrania. En la república checa 
aumentarían enormemente los temores a una colonización alemana, que ya está produciéndose a 
nivel económico, permitiendo también un aumento de la presión de los sudetes alemanes que 
fueron expulsados después de la guerra y que reclaman ahora sus tierras.“ EL País, June 6, 1992.  
33 EL País, June 7, 1992. 
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worse. The good times had gone for Czechoslovakia because, according to 
Mečiar, the state would be able to affect economic matters and Klaus claimed a 
bigger part of the country for the Czech Republic. This situation was waiting for 
compromise between these two sides.34 From this article, the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia was predictable long before the citizens of this state realized what 
was going on.  
Table 2: 1992 Election Results in Czechoslovakia35    
Czech Lands         Chamber of Chamber of National            
        People    Nations  Council  
 % (seats) % (seats) % (seats) 
Civic Democratic        
Party 33.9 (48) 33.4 (37) 29.7 (76) 
Christian Democratic  
Party Left Bloc 14.3 (19) 14.5 (15) 14.1 (35) 
(Communist Party of 
 Bohemia and Moravia, DLCSFR)  
Czechoslovak Social   
Democratic Party 7.7 (10) 6.8 (6) 6.5 (16) 
Republican Party  6.5 (8) 6.4 (6) 6.3 (15) 
Christian Democratic   
Union/People’s Party 5.8 (7)  6.1 (5)  6.3 (16) 
                                                 
34 “Los electores han dejado claro lo que ya se sabía: que en las tierras checas, tradicionalmente 
más ricas y más occidentales, el peso de las brutales reformas económicas se acepta con gusto. La 
victoria de la derecha es clara y el pobre resultado de los comunistas no hace más que 
confirmarlo.En Eslovaquia, más pobre, donde las tradiciones son otras y donde el derrumbe de la 
industria pesada y de armamentos esmás notorio, sucede todo lo contrario. Meciar, un ex 
comunista reconvertido en populista, es quien mejor ejemplifica el estado de ánimo poco propicio 
al modelo de capitalismo puro preferido por sus vecinos.“ El País, June 7, 1992. 
35 Wolchik, (1994): 185; Olson, (1993): 310-312; Jiří Pehe’s “Czechoslovakia’s Political Balance 
Sheet, 1990- 1992,” RFE/RL Research Reports 1:25, (June 19, 1992): 29; “Voľby 1992,” Rešpekt, 
(June 8-14, 1992); Svobodné Slovo, (June 8, 1992); Federal Election Commission, “1992 Report 
Disk”; and Rudé Právo, (June 1992). 
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Liberal Social Union  5.9 (7) 6.1 (5) 6.5 (16) 
Civic Democratic Alliance 4.98 ---  4.8 --- 5.9 (14) 
Association for  4.9 --- 4.2 ---  5.9 (14) 
Moravia-Silesia 
Civic Movement 4.4 --- 4.7 --- 4.6 ---  
Slovakia  Chamber of Chamber of National 
 People Nations Council  
Movement for  
Democratic Slovakia  33.5 (24) 33.9 (33) 37.3 (74) 
Party of the  
Democratic Left  14.4 (10) 14.0 (13) 14.7 (39) 
Slovak National Party 9.4 (6)   9.4 (6)   7.9 (15) 
Christian Democratic   
Movement 9.0 (6)    8.8 (8)  8.9 (18) 
Coexistence/Hungarian  --- ---   ---- --- 7.42 (14) 
Christian Democratic Movement 
Coexistence/Hungarian  7.4 (5)  7.4 (7)  --- --- 
Christian Democratic Movement/Hungarian People’s Party 
Social Democratic Party  --- ---  6.1 (5)  --- --- 
Civic Democratic Party  4.0 ---  4.0 ---  4.0 --- 
Hungarian Civic Party  2.3 ---  2.4 ---  2.3 --- 
Democratic Party/   
Civic Democratic Union 3.7 --- 3.4 --- 2.3 ---  
 
New problems rose between the Czech and the Slovak coalition partners 
and they occurred in times when the political position of these two parties began 
to crystallize. The Civic Forum dissolved in 1991 with the departure of Klaus to 
form his own party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). 36 His own party was made 
                                                 
36 Wilson, Paul, “The End of the Velvet Revolution.” New York Review of Books, (1992), pp. 57-
64, in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of 
theVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998).  
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because Klaus believed that the former party was too vigourless to his economic 
reforms. Mečiar was evicted from the Public Against Violence Party, from his 
position as the Slovak National Council’s Prime Minister. He wanted to be 
independent and created the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). His 
new party was oriented towards the autonomy of Slovakia. Over twenty parties 
were spawned by Public Against Violence and the Civic Forum, and over forty 
parties participated in the 1992 elections37.  
“In the Czech Republic, the leadership contest centered on the pace and 
scope of economic reform and on the leadership capabilities of rival Czech 
parties, with Václav Klaus and his ODS winning handily. The constitutional issue 
was secondary to his agenda. In Slovakia, where the constitutional/national issue 
was quite central, Mečiar’s HZDS made its successful bid for power on a platform 
that promised the best deal for Slovakia in a more decentralized confederal 
state.”38 
Although Czech observers interpreted the HZDS electoral program as 
“nothing more nor less than the end of Czechoslovakia,”39 it was not at all a clear 
independence platform. “Voters who support the HZDS held a variety of views 
on that issue, their concern being the protection of Slovak interests. But the 
electoral debate did nothing on either side to shed light on how Czechs could be 
reconciled to Slovak preferences or vice versa. The accent was, as is not unusual 
in any electoral campaign, on general promises rather than the details of 
accomplishment.40” 
“ People knew the clear winners of the elections in both states, but they 
were incompatible in each case. Klaus saw only the economic reform and the 
                                                 
37 Olson, David M., “Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in 
Czechoslovakia.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, (1993), p. 304, in: Seiller Daniela, 
Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University, (1998). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Mlynář,Vladimír, “Volební program HZDS,” Respekt, May 11-17, (1992). 
40 Leff, Carol, Skalnik., The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. Boulder, Colorado 
and London, in ”National identity and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia“, (1997), p. 131.  
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federation was obvious for him. On the other hand, Mečiar wanted to have a 
decentralized confederation that was totally unacceptable to Klaus. People vote 
for the parties without any intentions to destroy Czechoslovakia, but they did not 
expect that the policy of this state would take such a bad direction.41” 
With the same date in El País appeared another article dealing with the 
mentioned elections. “El resultado electoral en Checoslovaquia pone en peligro la 
unidad el país“42 is about the predictions of agencies whether Mečiar got enough 
votes to split the country and statistics like in a Table 1 (see page 21). 
There is a part focused on Klaus’s policy. He wants to continue in harsh 
measurements and changes just like in introducing economic reforms. Klaus did 
not exclude the dissolution of the country, but at first he wanted to deal with a 
possible federation which would satisfy both nations. In any other case, the 
separation would be inevitable. One of the problems was how to put together two 
different ideas about the state. The question is whether this separation would end 
peacefully or with civil war. Reforms in the Czech Republic were accepted by 
people surprisingly well.43 It was different in Slovakia; traditions were the main 
part of cultural and political life in this region, so the process of reformation was 
long – lasting and Mečiar was against strict capitalism. Mečiar promised a slower 
dismantling of the old communist system. Mečiar’s policy is established on the 
“rise to power” due to “vague promises to revive the country’s heavy industries, 
especially weapons production, in order to reverse rising unemployment”44. 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 EL País, June 8, 1992, p. 2. 
43 En los territorios de la república checa (Bohemia y Moravia), los tres partidos nacidos del Foro 
Cívico y que apoyan de hecho la política conservadora practicada por Václav Klaus, consiguen 
hacerse con una mayoría que les permitirá seguir adelante con el duro programa de reformas 
económicas. Klaus, sin embargo, declaró anoche que no descarta una separación entre checos y 
eslovacos, aunque la primera carta que quiere jugar es "la construcción de una federación 
razonable" entre unos y otros. "Si no es posible, habrá que separarse de manera rápida y 
civilizada", precisó. Ibid. , p. 2. 
44 Wallace, Bruce, and Susan Morgan, “Death of a Nation.” Maclean’s, (1993) 106, pp. 2 – 20. 
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However, the leading party in the Czech Republic had the opposite 
approach. The main policy of Klaus’ ODS was based on the rapid privatization 
programs. The platform of the ODS could be summarized as: “The Czech 
government of Vaclav Klaus is committed to a radical Thatcherization of both 
our economy and our society. The prime minister told us that our task is to 
combat socialism, not primarily in its crude Soviet form but in the insidious 
creeping form poking up its horns in countries like England, Sweden, or 
Austria.”45 Moreover, Klaus promised to “take a hard line on Slovak 
nationalism”46. This step assumed that his party would not support the Slovak 
decentralization efforts. 
 
3. 1. Czechoslovakia After June 1992 Elections  
 
In the section Opinión, there is an article under title “Dudas en Praga”47 
(Doubts in Prag) briefly analyzing the course of the elections in the Czechoslovak 
Federal Republic. The articles published under the section are two kinds of 
articles. Firstly, those that are signed only represent the views of the author. 
Secondly, those that are not signed and in fact represent the official views of the 
newspaper. In Spain these articles (unsigned) are called “editoriales” (in Britain 
they are usually called “leading articles”; in the US they tend to use the same word 
“editorial”). They are written by members of the editorial board of the newspaper 
and they are the most important articles reflecting the views of the newspaper on 
current events. 
This concrete one concludes how Czechs and Slovaks would resolve the 
question of disunity. Czechs voted for Klaus, who preferred the quick advance 
                                                 
45 Kohák, Erazim, “Tattered Velvet: A Country Falls Apart.” Dissent.(1992), p. 443, in: Seiller 
Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of theVirginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998). 
46 Wilson, Paul, “The End of the Velvet Revolution.” New York Review of Books. (1992) p.58, in: 
in: Seiller Daniela, Czechoslovakia: A State of Perceived Bias, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, (1998). 
47 EL País, June 8, 1992, p. 4. 
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and the market direct economy system. On the other hand, Slovaks voted for 
Mečiar, the radical nationalist, who represented the splitting up of Czechoslovakia 
into two parts.48 
However, the conclusions in this article seem to allege that the dissolution 
would harm just the Slovak Republic, because its economy was much weaker than 
that of the Czech Republic. The question emerges as to why everybody was so 
optimistic about the Czech Republic? The other conclusions are like the policy of 
Slovakia was going back to socialism and regime of one authority. However, the 
same problem is described in the next article from El País, “La República Menos 
Favorecida”.49 
This article from the same day is trying to show the economic situation 
mainly in Slovakia.  On the one hand, there was Slovakia, small country with high 
rate of unemployment. It was caused by liquidation of arms factories and other 
industries, when lots of Slovaks lost their jobs. Very burning issue was the 
question of investments, because Slovakia got just 8% of all investments for 
Czechoslovakia. The rest was used in the Czech Republic.50 
                                                 
48 “LOS RESULTADOS de las elecciones celebradas en Checoslovaquia -las segundas desde el fin 
del sistema comunista- dejan sin resolver cuestiones fundamentales sobre el futuro del país. El 
rasgo más destacado -y preocupante- es que la disparidad entre checos y eslovacos se ha 
agrandado: entre los primeros ha triunfado el partido derechista de Václav Klaus, actual ministro 
de Finanzas, artífice de la terapia de choque para imponer la economía de mercado; en Eslovaquia 
se coloca en primer lugar, con una gran ventaja sobre los otros partidos, el que encabeza Vladimir 
Meciar, abanderado de un nacionalismo que se ha ido radicalizando a medida que crecía su 
audiencia en los mítines. Teniendo en cuenta que más de cuarenta partidos competían en la 
campaña electoral, es positivo que no se produjera una dispersión de tipo polaco, lo que hubiese 
acrecentado las dificultades para un acuerdo. Hoy dos partidos dominan claramente, cada uno en 
su república. El problema es saber si entre ellos cabe un compromiso.“ EL País, June 8, 1992, p. 4. 
49 EL País, June 8, 1992, p. 8. 
50 “El año pasado, en Eslovaquia fueron despedidos de la industria estatal 45.000 trabajadores, un 
85% de ellos de la industria de armamento. Las fábricas empobrecidas de la región este de 
Checoslovaquia están fuertemente endeudadas y no hay flujo de capital extranjero. En la república 
eslovaca se ha registrado en el último año sólo un 8% de inversión extranjera y el resto ha ido a 
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The reaction of Slovak citizens is questionable; the politicians did not 
know what the people would do in a case of dissolution. This article stated 
ironically that people were more interested in football than in the situation in the 
state.51 
These two articles are from the same day and printed in the same 
newspapers. They both focus on the economic situation in the state. According to 
the facts, the unemployment in Slovakia was really high and people had big 
problems with finding a job. (see Table 1 on page 21 ). 
“The interaction of the components of the triple transition – politics, 
economics and identity – was thus part of the dynamics by which the state fell 
apart. This was especially true since the Czech and Slovak differences in 
conception of state organization were paralleled by differences in emphasis 
regarding the economic agenda. Most Czech politicians were inclined to insist on 
the logic of a centrally coordinated grand strategy of rapid marketization.” 52  
“Yet the dislocations of economic change hit Slovakia proportionally 
much harder. The only economic index on which the Slovaks ranked higher than 
Czechs in 1992 seemed to be unemployment. Hence Slovak public opinion and 
Slovak leaders were more skeptical of the radical reform program associated with 
federal Finance Minister (later Czech Prime Minister) Klaus. Support for these 
reforms in the eve of the 1992 election registered at 49% in the Czech Republic 
but only 28% in Slovakia”.53 
“Slovak economic hardship and the resulting resistance to economic 
reform only made a looser federation doubly attractive, since it would mean 
                                                 
51 “La semana pasada, sin embargo, se inició una fiesta espontánea con vítores y banderas cuando 
el equipo nacional eslovaco ganó por 3-0 a los semifinalistas checos, convirtiéndose así en los 
campeones nacionales.“ Ibid., p. 8. 
52 Directly quoted from Leff, Carol Skalnik, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, 
in chapter ”National identity and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia“ Boulder, Colorado and 
London: Westview Press (1997), p.136. 
53 Directly quoted from Leff, Carol Skalnik, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, 
in chapter ”National identity and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia“ Boulder, Colorado and 
London: Westview Press (1997), p.136. 
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greater control over the character and pace of economic reform in Slovakia. As it 
were, many Slovak saw themselves as victims of shock therapy – all shock and no 
therapy, as the saying went in the region. Many Czechs officially thought this 
attitude shortsighted and felt the Slovaks were disregarding the benefits of both 
federal subsides and stable economic policy.”54 “The prospect of a separate Slovak 
economic programme, in turn, appalled many Czech officials, who envisaged the 
nightmarish prospect of two simultaneous but conflicting economic transitions in 
course on the territory of a single state. “We cannot have two different reforms in 
a single economy!” protested the federal minister for strategic planning55. This 
unwelcome possibility only reinforced Czech insistence on preserving real 
authority at the centre56.” 
“Rétorica Hecha Realidad”57 is the headline of an article concerning the 
fact that Mečiar’s words are turning into the reality and it is very probable that 
Czechoslovakia will be separated. The leader of HZDS urges the sovereignty of 
Slovakia and wants the new government to be created. However, this government 
will be just temporal; it will last until the next referendum.58 The presidential 
                                                 
54 Directly quoted from Josef Kotrba and Karel Kríž. „Cui Bono? The Common State in 
Economic Perspective,“East European Reporter 5:5 (September – October 1992): 3-6. In: Ibid., 
Directly quoted from Leff, Carol Skalnik, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, 
in chapter ”National identity and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia“ Boulder, Colorado and 
London: Westview Press (1997), p.136. 
55 Directly quoted from Hospodářske noviny, May 2, 1991, p.4, reprinted in FBIS-EEU-91-091, 
May 10, 1991, p.9 In: Ibid., p.136 
56 Directly quoted from Leff, Carol Skalnik, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, 
Boulder, Colorado and London: Westview Press, (1997) „National identity and the disintegration 
of Czechoslovakia“, p.136. 
57 EL País, June 10, 1992, p. 9. 
58 “La retórica electoral del líder nacionalista Vladímir Meciar sobre la disolución del Estado 
checoslovaco comienza a hacerse realidad. Según el comunicado elaborado ayer por el 
Movimiento para una Eslovaquia Democrática (HZDS), tras la entrevista celebrada con Václav 
Klaus, Meciar insiste en proclamar la soberanía y promueve la idea de crear un Gobierno 
provisional federal que funcione hasta la realización de sendos referendos sobre la independencia 
en las repúblicas checa y eslovaca, organizados por los respectivos Parlamentos nacionales. El 
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elections are approaching and according to this article, the Slovaks will not mind 
to have the Czech president again. Despite this fact, Havel will not be supported 
by HZDS.  
Very interesting are the articles from La Vanguardia from their reporter 
Ricardo Estarriol. Among them there is an item “La División de 
Checoslovaquia”59 (Division of Czechoslovakia) which analyzes the situation in 
Czechoslovakia from another point of view because the author tries to show the 
situation objectively (see chapter newspapers, La Vanguardia). It refers to the 
Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Josef Zeleniec who sees the split-up of the 
country endorsed by parliament as a positive action. The Czech Republic has the 
most important foreign relations with Slovakia. Zeleniec hopes that after the split-
up, the relations between these two countries would be even better or remain the 
same and only the names of the two republics will change. Another task is the 
matter of duties and the currency in both states.60 The disadvantage for Slovakia is 
the fact, except inter alia, that this state is considered not just to be small but also 
of any interests for western countries. Zeleniec makes comments also on the topic 
that the future of the Visegrad triangle depends on the development of the Czech 
– Slovak relations.61 Zeleniec proclaims that the separation of two countries was 
legally correct and compares the process of separation of Czechoslovakia to a 
married couple, where the wife already with packed luggage in her hands decides 
to leave and her husband cannot stop her. The “family referendum” among 
                                                                                                                                 
referéndum, dice el comunicado, será una segunda etapa después de la proclamación de soberanía 
en Eslovaquia y la creación de una nueva Constitución nacional.“ EL País, June 10, 1992, p. 9. 
59La Vanguardia, December 29, 1992, p. 7. 
60 “El ministro checo reconoce que uno de los aspectos más importantes de las aspectos mas 
impotantes de las relaciónes exteriores de la República Checa lo constituirán sus relaciones con 
Eslovaquia. Espera que en el futuro inmediato, gracias a toda una red de tratados (especialmente la 
unión aduanera) firmados ya antes de la independencia por ambas republicas, para los socios y 
hombres de negocios extranjeros las cosas continuén más o menos como antés. ... Zeleniec 
recuerda que se ha acordado mantener una moneda comun, pero también tiene conciencia de que 
una moneda común sólo será posible si se coordina la politica monetária“ Ibid., p. 7. 
61 El futuro del “triángulo de Vishegrad“ (sistema de cooperación política Polonia-Checoslova-
quia-Hungría) dependerá de las relaciones checo – eslovacas. Ibid., p. 7. 
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children would be useless because the wife’s luggage is already packed.62 Another 
question are the relations between the Czech Republic and Germany, Germans do 
not want to renew the commercial treats.63 
Firm look into the problem of dissolution is offered in the article “El fin 
de Czechoslovaquia es Fruto de la Tropeza de la Clase política”.64 (The end of 
Czechoslovakia as a result of clumsy politicians). According to Estarriol, 
Czechoslovakia is just an artificial country consisting of two different nations. 
Further he refers to the process of dissolution which is happening in a peaceful 
manner and is not interesting for most of the people. Estarriol proclaims that 
Mečiar wanted the country to break up and Klaus supported him unintentionally 
all the time. Estarriol is quoting Klaus saying that he doesn´t want to rule a 
country where one of the parties could betray him anytime.65 Estarriol also 
provides with a table which shows the statistics on redistribution of money66 while 
Czechs were given 550 million dollars from foreign investments, Slovakia just got 
150 million dollars. Another example of “oppression” from the Czech side to 
which Estarriol is as follows: “But there were only two central committees: a 
federal one and a Slovak one (the latter subordinated, obviously, to the central 
committee of the federation), while the role that would have been played by a 
Czech central committee was done by the central committeee of the federation. 
The disparity is very clear.67 So, the criticism of Estarriol is that the Federal 
                                                 
62 “...puesto que en la extinta Checoslovaquia existe uná situacíon semejante a la de una familia en 
la que la mujer está dispuesta a separarse y está con las maletas an la mano: “Un reférendum 
familiar entre los hijos para evitar el divorcio no serviriá de nada si lamujer se empeńa en 
separarse.Y este es nuestro caso...“ Ibid., p. 7. 
63 El segundo centro de gravedad de la política exterior checa serán las relaciones con Alemania, de 
donde se espera que llegue una buena parte de las inversiones que necesitan los países checos. 
64 La Vanguardia, December 31, 1992, p. 10. 
65 Klaus se sentia inseguro:“ No puedo gobernar un país sobre la base de poderes que una de las 
partes puede retirarme en cualquier momento, soliá decir“. Ibid., p. 10. 
66 Ibid., p. 10. 
67 ...-Pero soló habiá dos comités centrales: uno federal y otro eslovaco (subordinado naturalmente 
al comité central de la federación), mientras que el papel de lo que hubiera tenido que ser un 
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Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Comunist Party was not really 
representing the interests of the Federation but only of the Czech part of 
Czechoslovakia and the “Slovak Central Committee” was clearly subordinated to 
that Federal Central Committee. 
The Article “El Eslovaco Mečiar a Favor de la Cohabitación Con los 
Checos”68 (The Slovak Mečiar wants a single state with the Czechs) is for deals 
with the declaration of the Slovak Government leader Vladimír Mečiar that he is 
keeping with the cohabitation of the Czechs and Slovaks in the confederation. 
The results of the referendum, according to Mečiar, would be a long lasting 
decision of the nation.69 This also means that most of the Czechs want the 
separation because the weak economy of Slovakia is taking the Czech Republic 
down. According to the Czech leaders, Czechoslovakia should be a federation, 
but Slovaks strongly insist on the confederation. 
“The state deteriorated rapidly, after the elections when people voted for 
totally different parties. The ODSKDS alliance decided not to deliberate with 
Slovak HZDS for many reasons. For example, Klaus was against the system that 
the state would have opposite economy and because the Slovaks insisted in their 
confederal adjustment of the state. Secondly, the Czechs view Slovakia as an 
economic drag”70. In case that the Czechs would not be limited by Slovakia, they 
could invest in their own future. They were confident that they could enter the 
European Union faster if they were free without any duty to “take care” of 
                                                                                                                                 
comité central checo era desempeńado por el comité central de la federación. La disparidad salta 
a la vista. Ibid., p. 10. 
68 EL País, June 13, 1992. 
69 VIadímir Meciar, líder del Movimiento para una Eslovaquia Democrática (HZDS), vencedor en 
la parte eslovaca de las recientes elecciones celebradas en Checoslovaquia, se mostró ayer a favor 
de una cohabitación entre checos y eslovacos en el seno de una confederación y abogó por la 
celebración de un referéndum que suponga "una decisión duradera" para Checoslovaquia. EL País, 
June 13 1992. 
70 Morrison, David C. 1993. “Like It or Not, Slovaks are on Their Own.” National Journal. 25,4, 
(1993), p. 202. 
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Slovakia. However, the compromise would solve this problem, but this chance 
was out of the question. 
The article “Un Triste Recuerdo”71 (A Sad Recollection) written by Ilona 
Kovaríková resembles to more or less a brief outline of history of the 
Czechoslovak Republic seen only from one side. As for an example in the 
following clause, where Kovaríkova mentions that the First Republic helped the 
Slovaks to develop in cultural and social way and Slovak brothers joined 
Czechoslovakia by means of Martin´s declaration.72 The declaration of the Slovak 
National council was an expression of will to separate from the old Kingdom of 
Hungary and create a common state with the Czechs.73 Ilona Kovaríková 
apparently relates to the inter-war period when Slovakia became part of the 
Czechoslovak Republic which was founded on 28 and 30 October 1918.74 This 
state was born due to changes among the powers caused by the First World War. 
It was incorporated into the system of international relations of post-war Europe 
as required by the victorious allied great powers. Slovak politicians saw in the 
union with the Czechs a promising solution advantageous for both sides. The new 
                                                 
71 EL País, June 21 1992, p. 3. 
72“La primera República checoslovaca, como se denomina al Estado que existió desde 1918 hasta 
1939, brindó un amplio espacio a los hermanos eslovacos para que se emancipasen cultural y 
socialmente y que, por su propia voluntad, se adhirieron a Checoslovaquia a través de la 
declaración de Martín.” EL País, June 21, 1992, p.3,…Reffering to the declaration in Martin … 30 
October- The Slovak National Council was founded at an assembly in Martin. It declared its 
support for the new state by accepting the Declaration of the Slovaka Nation. For an extended 
discussion and related issues see in Škvarna Dušan, Lexikón Slovenských dejín, SPN, (1997), pp. 
127-129. 
73 Mannová Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický ústav 
SAV, Bratislava, (2000), p. 240. 
74 On 28 October Edvard Beneš negotiated in Geneva with a delegation of the Czecho-Slovak 
National Committee, led by its president, Karol Kramář. They agreed that Czecho-Slovakia would 
be a republic and Masaryk would be a president . A large demonstration in Prague approved the 
proaclamation of an independent Czecho-Slovakia. That evening, the national commitee that led 
the movement passed the first law concerning the foundation of Czecho-slovakia. Vavro Šrobár 
signed it on behalf of the Slovaks. Ibid., p. 127. 
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state entity relieved the Slovaks of the pressure of Magyarization75 of the 
preceding decades, introduced a parliamentary democracy, raised the level of 
education of the population, stimulated the development of science and the arts, 
and made public events accessible to the citizens.76 However, the implementation 
of this decision was not simple. The Slovak National Council did not have military 
units, Slovakia national councils and armed militias formed in towns and villages 
struggled for power with officials, military units and policemen, who obeyed only 
the Budapest government. In some parts of Slovakia, like in many parts of the 
disintegrating Monarchy, anarchy prevailed. Armed soldiers, returning from the 
front, supported spontaneous uprisings in villages and small towns.77  
Up to 1918 Slovakia was not a separate administrative unit, and so did not 
have precisely defined frontiers. In the north and west, there were the historic 
frontiers of the Kingdom of Hungary with the Austrian provinces of the Empire, 
in the east an administrative boundary was defined in 1919, between Slovakia and 
Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which had been joined to Czechoslovakia. The frontier 
with Hungary to the south was confirmed only after prolonged negotiations at the 
Paris Peace Conference, by the Treaty of Trianon. 78  
                                                 
75 Attempts to make Magyars of the non-Magyar population of the Kingdom of Hungary. 
Although it contained elements of natural assimilation (spontaneity, voluntary acceptance), it was 
dominated by the resolute use of force. This form of national suppression accompanied the 
transformation of the Kingdom of Hungary from a state of estates into a modern state. See in 
Škvarna Dušan, Lexikón Slovenských dejín, SPN, (1997), pp. 245-246. 
76 See in Škvarna Dušan, Lexikón Slovenských dejín, SPN, (1997), pp. 127-129. 
77 Károlyi´s government tried to keep Slovakia within the framework of Hungary with a promise 
of autonomy, but the Prague government acted energetically. Slovak members were coopted into 
the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in November 1918 and the first provisional 
governement of Slovakia began its activity in western Slovakia on 6 th November Cf. 77 Mannová 
Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický ústav SAV, 
Bratislava, (2000), p. 243. 
78 Signed on 4th June 1920 in the Grand Trianon Palace near Paris. Edvard Beneš and Štefan 
Osuský signed for the Czecho-Slovak state, while August Benárd and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár signed 
it for Hungary. It definitively established the state borders of Hungary and obliged it to respect the 
rights of national minorities. For Hungary tiranon meant partial military and financial limitations. 
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In comparison to Slovak society, the Czech society had a better possibility 
to develop than the Slovaks in the Kigdom of Hungary. As a result, the Czechs 
entered the new state with well organized political parties, voluntary associations, 
managing elites, a complete Czech education system up to university level and a 
tradition of Czech statehood. The majority of Czech members of the 
Constitutional Assembly already had years of experience in the Vienna Parliament 
r in the provincial councils. Among the 54 Slovak members, only 6 had such 
experience and mostly only very briefly. Slovakia also lacked politically and 
economically experienced and leading personalities.79  
Back to the author´s one - sided view of this period in the above article, it 
can be said that Slovaks were not recognized as a distinct nation and the new state 
was built upon the principle of centralism. Slovak statehood did not exist, only 
Czechoslovak statehood existed. But on the other hand, especially the origin of 
Czechoslovakia undoubtedly accelerated the development of Slovak society. In 
particular, the democratic system created favorable conditions for this.  
Among other facts in the article, it is also mentioned that the Slovak 
Republic came to existence in 1939 and became the ally of Hitler´s Germany.80 
Practically, this indicates that Slovakia is to blame for collaborating with German 
Nazis. After all, the article concludes with a criticism of a Slovak commemoration 
of president Tiso. 
                                                                                                                                 
The Hungarian Parliament ratified the treaty but no more significant political force in Hungary 
was reconciled to the break-up of the old Hungarian state and the union of large parts of its teritoy 
with Yugoslavia, Austria,Rumania and Czechoslovakia. C.f. in Škvarna Dušan, Lexikón 
Slovenských dejín, SPN, (1997), p. 133. 
79 General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, who could have played an imporatant role in the liberation 
struggle, was killed in an air crash in May 1919, when returning to his homeland. The cause of 
Šefánik´s death still remains mysterious. For a detailed discussion and immediatey related issues 
see in: Mannová Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický 
ústav SAV, Bratislava, (2000) p. 244. 
80 En marzo de 1939, los eslovacos proclamaron su Estado independiente, aliado de Alemania de 
Hitler. De esta manera Eslovaquia logró formar su primer y hasta ahora último Estado 
independiente, entre cuyos méritos figuró el envío a los campos de concentración alemanes a más 
de 80.000 judíos. Ibid., p. 3. 
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The Czechs were blaming Slovaks for what they did; they had not done it 
on purpose.81 The historical facts show that the Sudeten Germans were finally 
granted their ultimate demand with the Munich Agreement82 in September 1938. 
Germany annexed the Sudetenland and Hungary absorbed Southern Slovakia. 
The rest of the state was left practically defenceless in the face of further German 
expansion. It is a sad fact of that time, that as a consequence of this significant 
weakening of the power of the Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak statehood was able 
to be implemented in the form of autonomy (6 October 1938). Germany did not 
have an interest in the further existence of the Czecho-Slovak state, even if it was 
transformed according to its own conception. It was interested in Czechia becoming a 
part of Germany. With this as a goal, Germany supported those Slovak politicians who 
sought to create an independent Slovak state. The history of this epoch concluded 
with the emergence of the Slovak state on 14 March 1939.83 Germany had urged 
                                                 
81 The Anschluss of Austria on 12 th March 1938 substantially worsened the strategic position of 
Czechoslovakia. The German frontier was shifted to the suburbs of Bratislava, and the inactivity 
of the great powers was a bad sign. In the Anschluss of Austria, Hitler used his agency there. In 
Czechoslovakia, Henlein´s Sudeten German party played a similar role. It deliberately made 
continual increases in its demands. For a detailed discussion and immediatey related issues see in: 
Mannová Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický ústav 
SAV, Bratislava, (2000), pp. 256-257.  
82 An agreement signed on 29 th September 1938 among the great powers concerning the German 
annexation of the territory of the Czechoslovak state occupied predominantly by a German 
minority. Its acceptance resulted from the negotiations of the Czechoslovak government with 
representatives of the German national minority and international negotations between Adolf 
Hitler and the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain in Berchtesgaden and Bad 
Godespeberg. In the negotiations Germany clearly declared itself for the annexation to its own 
territory of the part of the Czech state occupied by the German minority. Germany, Italy, Great 
Britain and France, without the participation of Czechoslovak representatives, dictated 
Czechoslovakia´s new frontiers with Germany, which made the state defenceless against Hitler. At 
the same time, they dictated a dealine for Czechoslovakia to agree new frontiers with Poland and 
Hungary. For a detailed discussion and immediatey related issues see in: Škvarna Dušan, Lexikón 
Slovenských dejín, SPN, (1997), p. 253. 
83 The Slovak assembly convened in Bratislava. The assembly firts accepted the resignation of the 
government of Karol Sidor. Jozef Tiso acquainted the deputies with the negotations in Berlin. 
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the establishment of the Slovak state, so that it could achieve the collapse of the 
Czecho-Slovak state from within. This did not mean, however, that the idea of 
the Slovak state was foreign to Slovakia or imposed from outside. 
For the Slovaks the Munich Agreement was something like an offence 
from the government side and the desire for autonomy became even stronger84. 
“A new government and assembly were established, autonomous in everything 
except defence, foreign policy, and national finances” 85. Good point was that the 
federal system was tested before the destruction. However, the Czechs were afraid 
of a situation like that, the granting of independence to the German minority 
resulted in the federalization of the republic. 
“The Slovak fear before the “Hungarian threat” – i.e. that a fully 
autonomous Slovak state resulting from the separation of Czechoslovakia might 
be an easy prey for Budapest for lack of protection by the Nazis – led them to 
controlling their dreams and compromise with supporting a federalized common 
Czech and Slovak state.86” 
 “Josef Tiso, the leader of the Slovak People’s Party after Hlinka died, had 
to agree with the disintegration of the state. For the Czechs it was an irreversible 
step and an offence from the Slovaks. However, the Slovak leader had no other 
choice. Tiso was in Germany on March 13, 1939 for a meeting with Hitler. There 
an ultimatum was addressed to Tiso: “Either Slovakia would declare its 
independence and become Germany’s ally, or else it would refuse - an act which 
                                                                                                                                 
After his presentation the 57 deputies present voted by acclamation (by standing up in their places) 
on the question: „ Do you agree with the declaration of an independent Slovak state? Shortly after 
noon, all of the deputies present voted in the affirmative. The adoption of a law concerning an 
independent Slovak state followed. Following this, the presidium of the Slovak assembly named 
the first government of the Slovak state. Jozef Tiso became its prime minister. After the situation 
in Slovakia was clarified, Adolf Hitler approved the request of František Chvalkovský, the Czech- 
Slovak foreign minister, that negotiations between Hitler and Hácha take place in Berlin. Emil 
Hácha departed for Berlin. C.f. Škvarna Dušan, Lexikón Slovenských dejín, SPN, (1997), p. 144. 
84 Wallace, William V., Czechoslovakia. Boulder: Westview (1976), p. 176. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Mannová Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický ústav 
SAV, Bratislava, (2000), pp. 257-258. 
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would be a reason for the Reich’s leaving Hungary’s hands free to reconquer the 
former territory of the crown of Saint Stephan.” 87 Tiso was persuaded to declare 
Slovakia’s independence on March 14, 1939. On March 15, Emil Hácha88, sent the 
troops into Slovakia and this was an opportunity for Hitler to rush into the Czech 
Lands and make of them the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia89. The 
separation of Czechs and Slovaks lasted until the end of WW II. Czechs were 
under total German control while the Slovaks “enjoy themselves” theoretically an 
“independent” status.90 
“Despite the undeniably strong Nazi influence, Slovak leaders had been 
able to work on developing “autonomous” national programs. The new state 
adopted policies that led to separation from the Czech supremacy, satisfying the 
Catholic majority, and helped progressing Slovak cultural life. One of the first 
decisions was to get rid of the Czechs in their administration and replace them by 
Slovaks91.”  
“Besides eliminating the Czechs’ physical presence, their ideas were also 
banished. It was only natural that political socialization following this 
development had a clearly nationalist character. Both the media and the system of 
education were now systematically tuned to projecting into a difficult and 
menacing present the genuine and glorious past: a new identity based on language, 
                                                 
87 Mikus, Joseph A, Slovakia: A Political History: 1918-1950. Milwaukee: Marquette UP, (1963), p. 
76. 
88 “The president of Czechoslovakia after Beneš went into exile,” see in Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. , 
A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, (1995), p. 182. 
89 Taborsky, Edward “Tragedy, Triumph and Tragedy: Czechoslovakia 1938-1948.” Pp 113-134 in 
Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Ages Past, eds. Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes. New York: 
Columbia UP (1979).  
90 Mannová Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický ústav 
SAV, Bratislava, (2000), p.257. 
91 Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. , A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin, (1995) pp. 186-188. 
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culture and history – all Slovak. This new Slovak identity was growing and 
replacing the Czechoslovak idea.”92 
“Meanwhile, exiled Benes kept struggling to help the idea of a common 
Czechoslovak identity survive. However, his right to form a Czechoslovak 
government in exile not having been initially recognized, he has been obliged to 
resign as president. It was now an open question whether he still had the right to 
represent decisions taken by others in the state. However, in late 1939 the Allies 
recognized his right to speak for the “Czechoslovak peoples”, though there was 
no mention whatsoever of a “Czechoslovak state”93. Once again, Beneš won the 
right to speak on behalf of the Slovaks.94” 
From the historical point of view it looks like the Slovaks wanted 
autonomy of their state so much that they forgot on their neighbors Czechs and 
left them alone. This feeling of having been betrayed by the Slovaks, of their 
unreliability in state affairs nourished in Czech society, as it was significantly 
manifested in the controversies and considerations about the position of Slovakia 
in the renewed republic during the war and after it, with reverbations until 
dissolution in 1992. Nonetheless, it should be remarked that the Slovak nation 
demonstrated it was able to build its own state in extraordinarily unfavorable 
circumstances. 
The article “Checos, eslovacos... y Centroeuropa“95 refers, among other 
things, to the emerging problems with the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, 
addressing their concerns of being in a more difficult situation, if Czechoslovakia 
                                                 
92 Mannová Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický ústav 
SAV, Bratislava, (2000), p.246. 
93 Taborsky, Edward. 1979. “Tragedy, Triumph and Tragedy: Czechoslovakia 1938-1948.” Pp 113-
134 in Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Ages Past, eds. Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes. New York: 
Columbia UP. 
94 Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. , A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin, (1995) pp. 194-204. 
95 EL País, June 14, p. 6. 
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desintegrates and the leaders of HZDS limit their cultural and linguistic rights.96 
The quotation must be referenced to the language bill proposed in 1990 by the 
Matica Slovenská (Slovak national organization) which sought the introduction of 
a sole official language in the Slovak republic to much oppostion of the political 
leaders of the Hungarian minority. In districts where the Hungarian minority 
made up at least 20 per cent of the population it was possible to use Hungarian in 
official correspondence. The bill was accompanied by much controversy and 
found massive support especially among Slovak „nationalist“students who took 
part in an extensive demonstrations orchestrated by Matica Slovenská and its 
political supporters including the SNS from 25 October to 19 November.  
Ultimately, this bill was dismissed in favor of the government bill, which 
was passed by the Slovak National Council as Act No. 428/1991 Zb.. Under that 
Act, Slovak was declared the offical language in Slovakia, however other languages 
such as Czech could also be used for offical purposes, in addition to languages of 
minorities comprising at least 20% municipal or town population.97  
As for the article’s reference to „la iniciativa de Havel de una alianzia entre 
Checoslovaquia, Polonia y Hungria“98 as being „promising“, it should be noted 
                                                 
96 “La iniciativa de Havel de una alianzia entre Checoslovaquia, Polonia y Hungria fue 
prometodora. Podrá mantenerse en la nueva situación surgida an Czechoslovaquia? Además, con 
una Eslovaquia soberana se agudizará la amenaza a la minoria hungara (600 000 persónas) a la que 
el nacionalismo eslovaco niega el derecho incluso a su lengua propia. Puede surgir ahí un nuevo 
foco de conflicto. Mientras se retrasa la cración de estructuras capaces de asegurar una protección 
real de las minorías, avanzan los fenomenos de instabilidad en la zona, cargados de peligro.” EL 
País, June 14, 1992, p. 6.  
97 The Matica Slovenská bill initiative and the accompanying events are extensively covered in Jan 
Rychlík, Rozpad Československa. Česko-slovenské vzťahy 1989-1992 (Bratislava 2002) 142-144. As 
for Mečiar’s involvement in the language bill controversy, he strongly advocated the government’s 
bill; especially notorious in this context was his televised appearance, in which he publicly attacked 
Jozef Markuš, the president of Matica Slovenská, for his nationalism. For this episode, see also the 
chapter „Constitutional Discussions“ in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia. The 
Struggle for Survival (London 1995), p. 258. 
98 EL País, June 14, 1992, p. 6.  
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that the alliance of the three countries was already formed in 1991 in the 
Hungarian town of Visegrad (the Visegrad Three), and was later automatically 
extended to include the newly independent Slovak Republic, upon its 
establishment, in 1993, to become known as the Visegrad Four, a form, in which 
it continues to exist until present times.99 
The above mentioned article might be also a reaction on the meeting held 
in June 19 -20, between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Civic 
Democratic Party in Bratislava. There they agreed to reduce the number of 
ministries in the federal government and to parity in the number of ministries they 
filled. Moreover, the federal government was to understand its mandate as 
temporary.100 
This meeting was the last of four meetings101, where the leaders of parties 
tried to find a opinions were totally different102. The second problem discussed 
was the question of the federal government. The result of the fourth meeting was 
the signing of a political agreement and the agreement on a federal government. 
The political agreement had nine points, in which the suggestions of both sides 
were summarized.103 
To sum up, this meeting accepted the existence of the Czechoslovak 
Federal Republic, but on the other hand, it did not exclude the extinction of this 
state in the future. 
The author of “La Unidad De Europa”104 (Unity of Europe) is very 
surprised by the results of the referendum in Denmark. He writes about the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
99 Kováč Dušan, Dejiny  Slovenska, Nakladatelství Lidové Noviny (1998), p. 315. 
100 Škvarna Dušan et al.,Lexikón Slovenských dejín, SPN, Bratislava (1997), p. 172.  
101 The first meeting was held in Brno in June 8 – 8; the second in Prague in June 11; the third in 
Prague again in June 17; and the last – fourth was held in Bratislava in June 19 – 20. Ibid., p.172. 
102 ODS insisted on the federal republic with international – legal personality and HZDS wanted 
to have a confederation with international – legal personality of both republics.Ibid., p. 172.  
103 Roháčová, Irena, Chronicles 1992, article: “ČSFR stays on the map of Europe so far“. 
Bratislava: Fortuna Print spol. s. r. o., 1993, p. 65. 
104 EL País, June 23, 1992, p. 9. 
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European Union and the fact that Europe is crumbling into pieces and 
Czechoslovakia is part of this disintegration.105 
In this article, Fernandéz is reacting to the referendum in Denmark in 
June 2. The result of this referendum was that the citizens of Denmark voted 
against the adoption of the Maastricht agreement106. This result was regarded by 
politicians and commentators as a “punch against the European integration”. The 
main aim of the Maastricht agreement is united currency, economic union and the 
unique European citizenship. The disagreement of Danish citizens would 
stimulate the new referendum or this state would not be a part of European 
Union. 107 
An article of Václav Havel has a headline “La Impotencia de los 
Poderosos.” (Power of the Powerless).108 It is referred to Havel´s seminal 
theoretical work describing east European dissidence under communism.109 It is 
about the situation in Czechoslovakia after Communism. According to this clause, 
socialism destroyed the idea of pluralism of political parties as well as the strength 
and function of opposition in parliament. On the other hand, opposition was as 
for this article set in the parliament just for a garnish. Politicians were replaced by 
                                                 
105“ Más que el sí o el no de los daneses, me ha sorprendido la convocatoria del referéndum. 
Porque, vamos a ver: si los Gobiernos de los países que componen la Comunidad Europea están 
suficientemente legitimados por el voto de sus electores y no basan sus decisiones en apresuradas 
ocurrencias, ¿por qué no se les deja gobernar en paz, aunque fiscalizada siempre su gestión por los 
Parlamentos respectivos?“ Ibid., p. 9. 
106 The result of referendum was very close. The citizens of Denmark voted against the ratification 
in 50, 7% an for the ratification in 49,3%. In Roháčová, Irena, Chronicles 1992, article: “United 
Europe without Denmark?.“. Bratislava: Fortuna Print spol. s. r. o., (1993), p. 63. 
107 Roháčová, Irena, Chronicles 1992, article: “United Europe without Denmark?.“. Bratislava: 
Fortuna Print spol. s. r. o., (1993), p. 63. 
108 EL País, June 24, 1992, p. 8. 
109 C.f., Havel´s most important essay The Power of the Powerless was written in October 1978. It is 
Havel´s statement of who he is, what dissidence means, what he sees as worthwhile in the world 
and what he thinks trivial or threatenig. See in Shepherd Robin H.E., Czechoslovakia, The Velvet 
Revolutution And Beyond, Great Britain, USA, (2000). 
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“figureheads” and the power was concentrated just in the center.110 The groups of 
intellectuals tried to fight against socialism and were open for new dares. It was 
natural that the group of intellectuals took a part in revolution in 1989. These 
dissidents took power after the year 1989 and wanted to have a democratic state. 
However, they were just rebels and intellectuals desiring freedom.111 
The memorable year 1989 brought unheard of new words into the 
vocabulary the peoples of the soviet satellite states: glasnost and perestroika haunted 
the imagination and the wildest dreams of their peoples and Gorbachev’s reforms 
symbolize the turning point for the renaissance of political life in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The people of Czechoslovakia could not remain indifferent to 
this mighty wave washing away the communist system united in their wish to 
reform.112 However, this unity was short lived: democratic consensus collapsed 
soon after the downfall of the government in 1989 owing to the fact that Czechs 
condemned the communist system because it lacked political and economic 
freedom, whereas the Slovaks sought after religious freedom and broader 
federalization of the state. The turbulent past made a common future impossible. 
                                                 
110 “El sistema totalitario de tipo comunista, tal como se desarrolló en la ex Unión Soviética y 
como más tarde fue impuesto a todos los países de la esfera del poder soviético, no sólo destruyó 
el pluralismo político y los elementos o posibilidades de una oposición política auténtica, sino que, 
de hecho, aniquiló la política como esfera de actividades concretas del hombre. El poder se 
concentró gradualmente en las manos de una burocracia dirigida de un modo estrictamente 
centralista y los políticos fueron siendo sustituidos por simples administradores, ejecutores 
obedientes de una voluntad central .“ Ibid., p. 8. 
111 De vez en cuando llegaban incluso a rebelarse capas más amplias de ciudadanos, pero al frente 
de esas insurrecciones, siempre reprimidas, solían estar nuevamente los intelectuales, quienes 
también eran sus inspiradores ideológicos.Por tanto, cuando en 1989 el sistema totalitario empezó 
a desmoronarse en todos los países del bloque soviético y especialmente cuando cayó en avalancha 
en los países de Europa Central y Oriental, era natural que la resistencia popular fuera encabezada 
por numerosos intelectuales, generalmente conocidos gracias a sus anteriores críticas al régimen, y 
que el movimiento revolucionario terminara elevando a muchos de ellos a los cargos más altos del 
Estado. Ibid., p. 8.  
112 Karen Henderson, Neil Robinson, Post- Communist Politics, An Introduction, Prentice Hall 
Europe, Great Britain, (1997), pp. 67-68. 
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The priority which the communist rulers in Slovakia had given to 
uncompetitive and inefficient industrial sectors, nailing the economy in total 
dependency on imports from the Soviet Union (mines, petrochemicals, paper 
production, energy and weapons) led to an inevitable dead end after the latter’s 
dissolution. There was no stepping stone for competing in world markets – and 
the negative effect was much more painful for the Slovak than for the Czech 
economy. President Havel decided to abolish the weapon industry symbolizing 
the dark past. However, the decisions being taken in Prague imposed a non-
Slovak oriented program of action at a pace too fast for a small country to 
follow.113 
Newborn Czech capitalism was a traumatic experience for Slovaks. 
History tends to repeat itself – as in the case of the First Republic, what for the 
Czechs meant the short and even way to a prosperous future was seen by the 
Slovaks as one more attempted negation of their long sought after freedom.114 
 
3. 2. Czechoslovakia After 1993 Dissolution  
 
Many articles from Spanish newspapers addressed the situation in the first 
days of the new Republics. One of them, “La Triste Resaca De Aňo Nuevo”115 
describes the celebrations of the end of the old and the beginning of the New 
Year. The author depicts this rather sad occasion, which the citizens don’t like. 
Havel is likely to become the new Czech president. The author remarks that even 
if Havel is not elected President, he will be a great support for the country in the 
times to come. The politicians did not manage to fill the citizens with enthusiasm 
for new states. Havel’s opponent Klaus opposes the idea of Havel’s presidency; 
saying he should mind his own business and keep on writing poetry`116. 
                                                 
113 Ibid., pp. 232-240. 
114 Mannová Elena, A Concise History of Slovakia, Studia Historica Slovaca XXI, Historický ústav 
SAV, Bratislava, (2000), p.249. 
115 EL País, January, 1993,p.2. 
116 Un grupito de ancianos se acercó antes de la cena de fin de año a la estatua ecuestre de Svaty 
Vaclav (San Wenceslao) en Praga. Alguno lloraba. En el enorme pedestal marmóreo, alguien había 
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Everybody remembered the 1989 Revolution, which brought up an immense 
wave of enthusiasm; in contrast, the new government is now attempting to divide 
the country. The author says that three years ago the best of the nation gathered 
at the same square that is now filled with the disillusioned men and drunk 
teenagers. Changes are visible everywhere – typical Czech inns, just like many 
other things are being sold to foreign investors; the original names are replaced 
with German or English ones. Slovaks did not feel like celebrating their own 
independence either. In Bratislava, hardly 3000 people, most of them tourists, 
came out in the streets. I consider this a picture heavily distorting the reality. Early 
in the morning squares at Prague and Bratislava were littered with broken glass 
and smelled after alcohol and vomits. Neither nostalgia nor sadness of citizens 
ruins politicians’ satisfaction. The author intentionally closes his article on a very 
expressive note, as if likening all the rubbish to the future of Czech and Slovak 
Republic.117 
          “Checoslovaquia se partió en dos“118 (Czechoslovakia Is Split-up Into Two 
Parts) is the headline of an article from El Mundo.  It refers to the situation 
before the split-up. The layout was anticipated by many revolutionary changes 
that allowed the Czech Republic to install new economic reforms and democracy. 
However, democracy and economy of Slovakia is not mentioned, although these 
changes occurred during the common state. Success will keep unemployment and 
                                                                                                                                 
colocado una gran foto de otro Wenceslao, de Vaclav Havel, el último presidente de la ya extinta 
Checoslovaquia. Puede que pronto sea el presidente de la nueva República Checa. El poeta seguirá 
siendo una instancia moral para los checos, tenga o no despacho en el palacio presidencial del 
Castillo de Praga, pero ya no será la autoridad del Estado. El que ahora manda en Praga es otro, el 
tercer Wenceslao, Vaclav Klaus, el primer ministro de la República Checa, un hombre duro que 
cree que los poetas deben limitarse a la escritura y a las tertulias filosóficas. Ibid.  
117 “En Bratislava, capital de la nueva Eslovaquia, ni los fuegos artificiales ni las salchichas gratuitas 
en que el Ayuntamiento había invertido parte de su precario presupuesto animaron a los eslovacos 
a celebrar su independencia.  Menos de tres mil personas, en su mayoría también juerguistas, 
acudieron a la cita. En otras ciudades eslovacas, las fiestas oficiales se vieron aún menos 
concurridas. Al despertar la mañana, las dos plazas históricas de Praga y Bratislava estaban 
cubiertas de basura y cristales, olían a alcohol barato y vómitos.” Ibid. 
118EL Mundo,January 2, 1993, p.15.  
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inflation at low levels. These two problems seem to be very serious for Slovakia. 
While the Czech Republic is strong, the Slovak Republic has a weak economy. 
The new Czech Constitution includes references to private ownership, freedom 
and political pluralism. The Czechs want the Slovaks to preserve pluralist 
policies.119 The Czech Republic appears to become the new “success story” in the 
middle of Europe. On the other hand, there is Slovakia that is taking steps 
towards its eastern and south-eastern neighbours like Serbia, Romania and 
Bulgaria. The Slovak Republic is stagnating, and the Czech Republic flourishes, 
because the burden of benighted Slovakia was taken off the Czechs’ shoulders.120 
            This coverage is a very critical one. It makes the Czech Republic 
something of a super-hero, and Slovakia just a dull small state somewhere in the 
Central Europe.  
             Ramiro Vallepadierna is the reporter, whose articles about the split-up of 
Czechoslovakia were written in a realistic way (see Chapter: Basic Facts about the 
Newspapers). For ABC he wrote some very good articles. Just two days after the 
division, Vallepadierna’ s headline read: “Checoslovaquia: la fria separación, que 
no puede abrigar el terciopelo”121 (Czechoslovakia: The Cold Separation That 
Velvet Cannot Warm Up), and description of little “quarrels” between the Slovaks 
and Czechs followed. Many people are confused. They cannot have dual 
citizenship anymore and the borders of these states could be crossed only by the 
citizens of the Czech and Slovak Republic. Vallepadierna claims that the division 
occurred too quickly, and that the leaders took a very thoughtless decision. 
Further he reports that “the date of the split-up was known before a good reason 
for this resolution was given. The state finances are divided into three thirds; one 
for Slovakia and two for the Czech Republic (this redistribution was made in 
proportion to the population of the two Republics). The Czech “stole” the federal 
flag, and this was another point for disagreements between the two nations. The 
dissolution arose mostly from the political misunderstandings and differences in 
                                                 
119 Ibid., p.15 
120 Ibid. p. 15 
121 ABC, January 2, 1993. 
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political programmes in the two countries. The panic spreads when it is 
proclaimed that the two countries with different economy cannot use the same 
currency. Bratislava had to borrow most of its foreign stock from Prague. The 
only positive thing is that the koruna (crown) has been the most stable currency in 
Eastern Europe since the fall of Communism.”122 
             “As for the flag of the Czech Republic, it is the same as the flag of the 
former Czechoslovakia. Upon the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech 
Republic kept the Czechoslovak flag while the Slovak Republic adopted a flag of 
its own. When the Czech and Slovak Republics separated in 1993, by keeping the 
flag that was identical with the former flag of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, the Czech Republic acted in direct violation of the constitutional act 
that explicitly forbids the former federal symbols to be used by the two successor 
states.  The first flag of Czechoslovakia was white and red. This was identical with 
the flag of Poland, so a blue triangle was added at the hoist. The flag was banned 
by the Nazis in 1938, and a horizontal tricolour of white, red, and blue was 
enforced. The original flag was restored in 1945”123. “The current form of the flag 
of Slovakia was adopted by the Slovak Constitution, which came into force on 
September 3, 1992. The flag, in common with other Slavic nations, uses the red, 
white and blue colours.”124 
             It is true that neither the Slovaks nor the Czechs wanted the split-up of 
Czechoslovakia. On January 1, 1993, the independent Slovak and Czech 
Republics came into existence. The deputies of the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic and the government of independent Slovak Republic met at a common 
solemn session. The deputies took an oath of loyalty to the Constitution of the 
Slovak Republic and accepted a declaration. The Slovak Republic became a full 
member of the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Security 
                                                 
122 ABC, January 2, 1993. 
123 Flag of Czechoslovakia. In: <http://www.smso.net/Flag_of_Czechoslovakia.>, last visited on 
28.10.2008. In: Constitutional act. No. 542/1992 Col. on the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak 
Federative Republic, art. 3 sect. 2. 
124 Flag of Slovakia. In: <http://www.smso.net/Flag_of_Slovakia>, last visited on 28.9. 2008 
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and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Already in their first hours of existence, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics were diplomatically recognized by 62 countries of the 
world.125 Moreover, the Czech Republic also had many problems at the beginning. 
Even though the state was freed of the Slovak moans, the Moravians were 
nevertheless striving for autonomy. For this reason, the pressure and urge for 
decentralization has not disappeared.126 
 
3. 3. After Separation: New Problems 
 
           Czechoslovakia is dead; the name disappears from the borderline and 
airports - so “La Triste Resaca De Aňo Nuevo.”127 The situation is compared to 
the one in Yugoslavia – both countries were formed at approximately the same 
time, under similar conditions, but the end of Czechoslovakia involved no 
bloodshed struggles. “It wasn’t the Slovaks who quit; the Czechs were first to 
leave the common Republic (all articles blame the Slovaks for disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia; surprisingly enough, Tertsch contradicts them). The Slovaks are 
annoyed; they feel as if the Czechs somehow tricked them. As early as in 1918 the 
Slovaks were offered autonomy, but this was never accepted for unknown reasons 
(it was an agreement for the new state’s formation signed by T. G. Masaryk and 
Woodrow Wilson). Slovaks also deprecate the Prague’s centralism that has always 
pushed them aside. The author reminds the readers of Dr. Tiso and the old Slavic 
disintegration in the 10th century, when the Hungarian tribes arrived and settled in 
the Danube basin. The national esteem grew separately in both countries. The 
Czech Republic is planning to become the centre of Europe, while Slovakia is 
hardly overcoming problems with enormous unemployment and poverty.”128  
                                                 
125 Škvarna, Dušan et al., Lexikón slovenských dejín, Bratislava:  Slovenské pedagogické 
nakladateľstvo, (1997), p. 170.  
126 Leff, Carol Skalnik,The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. Boulder: Westview, 
(1997),pp. 176-180. 
127 El País, January 2, 1993. 
128 Ibid. 
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This article also addresses the issues of differences between the Czech and 
the Slovak Republics.  In Slovakia, unemployment rate was higher than in the 
Czech Republic, at the time of the division of the Federation. So the situation in 
Slovakia was worse. “Predictably, the dissolution of the state was itself initially a 
bad news for the new economies. A major impediment was the flood of new 
border regulations; the customs union promised at separation collapsed in several 
months, amid a welter of customs barriers, trade licensing requirements, import 
duties, tax codes and transit regulations. All of this pushes the trade between the 
two Republics down to 30% below its former levels in the first six months of 
1993.”129 “Food processing industries were primarily located in the Czech 
Republic, whereas the Slovak agricultural sector produced most of the raw food. 
The appearance of international border between the two Republics forced 
Slovakia into import of poultry, dairy and bakery products, margarine and 
tobacco, even when the unprocessed agricultural goods had originated in 
Slovakia.“130 
The problem between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority is 
very well defined in La Vanguardia under the headline “Hungría busca su lugar 
entre el polvorín de los Balcanes y la Comunidad Europea”131 “The problem 
between Slovakia and Hungary gets worse. Budapest was used to negotiate with 
Prague, but it is going to be much harder with Bratislava because of a strong 
nationalist impact. Mečiar, as usual, is blamed for the animosity between these two 
countries. The situation among the Hungarian minority is complicated. The 
Slovaks prolonged the approval of a law on minorities. The dissent deteriorated 
                                                 
129 By the end of 1995, the last remnant of the special Czech – Slovak economic relationship was 
scheduled to be dismantled; since independence, the two economies had operated under a special 
clearing agreement for payments. The Czech and Slovak governments were negotiating in 1995 for 
payment arrangements between the two states to shift over to a hard currency basis. Directly taken 
from Leff, Carol Skalnik. The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State. Boulder: Westview 
(1997), pp. 186 – 187. 
130 Ibid. 
131 La Vanguardia, February 1993, p. 9. 
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when Hungary left the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymáros waterworks 
after a big investment from Czechoslovakia.”132 
              The problem between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority is 
discussed also in “Dos Caras de Eslovaquia”133 (Two Faces of Slovakia). “Slovakia 
has ceased to grow economically and the government is helpless. Mečiar made no 
effort to change it and the other politicians are turning coats despite the needs of 
the people, who gave them their votes. Everything is being privatized, 
unemployment increases, economic crisis grows. Another problem is the 
disagreement between Slovakia and Hungary concerning the Hungarian minority 
and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros waterworks. The author believes that sympathy 
for Budapest is needed for Slovakia to move on.”134  
As for the problem with Hungary about the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
waterworks, it all started when the continued increase of Slovakia’s economic 
indices remained one of the objectives of the plan for the national economy in the 
1970s. Considerable funds were spent to finance the development of the Slovak 
capital, Bratislava, industrialization of the least developed north-eastern part of 
the country,  modernization of the expanding Slovak armaments industry, the first 
Czechoslovak nuclear power plant located in western Slovakia, and for 
considerable improvements in the eastern lowlands of the country afflicted by 
frequent floods or draughts. In the 1980s the joint Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
hydroelectric project on the river Danube, based on a treaty with Hungary, was 
already under construction. Towards the end of the decade, this project became a 
highly controversial issue between the two countries involved. This balancing 
factor in the relationship between Hungary and Slovakia started as a contentious 
legacy of the communist era, and subsequently turned into a symbolic 
confrontation of national pride. Prague’s withdrawal from the negotiating process 
has given all the more importance to the mediating efforts of the European 
Community. While Slovakia became more assertive in the controversy after the 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 El País, April 4, 1994, p. 6. 
125 Ibid. 
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separation, the new development in the Hungarian position was a shift from an 
ecological argument to one questioning the modification of the border as a result 
of the dam135. 
 
                                                 
135 Rupnik, Jacques, The International Kontext, In: Musil, Jiří, The End of Czechoslovakia, 





















4. PRESENTATION OF THE MAIN ACTORS OF               
    DISSOLUTION IN SPANISH NEWSPAPERS 
 
Concerning the presentation of the main actors in the Spanish press, the 
easiest way to approach it is to look at the kind of adjectives or explanations are 
given when  mentioning these main actors (including, essentially, Havel, Mečiar 
and Klaus, as references to Čarnogurský, Kováč, Mikloško, Kňažko and others 
were scarce). Most commentaries appeared around June 1992, at the time of the 
elections, and at the beginning of 1993 when the separation effectively took place. 
Generallly, El País considers Havel a great political leader, Mečiar a 
populist and nationalist and Klaus a liberal, ultraconservative and father of the 
shock therapy; the harshest among the ultraliberals; a tough man; a pragmatic 
prime minister. Meanwhile, La Vanguardia is much more cautious and only 
occasionally mentions the communist past of Mečiar; nor do they use praising 
adjectives to describe Havel. ABC does not include many characterizations of 
these actors. 
In addition to the dissolution process itself, the Spanish press covered the 
Czech and Slovak politicians such as Havel, Klaus and Mečiar and their approach 
to the break – up of the federal state; when reporting on the major politicians as 
follows:  
 
4. 1. Václav Havel 
 
Havel, as President of ČSFR, is mentioned in the Spanish press on many 
occasions. El País addresses him as a writer and playwright in the article entitled 
“Un Moralista En Política”,136 praising his work Letters for Olga written during his 
                                                 
136 Las Cartas a Olga, de Václav Havel, desde una perspectiva individual, inevitablemente limitada, 
pero de una concentración y una penetración extrema, permiten conocer el proceso checo mejor 
que muchos tratados científicos Havel entró a la prisión en 1979, acusado de formar un 
movimiento de oposición Ilegal, y estuvo en la cárcel, en régimen de trabajos forzados, hasta fines 
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imprisonment as a highly important and intelligent work. Giving a brief account 
of his career as a writer, the article focuses on his moral resistance to the 
communist regime, crowned by his unpredictable fate of the first post-communist 
president of Czechoslovakia.137 
Of more weight are the reports from June 6, 1992 “Havel Teme Que El 
Resultado De Las Elecciones En Checoslovaquia,”138 in El País. This article refers 
to the elections in Czechoslovakia. According to Havel, the results of these 
elections could disturb the stability of Central Europe. He also said that should 
ČSFR split up, it would be bad for the Slovak Republic. The Czech Republic 
would be considered a “country of the West” and Slovakia a country of Eastern 
Europe and “Soviet Union”. It appears, from this article, that Havel was not well-
disposed towards Slovakia.139 To support this observation, it could well be argued 
that Václav Havel acted, in 1990-1992, as a true federalist, although some 
politicians and scholars tried to present him to the public quite differently. 
Particularly negative was the impact of his actions following the 1992 elections 
referred to in this Article, when he participated in the decision over the future fate 
of the common state. Refused as a candidate for the President of Czechoslovakia 
by HZDS, he failed to be elected on the 3 July election.140 According to Petr 
Pithart, Havel should have abstained from re-running for presidential office 
following his 3 July debacle, remaining in office until 5 October 1992 (expiry date 
of his previous term in office as President of CSFR) until the end, without making 
                                                                                                                                 
de 1982. En todo ese periodo le permitieron destinar un par de horas por semana a escribir una 
carta a su mujer. EL País, February 6, 1992, p. 18. 
137 “Algunos de sus colegas salieron al exilio, con razones más que justificadas, pero Havel resistió, 
se fortaleció en la cárcel y escribió una correspondencia de una fuerza moral y estética 
extraordinaria. Al final se convirtió en el presidente de su país y en el símbolo de las libertades 
recuperadas. Es una historia que vale la pena conocer por dentro, con atención pensativa”. EL 
País, February 6, 1992, p.19. 
138 EL País, June 6, 1992. 
139 “Eslovaquia sería percibida inmediatamente como parte del Este y las tierras checas como parte 
del Oeste”. Ibid. 
140 Srb Vladimír,Veselý Tomáš, Rozdelení Československa, Bratislava 2004, p. 99.. 
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any comments. He failed to do so, thus contributing to the appearance of an 
irreversible break-up. In the eyes of the public he made an early decision, 
determining, in a considerable measure, the course of events.141 Several minutes 
after the Declaration of Slovak Sovereignty, Havel announced he would abdicate 
on 20 July at 6 p.m, a fact overwhelmingly criticized by numerous experts and 
politicians.142 According to Rastislav Gargulák, a political scientist, Havel resigned 
in a situation where the fate of the common state was still unresolved, and, most 
assuredly, still worth fighting for. By abdicating and leaving his office, ČSFR lost 
its supreme symbol of power, implying that further negotiations between ODS 
and HZDS would follow.143  
In the article “Un Jefe De Estado Encargado A Dar Sepultura A Su 
Propio País”,144 El País, Hermann Tretsch compares the presidency of Václav 
Havel with that of Tomáš Garique Masaryk. He writes that Havel is the second 
greatest political leader, after Masaryk, in Czechoslovak history.145 He further 
describes him as a writer, playwright, the former detainee and a man of great 
moral and intellectual authority146, who suffered from numerous prison sentences 
imposed on him by the communist regime. The author concludes that Havel,  
born in the Czech Republic, is naturally a Czech, which means he thinks the 
Czech way, but not for the Slovaks who felt oppressed under the hegemony of 
                                                 
141 Klusáková, J.:Petr Pithart – Nadoraz, Praha 1992, p. 97. In: ibid., p. 99. 
142 Srb Vladimír,Veselý Tomáš, p. 99. 
143 Gargulák Rudolf, Tríletí presidenta Václava Havla, Brno 1993, p. 10,11. In: Srb Vladimír,Veselý 
Tomáš, p. 99. 
144 EL País, June 8, 1992 p. 14. 
145El resultado de las elecciones generales en las dos repúblicas, checa y eslovaca, que componen la 
federación que preside, puede suponer el abandono de Havel y la desaparición de este cargo y del 
propio Estado. Checoslovaquia comenzó hace 75 años su andadura como Estado con una gran 
figura histórica por jefe del Estado, Thomas Garrige Masaryk. Ibid., p.14. 
146 El presidente de Checoslovaquia, Václav Havel, escritor, dramaturgo, ex preso y gran instancia 
moral e intelectual, podría sumar pronto a todos estos títulos el de ex jefe del Estado. Ibid., p.14. 
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Prague. 147 Here it can be again observed that the personality of Havel is always 
highly admired and presented in a positive sense. 
The article called “La Triste Resaca de Aňo Nuevo”148 (a Sad Ending of 
the New Year’s Eve), written by Hermann Tretsch is something of a prediction 
that Václav Havel might become the new President of the Czech Republic.149 
Contradictory to this, there is also an opinion of Václav Klaus that Havel should 
not run for the president, but remain what he used to be before, a writer.150 The 
facts confirm that the official nomination of his candidacy was submitted on 
January 18, 1993 by four political parties of the ruling coalition government. On 
January 26, 1993, the Chamber of Deputies elected Václav Havel to be the first 
President of the independent Czech Republic.151 Another source claims that when 
asked under what circumstances he would not wish to become President of the 
Czech Republic, Havel made a statement in September 1992, according to which 
he was haunted by that idea, because the powers of the new Czech presidency 
were steadily removed in the independent state. “I would not”, he had declared 
then, like to be a president doomed to wear a tie from morning till evening, to lay 
flowers on memorials, make festive speeches on anniversaries and attend 
innumerable lunches and dinners. Despite his claims that he had no desire to be a 
paper President and that he regarded the collapse of the federation as a personal 
failure, Havel had acted to maintain the office rather than to stand up or rather 
stand down for his confidence in the federal Czech and Slovak state, based on the 
relationship, as he put it, “bound together by thousands of historical, cultural, and 
                                                 
147 Sin embargo, Havel es checo y piensa como un checo, y una mayoría de los eslovacos lo 
considera representante de la hegemonía de Praga y negligente hacia los intereses eslovacos. Ibid., 
p.14. 
148 El País, January 2, 1993, p. 2. 
149  …Puede que pronto sea el presidente de la nueva República Checa. Ibid., p.2. 
150 El que ahora manda en Praga es otro, el tercer Wenceslao, Vaclav Klaus, el primer ministro de 
la República Checa, un hombre duro que cree que los poetas deben limitarse a la escritura y a las 
tertulias filosóficas. Ibid., p. 2. 
151 Srb Vladimír,Veselý Tomáš, Rozdelení Československa, Bratislava 2004, p. 99. 
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personal ties“ 152 In this claim he might have been right, his change came within 
weeks of losing presidency; for Czechs who still believed in the federation it 
represented an abrupt defeat of the principle.153 
In ABC, of the same date as the text above, there is an article called 
“Checos y Eslovacos, más primos que hermanos (The Czechs and Slovaks are 
cousins rather than brothers.”154 Havel is mentioned firmly as a “benefactor” who 
wants to understand the Slovaks and is depressed by the split-up of the state.155 As 
already mentioned before in this chapter, for many Czechs President Havel had 
represented a defender not only of the federation, but also of the citizens’ right to 
be consulted through referendum on the issue of the country’s fate. Slovaks, on 
the other hand, had a reason to be irritated by Havel´s aloof attitude to Slovakia. 
The last nail in the coffin was hammered when HZDS blocked Havel´s re-
election as president in July 1992.156  Later, after Havel´s abdication, an interview 
with Havel was published in the American Time magazine in August 1992 “.. .to 
the following question, “Are you relieved to have resigned?” Havel replied: “ I am quite relieved, 
almost happy actually, because when I accomplish something or make an important decision, I 
always drive others to act rather than react only to what is happening around me, this gives me a 
feeling of inner freedom and self-confirmation. And everyone needs such self-confirmation. It is 
                                                 
152 Mladá Fronta Dnes, September 25, 1992. In: Innes, Abby, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press (2001), p. 216. 
153 Innes, Abby, p. 216. 
154 ABC, January 2, 1993, p. 30. 
155 “ ÉL ha sido el checo que más ha intentado entender a los eslovacos, fue el único que luchó 
hasta el final por la Checoslovaquia unida, porque pensó siempre que ambas repúblicas se 
necesitaban para no hundirse la una en el Este y la otra en el Oeste, y sin embargo no intentó 
nunca cortar las alas a Eslovaquia, pero ni élpudo dejar de pensar como un checo y preguntarse 
¿Qué harán los eslovacos sin nosotros? Ibid., p. 31. 
156 On 3 July the Federal Parliament failed to elect the new Czechoslovak President, even in 
repeated rounds of voting. Václav Havel, the only candidate, was rejected by the House of the 
People and the Slovak section of the House of the Nations, the repeat round elicited only reduced 
support in the chamber of the Nations.A second election with new candidates was cheduled for 16 
July. Mladá Fronda dnes 4 July 1992, pp. 1-2. In: Innes, Abby, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye, 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press (2001), p. 216. 
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one of the paradoxes of my life that I am experiencing such a creative feeling at the moment of my 
resignation.” Reacting to the next question: “Some have said the breakup of Czechoslovakia 
would be a tragedy, some say it is inevitable, and some say it is a good thing,” Havel replied: “If 
we do become two stable democratic states, then the fact that the state is not large is not a tragedy. 
If the breakup of our common state should lead to inner instability, chaos, poverty and suffering, 
that would be the beginning of the emerging tragedy. I do not feel emotionally tied to the 
Czechoslovak state. I do not place the highest value on the state, but rather on man and 
humanity.”157 In this respect, such claims can be marked as signals of the public 
disappointment on both sides. Following Havel´s abdication, the highly symbolic 
post was utterly discredited by the failure of the political parties to put forward 
respectable candidates. 
Another article from ABC “Seís meses después de su renuncia, Havel 
regresa al Castillo de Praga”158  also by Ramiro Villapadierna, points out to the 
boycott of Havel´s presidential election in parliament that did not prevent him 
from being nominated for the position.159 Havel congratulates officially Slovakia 
for its sovereignty.160 Meanwhile, Slovakia had to develop as quickly as possible 
the complete structure of state administration. In February 1993, Michal Kováč 
was elected the President.  
In the next article under section “Opinión” entitled El gesto de Havel,161 
the personality of Havel is highly admired and presented in a positive stance. The 
second paragraph begins with “...an intellectual with a faultless democratic 
                                                 
157 Directly quoted from Srb Vladimír,Veselý Tomáš, Rozdelení Československa, Bratislava 2004, p. 
101, in: Time, August 3, 1992. 
158 ABC, January 27, 1993, p. 30.  
159 “Once de los catorce diputados que tiene este partido en el parlamento pidieron reiteradamente 
hacer uso de la palabra, durante el debate, para leer uno trás de otro un discurso encendido y por 
momentos grosero contra Havel, provocando el abondando de la sala por parte del resto de los 
diputados presentes.“  Ibid., p. 30. 
160 “Vaclav Havel es el presidente de los Países Checos, por 109 votos de los 200 que forman la 
cámara única del parlamento checo, y lo será oficialmente desde el próximo 2 de febrero tras la 
investidura en el Castillo de Praga, del que salió el pasado 17 de julio con una cazadora al hombro 
y una felicitación en los labios para Eslovaquia por su declaración de soberanía.“ Ibid. , p. 30. 
161 El País, July 19, 1992, p. 10. 
64 
personal biography, co-founder of Charter 77 – a movement to support human 
rights that gathered the dissidents to the comunist regime-, untiring negociator, 
promoter of the so called velvet revolution, visible head of the movement Civic 
Forum and one of the makers of the transition towards democracy…”162 It is 
difficult to find so much praise in so few sentences. 
  At the begining of the next paragraph, it appears as if it is the decisión of 
the Slovak parliament, and only this decision, that has decided the separation of 
Checoslovakia. The paragraph ends by saying that Slovakia is the less 
industrialized and with less economic development “y, al parecer, más proclive a 
pensar que sus males proceden exclusivamente del predominio checo.”163(...and, 
apparently, the one more inclined to think that its ills – misfortunes - come 
exclusively from the Czech predominance). 
Generally, the Spanish press did not bring much information about Havel 
and his life or career. To sum up, Havel is mentioned mostly as a benefactor of 
Czechoslovakia, who wanted the best for both Slovaks and Czechs, but Slovakia 
saw and proclaimed him a non-Slovak. And most of the time he is apparently 
presented as a clever and wise politician.  
 
 
4. 2. Václav Klaus 
 
Václav Klaus, the former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, the 
second President of the Czech Republic, is indisputably one of the most 
important Czech politicians of the recent period. Václav Klaus still has many 
opponents,  who not only criticize him for his alleged arrogance, but they often    
depict him as a narrow-minded pragmatist interested only in the technology of 
                                                 
162 “intelectual de impecable biografia personal democrática, cofundador de Carta 77 –un 
movimiento en defensa de los derechos humanos que aglutinó a los disidentes del régimen 
comunista-, negociador incansable, impulsor de la llamada revolución de terciopelo, cabeza visible 
del moviemiento Foro Cívico y uno de los artífices de la transición hacia la democracia…”. Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
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power and theoretical economic precepts. However, his personality provides a 
striking comparison with Mečiar. Although at first look, the eloquent economist 
seems to stand in complete contrast to Mečiar, their resemblance is 
unquestionable. Both men created and led the political parties that emerged out of 
the anti-regime umbrella organizations formed in 1989.164 In Slovakia, it was VPN 
–The Public against Violence (PAV) and in the Czech Republic OF – the Civic 
Forum (CF).165 
 As regards the Spanish press, V. Klaus is often mentioned in El País, such 
as for example “ EL Resultado Electoral En Checoslovaquia Pone En Peligro La 
Unidad Del Pais166.”(The results of the elections in Czechoslovakia are dangerous 
for the unity of the country). The author, J. M. Marti Font, refers to Klaus’s plans. 
Font informs how V. Klaus wants to continue the policy of severe re-structuring, 
changes and economic reforms. Not excluding the possible division of the 
country; however, at first he supported the attempts to make a federation 
satisfactory to both nations. 167 On the other hand, if this plan fails, this country 
                                                 
164 Haughton Tim, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Post-Communist Europe, University of 
Birmingham, UK 2005, p. 139. 
165 The Civic Forum‘s chief goal was indeed sweeping. It was, as if it had been for the dissidents 
back in 1968, to return Czechoslovakia to Europe, culturally, economically and politically. The 
Socialist youth also had a legitimate point in that the Forum´s rhetoric of non-partisanship had 
from the beginning obscured a very real political bias. Financial caution – a strong tradition in 
Czech governement, even under the Communists – was now promoted as a call for austerity. As 
well as advocating the rapid introduction of a market economy, the Civic Forum encouraged the 
idea that the reformed economic space would thereafter stand entirely beyond governemnt, in the 
sense of political juridisdiction. In other words, the Forum, from the very beginning, sought to 
carve out truly free- market –liberal- territory. Innes, Abby, Czechoslovakia: the Short Gooodbye, New 
Haven and London:Yale University Press (2001) p. 80.  
166 EL País, June 7, 1992, p. 2. 
167 “En los territorios de la república checa (Bohemia y Moravia), los tres partidos nacidos del Foro 
Cívico y que apoyan de hecho la política conservadora practicada por Václav Klaus, consiguen 
hacerse con una mayoría que les permitirá seguir adelante con el duro programa de reformas 
económicas. Klaus, sin embargo, declaró anoche que no descarta una separación entre checos y 
eslovacos, aunque la primera carta que quiere jugar es "la construcción de una federación 
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will have to be divided. Moreover, the strict reforms made by Václav Klaus were 
well accepted in the country, mostly economic amendments. It is a well known 
fact that in 1990/1992 Klaus compromised on the social welfare reform, 
sanctioning the continuation of universal benefits, for instance,  keeping in the 
cabinet those who were not neo-liberals, but also dampening the potential 
backlash against neo-liberalism168. Klaus acted strategically, at times tempering his 
radical Thatcherite instincts by tailoring them to suit the public opinion and to 
maintain politically advantageous alliances.169 There is also a note about the 
relationship between Klaus and Mečiar.170 According to this article, the correlation 
between these two politicians is great and they both want just the best for 
Czechoslovakia. Though, each supported the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks 
on a different basis.        
Another remark on Klaus is from the article “Checos y eslovacos, 
escépticos ante la partición del país”171(Czechs and Slovaks are Skeptic of the 
Break-up of the State). Hermann Tretsch writes about the advantages of the new 
Czech Republic. At that time Václav Klaus acted as the head of the country, until 
the new/old president is elected. Klaus is confident that the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia is a step forward in progress, a new successful beginning for his 
country. Klaus says that the Czech Republic can go ahead and develop further on. 
In his defense of the government in 1992, Klaus said that the main aim was not 
just to divide the state into two new republics, but also to split the country in 
peace. According to the author of the article, the new government does not offer 
an illusion of the future rather its intention is to show the reality to all the people. 
Klaus maintains that the reform in the Czech Republic is very successful and that 
                                                                                                                                 
razonable" entre  unos y otros. "Si no es posible, habrá que separarse de manera rápida y 
civilizada", precisó.” Ibid., p. 2. 
168Orenstein Mitchell, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcomunist 
Europe, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press (2001)p. 48. 
169 Haughton, p.139. 
170 “Si las relaciones personales entre Václav Klaus y Vladimír Meciar son excelentes, no sucede lo 
mismo entre el líder eslovaco y el dramaturgo convertido en presidente.” Ibid., p.3. 
171 El País,January 2, 1993, p. 2. 
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the wicked tongues and bad predictions were just rubbish and gossips. The good 
relationships with the Slovak Republic are of top importance for Klaus and his 
government, so are the relations between the Czech Republic and Austria, 
Germany, Poland, Hungary and the USA.172 It can be said that Klaus was aware, 
in particular, of the constraints and opportunities accorded by in the framework 
of the politics in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, and shaped his strategy 
accordingly. 
Klaus is well known because of his arrogant, strict, haughty, 
uncompromising policies and ideas. These facts about him are found in the article 
“Final De Trayecto”173 (The End of a Way). The author is again Hermann Tretsch 
who hints at the views of Václav Klaus concerning the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia. Although it is a failure for the ordinary citizens, Klaus tries to 
persuade himself, and the people around that the split-up was the best choice. 
Klaus’ idea is to have proud and stern people in his country, such as his political 
line and his economic policy are174. Klaus’ austerity is shown also in the article 
bearing the title “Absurdo Divorcio”175 (An Absurd Divorce). This article reflects 
back to the year of 1992, when Klaus gave an option to the Slovaks; there would 
either be the old regime or the country will be dissolved. Klaus was strictly against 
autonomy of Slovakia as a part of Czechoslovakia. He proclaimed that the only 
                                                 
172 “Según Klaus, "la reforma está siendo un éxito excepcional" en la república checa y su 
Gobierno ha demostrado que "eran falsos los pronósticos de aquellos enemigos de la reforma que 
auguraban millones de desempleados y desórdenes sociales". Klaus insistió en que las relaciones 
con Eslovaquia tendrán máxima prioridad también después de la división, seguidas de los vínculos 
con Austria, Alemania, Polonia, Hungría y EE UU.”  Ibid., p. 2. 
173 El País, January 1993, p. 2. 
174 “Klaus qierre un país duro como el, con exíto, y emplacable. Una red social, apoyo a las 
vicitimas de la transformación económica, desacelaración de los cambios para intentar salvar 
algunas empresas; le parecen detestables ideas de socialistas y criptocomunistas. “No hay 
económia social de meracado. Hay económia de mercado a secas, sin adjectivos, ” le gusta decir.” 
Ibid., p.2. 
175 El Pais, January 3, 1993, p. 12. 
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solution was the break-up.176 The Czechoslovak divorce gave both to Václav 
Klaus and to Vladimír Mečiar the opportunity to build the two new states on their 
own visions. As for Klaus, a neo-liberal with a deep antipathy to the state in 
principle, an ideological rather than entrepreneurial explanation might be offered 
for his party’s continued unwillingness to build productive state institutions; he 
believed neither in automatic shrinking of the state, nor in the flowering of 
the Czech civil society, nor in the creation of transparent markets.177 
 The article in El Pais, “Nadie Puede Acusarme De Contribuir A Dividir 
Checoslovaquia”178 (Nobody Can Accuse me of Contributing to the Split-up of 
Czechoslovakia) is focused on the situation in the Czech Republic from Klaus’s 
point of view (an interview by J. M. Marti Font). In this interview Klaus said that 
he felt Spain was afraid of Prague joining the EU. Klaus also said that those four 
months after dissolution, the situation in the Czech Republic was stable socially 
and economically and the break-up is just the matter of the past.179 As for him, 
only the Slovaks were in favour of the split-up and the task for the Czechs was to 
make it in a peaceful manner. On the other hand, he admitted that life in 
Czechoslovakia was much better and he would prefer living in Czechoslovakia180. 
The economic situation is quite good, and Klaus proclaimed that unemployment 
was below 5%. Although many factories were closed down, the private sector was 
growing and spreading quickly. As a propagator of the liberal policies he claimed 
the state had no right to influence the market economy.181 As far as Slovakia 
                                                 
176 “Klaus rejaza tajantemente la idea confederal:o se mantiene la federación que existe o se va a la 
separación. El absurdo resultado ha sido una divisón, que, en principio, nadie quería.“ Ibid., p.12 
177 Innes, Abby, Czechoslovakia: the Short Gooodbye, New Haven and London:Yale University Press 
(2001) p. 220.   
178 El País, May 9, 1993 p. 9. 
179 “Checa es realmente estable, tanto política como socialmente. A nuestro pesar, la división del 
país ha provocado un choque externo adicional en nuestra economía.” Ibid., p. 9. 
180 “La separación la hicieron en un ciento por ciento, repito, en un ciento por ciento, los 
eslovacos, a los checos nos quedó tener que organizarla pacíficamente, pero estaríamos muy felices 
de vivir todavía en Checoslovaquia.” Ibid., p. 9.                                                                                                                                
181 “Ya lo hemos contabilizado incluso en el presupuesto del Estado calculando un crecimiento del 
desempleo de hasta un 4% o un 5%. Hay muchos proces,os paralelos funcionando en este país. 
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concerns, he said that he could not answer any question about the future of that 
country. In the past he favoured the federation of the two states. At the end of 
this interview, he ensures Spain, again, that the Czech Republic was not looking 
for any financial assistance. Therefore the Spanish government need not worry 
that Spain may lose its position of a poor state, with all the money from the 
European Community flowing to the new states.182 Further in the interview Klaus 
mentioned that the fact that because of the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia, 
in contrast to Yugoslavia, caused misinformation in Europe, so that many 
countries didn’t know about the split-up.183     
In the rest of the Spanish newspapers under the scrutiny, there were just 
few and brief remarks concerning Klaus as a politician. Only in El Mundo, the 
article “Checoslovaquia: un divorcio no deseado”184 (Czechoslovakia: Undesirable 
Divorce), there is one paragraph describing Klaus and his theory that Slovakia 
means a brake for the Czechs and without this little state, the Czech Republic 
                                                                                                                                 
Sigue habiendo un almacenamiento de masa laboral, ya que las empresas esperan un aumento de la 
demanda, pero, al mismo tiempo, hay una gran capacidad de absorción en nuestra ecoriomía, ya 
que el sector privado crece a una velocidad increíble y se están creando grandes oportunidades 
cada día. Teníamos un sector de servicios muy subdesarrollado y ahí hay otra tremenda reserva de 
empleo.”  Ibid., p. 9. 
182 “No sé si España está a favor o en contra de nuestra entrada en la CE, pero me temo que tiene 
algunos miedos irracionales de que países como la República Checa vayan a constituirse en el 
grupo de los países pobres de la CE y que la redistribución que va de los ricos a los pobres dentro 
de la CE cambie en contra de los intereses de los países actualmente pobres, como España. 
Comprendo que la entrada de los países poscomunistas moverá a España hacia el punto medio de 
ingresos en el contexto comunitario. Puedo entender este miedo, pero puedo asegurarle que la 
última cosa que la República Checa pide es dinero. No lo necesitamos, no lo queremos. Militamos 
agresivamente contra todo tipo de redistribución, por lo que no creo que pueda haber temores de 
que nos llevemos algo.” Ibid., p. 10. 
183 “Seguimos las resoluciones de la ONU. Han pasado varios meses desde la separación de 
Checoslovaquia y estamos muy satisfechos de haberlo conseguido de manera diferente a la de 
Yugoslavia. Somos expertos en dividir países, así que si Yugoslavia nos hubiera pedido asistencia 
técnica se la hubiéramos dado felices.” Ibid., p. 10. 
184 EL Mundo,January 3, 1993, p. 5. 
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would be able to join the European Union much earlier. 185 However, the author    
concludes that Slovakia was not the brake.    
Ultimately, Klaus appears in other newspapers mostly because of his 
strong beliefs and arrogance.  
 
4. 3. Vladimír Mečiar 
  
 This Slovak politician is dealt with by the majority of articles. He was and 
still is one of the most controversial leaders at the Czechoslovak and Slovak 
political scene.  
 Initially, in summer 1992, Mečiar is referred to in the context of the 
elections in Czechoslovakia. At first,  the article “Los checoslovacos acudirán a las 
urnas con el destino del país en el juego186 (Czechoslovaks To Vote With Their 
Country´s Fate At Stake)  predicted that two totally opposed parties would win 
the upcoming elections in the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. The 
author points out that Mečiar’s HZDS party plans to set up the new conditions, 
adopt a new constitution, elect the new President and call for a referendum.187 
Knowingly, HZDS soon after it was formed in 1991, became gradually 
synonymous with Vladimír Mečiar, as he was both its founder and top 
representative. In the electoral terminology the party founded and led by Mečiar 
was the country’s most successful party through the first decade of its 
independence. The party’s centrist political appeal, with emphasis on the Slovak 
                                                 
185 “Puestos en la balanya, los inconvientes pesan más que las ventajas. El ingreso en la CE se 
retrasar8, pese a que Klaus pensó de lo contrario al haber soltado Praga el lastre de su pariente 
pobre. El capital exterior dejará de afluir a los dos países, dada la incertidumbre creada y quedará 
enterrada, en fun, la idea de un Estado-encrucijada centroeuropeo destinado a server de puente 
económico y cultural con el Este. “Ibid., p. 5. 
186 El País, May 21,1992 p.6. 
187 En Eslovaquía probablemente ganaría el Movimiento por Eslovaquia Democrática, de Vladimir 
Mečiar, un carismático dirigente que ha pregonado a los cuatro vientos su intención de declarar la 
soberanía de Eslovaquia después de las elecciones, adoptar una Constitución puramente eslovaca, 
introducir la figura de un presidente eslovaco y co
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national interests, Christian basis, and the economic reforms was designed to 
address a wide spectrum of voters.188  
The next article from El País “Profundas Grietas En La Federación,”189 
(Profound Divisions In Federation) informs on the results of the elections in 
Czechoslovakia labeling Mečiar as a populist of the winning party.190 In the Slovak 
Republic the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia triumphed with 37.26 per cent 
of the votes, and the Slovak National Party with 7.42 per cent as the fourth 
strongest party.191 Having won a substantial plurality of seats in the Slovak 
National council, Mečiar formed a coalition with the Slovak National Party, but 
offered its leaders only one Cabinet seat, the Economic Ministry. HZDS´s 
electoral success placed the party and its dominant leader at the center of the 
Slovak politics and Mečiar began to be finally projected by himself as the father of 
the Slovak nation.   
 The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was taking shape. The evidence in the 
Spanish press can be found in El País, under the title “EL Resultado Electoral 
Hace Inevitable La División Del País.”192 Font reports on the situation in 
Czechoslovakia between Mečiar and Klaus. The election results have set Klaus 
and Mečiar against each other. Havel entrusted Klaus with the formation of the 
new government before the official election results.193 The results of the elections 
                                                 
188 Haughton Tim, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Post-Communist Europe, University of 
Birmingham, UK 2005, p. 139. 
189 El País, June 7, 1992, p. 3. 
190 “Pero un 37,2% de los 51 escaños eslovacos del Parlamento Federal se los lleva el Movimiento 
para una Eslovaquia Democrática (HZDS) del populista Mečiar, el hombre que anunció la 
inmediata soberanía de Eslovaquia tras las elecciones, y los separatistas del Partido Nacional 
Eslovaco un 7,3%. “ Ibid., p. 3. 
191 Škvarna Dušan et al, Lexikón Slovenských Dejín, Slovenské Pedagogické Nakladateľstvo, 
Bratislava (1997), p. 174. 
192 EL País, June 8, 1992, p. 2. 
193 “Los resultados definitivos de las elecciones celebradas el viernes y el sábado en 
Checoslovaquia han dejado frente a frente al conservador checo Václav Klaus contra el populista 
eslovaco Vladímir Mečiar, haciendo prácticamente inevitable la división del país en dos Estados. El 
presidente Václav Havel, cuyo futuro político pende de un hilo, encargó a Klaus la formación del 
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in June 1992 strengthened the inclinations towards separation. Based on the 
victory of this scale and the support of the ultra right SNS, Mečiar took Slovakia 
to independence, at the same time establishing himself as Prime Minister of the 
independent country. At the time of achieving independence, however, the 
coalition was already showing signs of having become a personal vehicle of 
Mečiar´s power building.194 Gradually, Mečiar replaced ministerial leaders by his 
friends and supporters, and also expanded the government influence over the 
state-run radio and television. The opposition parties and even members of his 
own party were critical. However, the more criticism came his way, the more 
sensitive and power- grabbing Mečiar became determined of the importance to 
establish and confirm his personal dominance over the Slovak government.195  As 
for the article, reference was made to the fact that the two leaders has different 
ideas of the state organization, a different form of government.196 After the 
elections, the leading Czech and Slovak political figures attempted to find a 
compromise by negotiations.197 As it appears, the 1992 elections in 
Czechoslovakia led directly to the break-up of the federal state, giving Mečiar the 
leading role in the drama.  
                                                                                                                                 
Gobierno federal incluso antes de hacerse públicos los resultados oficiales y sin mencionar para 
nada al eslovaco Mečiar.” Ibid. p. 2. 
194 Goldaman, Minton, F., Slovakia Since Independence, A Struggle for Democracy, London 
(1999), p. 61. 
195 Ibid., p.63. 
196 “Mientras que Klaus insistía que la reforma económica en curso, una terapia de choque 
neoliberal del más puro corte thatcheriano, era "innegociable" Meciar decía que "es muy difícil un 
compromiso constitucional por el tema de la reforma económica”. Ibid. 
197 On 17 June, 1992, Vladimír Mečiar and Václav Klaus negotiated about the composition of the 
federal government in Prague.Klaus declared that he was interested in the Office of the prime 
minister of the Czech Republic (which he gained on 2 July 1992) and would not accept any other 
Office in the federal government. Both sides agreed that each republic would have its own budget 
and that the distribution of funds from the federal state budget would be halted. On 19-20 
June,1992, negotations between the representatives of HZDS and ODS took place in Bratislava. 
They agreed to reduce the number of ministries they filled. Moreover, the federal government was 
to understand its mandate as temporary. See in Škvarna at al., p.172. 
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According to an article from Viviene Schnitzer in El País Rétorica hecha 
realidad198 (Rhetorics Turned Thruth), Mečiar appeals to the Sovereignty of 
Slovakia. He called for a new temporary government ruling until the split-up of 
Czechoslovakia.199 Within a few weeks, on the 17th July 1992, the Slovak National 
Council proclaimed the Declaration of Sovereignty of Slovakia.200  The 
preparation of the new Constitution as the fundamental law of the independent 
Slovakia accelerated. Arguably, the biggest problem was that the Slovaks agreed 
on a very tight time limit for adopting the constitution (due to its symbolic value) 
and allowed themselves little time to deliberate. As mentioned earlier, the drafting 
of the constitution began with the Declaration of Slovak Sovereignty by the 
Slovak Parliament in July 1992, and by the end of the month, the draft of the new 
Constitution was already approved.201 
 The Czech and Slovak leaders tried to reach a compromise. An article 
from El País, El Eslovaco Meciar A Favor De La Cohabitación Con Los Checos202 
informs that Mečiar wants the Czechs and Slovaks to live in one country together 
in a confederation.203 He meets Klaus and Havel in order to negotiate on his 
                                                 
198 EL País, June 10, 1992, p.2. 
199 Según el comunicado elaborado ayer por el Movimiento para una Eslovaquia Democrática 
(HZDS), tras la entrevista celebrada con Václav Klaus, Meciar insiste en proclamar la soberanía y 
promueve la idea de crear un Gobierno provisional federal que funcione hasta la realización de 
sendos referendos sobre la independencia en las repúblicas checa y eslovaca, organizados por los 
respectivos Parlamentos nacionales. EL País, June 10, 1992, p.2. 
200 Voting for the acceptance of the declaration were the deputies of the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia, Slovak National Party, and the Party of the Democratic Left (113 for, 10 
abstained and 24, mostly from the Christian Democratic Movement and the Hungarian Parties, 
voted against). See in Škvarna et al. p. 173. 
201 Kopecký Petr, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party competitions and parliamentary 
institutionalization, Aldershot: Ashgate (2001), p. 36. In: Haughton Tim, Constraints and Opportunities 
of Leadership in Post-Communist Europe, University of Birmingham, UK (2005), p. 83. 
202 El País, June 13, 1992. 
203 VIadímir Meciar, líder del Movimiento para una Eslovaquia Democrática (HZDS), vencedor en 
la parte eslovaca de las recientes elecciones celebradas en Checoslovaquia, se mostró ayer a favor 
de una cohabitación entre checos y eslovacos en el seno de una confederación…ibid. 
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proposal. Mečiar proclaims that he does not want to divide their state, but he 
wants these two nations to live in the same state. During July and August, Mečiar 
tried to move closer to the Czech position on power-sharing and confederation. 
He withdrew the demand for separate Slovak banking and currency system and 
backed off on previous demands that Slovakia be given its own representation 
seat in the United Nations. There is evidence of Mečiar´s tactic of overbidding, 
for confederation from the Czech government that many others considered 
resolutely centrist. It afforded the alibi Klaus would need for hastening the split of 
the state.204  
 Ricardo Estarriol from La Vanguardia writing in La Divisón de 
Checoslovaquia no desestabiliza Europa Central205 (The Division Of 
Czechoslovakia does not Destabilize Central Europe) presents Mečiar as a man 
who made the process of dissolution faster and looking from the neutral 
standpoint; it is questionable whether this step would be positive or negative in 
his career and for Slovakia. The same author captured the main idea of Mečiar’s 
policy. Mečiar, primarily supporting officially proclaimed autonomy for Slovakia 
within the federal state; did not fancy the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. 
Generally, Estarriol writing about Mečiar, is much less critical than the articles 
published in EL País. 
 The following articles were written early in 1993. Surprisingly, not blaming 
Mečiar for the break-up of Czechoslovakia, they claimed he required autonomy of 
Slovakia within Czechoslovakia but Klaus was against it. Klaus insisted the 
Slovaks must either accept the federation in its present form or leave the 
federation. The headline read: “Absurdo divorcio.”206 Yet, the first problems 
appeared in the new Slovak Republic. The relations with the Hungarian 
government were not particularly good. Mečiar tried to weaken the rights of 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia, as described in the article “La Oposición eslovaca 
                                                 
204 Abby, p. 184. 
205 La Vanguardia, December 29, 1992, p.7. 
206 EL País, January 3, 1993, p. 12. 
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deberá confirmar su lealtad al nuevo Estado”207 (The Slovak Opposition Has To 
Confirm Its Loyalty To The New State).  Basically, Mečiar and other Slovak 
nationalist politicians were furious over the Hungarian efforts to help and 
encourage the Hungarian minority. Mečiar considered the problems with the 
Hungarian community a matter of domestic concern. This problem was to persist 
in the Slovak Republic indefinitely.  
Another coverage concerning Mečiar and the problems with the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia appears in the same newspaper, following the line 
of the above article “Eslovaquia Inquieta a la Minoria Hungara”208 (Hungarian 
Minority at Ease in Slovakia). The author of this article quotes Mečiar saying  that 
the real danger for the Central Europe is not Slovakia, but the state to the 
south.209      
The first crisis in Slovakia gets published in El País under the headline 
“Eslovaquia Sufre Su Primer crisis al no lograr el Parlamento elegir presidente”210 
(Slovakia Suffers Its First Crisis Because Parliament Fails to Elect its President). 
The new president of the Slovak Republic was not elected in the second round.   
Vladimír Mečiar fell into disfavour for his visits to the countries east of Slovakia, 
e.g. the Ukraine. Although, according to him the aim of these visits was to 
improve the relations with eastern neighbours. 
As for the problem with the elections in Slovakia, Ramiro Villapadierna, 
the reporter of ABC, using the headline “Cumbre centroeuropea sin Mečiar en la 
investidura de Havel211,“ (Central European Meeting Without Mečiar at Havel´s 
investiture) writes a short article about the situation.. “It is strange that Mečiar 
does not take part in the elections as a candidate, he calls Roman Kováč instead of 
himself, but then puts his candidate’s political career to death. Roman Kováč was 
                                                 
207 EL País, January 3, 1993, p. 4. 
208 EL País, April 2, 1993, p. 6. 
209 “Eslovaquia no es un riesgo para la seguridad en Europa central, ha repetido el primer ministro 
de ese país, Vladimir Meciar, pero, "la verdadera amenaza está en el Sur", ibid. p. 6. 
210 EL País, January 28, 1992, p.4.  
211 ABC, February 3, 1993, p. 34.  
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unsuccessful in two rounds. He was not the right person for the office of the 
President“212  Here Mečiar is criticized for his non-diplomatic and immature 
scene, when he could not hide his feelings about the situation.  
The article called “Dos caras de Eslovaqiua”213 (Two Faces of Slovakia) 
has a fitting title, bringing information about the sad economic and political 
situation in Slovakia. “Mečiar has not done anything good for his country and he 
is always acting in opposition of the ideas of President Michal Kováč. Mečiar 
could not accept presidential powers. The president is not just a formal head of 
state, he is also active in state policies, while the Prime Minister is just his adviser. 
Ramiro Villapadierna, the author, shares his personal experience during his 
meeting with Mečiar. He was surprised at his gentle behaviour and perfect 
manners, wondering why this politician is often criticised for his imperturbable 
manners and improper expressions. During this interview, Mečiar was not the 
Prime Minister anymore. He was speaking about problems with the Hungarian 
minority and blamed the other political parties in Slovakia for their unrealistic 
political programmes, while his national party tried to form a new Republic.  
Another issue was his privatization attempts, which were much criticised. 
Mečiar was for a slow and gradual privatization; the other politicians wanted to 
acquire property in a short time.  
Mečiar’s comeback to the political scene in September 1993 before the 
elections is extensively covered. Mečiar is blamed for the catastrophic policy, but 
defends himself because the results of his governance are very positive. For 
example the Slovak monetary unit, koruna is stable, the state reserves are growing,  
foreign trade is advancing and more than 15% of domestic production is being 
exported.“214  
To conclude, Mečiar is a politician with two faces. On the one hand, he is 
a great powerful man with big ambitions. However, his second face is that of an 
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213 EL País, April 4, 1994, p.6. 
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arrogant and unpredictable person. In the Spanish press he is presented as a big 
man of big ideas. On the other hand, his decisions are frequently criticised.   
      
 
 
5. LANGUAGE IN SPANISH NEWSPAPERS 
 
Based on the fact that most Spanish readers are not familiar with the social 
and political situation in Czechoslovakia or in the two new countries formed after 
the split-up, it may be interesting to analyze the vocabulary and some statements 
and phrases appearing in the main-stream media, the news and articles dealt with 
in this work. In many cases the same sentences, adjectives or verbs used in 
different articles can exceed the meaning originally intended. It is a well known 
fact that in Spain, full of history of internal problems, national demands, and the 
civil war of the first half of the last century, provoked mainly by the Spanish 
nationalism – the words occur in typical semantic fields. The following brief 
outline is based on most frequent words and phrases appearing in the headlines 
and the contents of the articles and editorials covered by this study.  
 
5. 1. EL PAÍS 
 
As early as in 1991, when the future two Republics began to take diverging 
roads, with the demands on the Slovak side growing stronger and with the 
uncompromising attitude increasing on the Czech side, the language chosen by 
the El País daily implied the side it was taking, patronizing one of the two rivals, 
clearly without any previous attention drawn (in the articles produced) to its 
favorite. The attitudes of special correspondents, reporters from Vienna or 
Prague, and quite rarely from Bratislava, were unambiguously and clearly 
opposing the new borderline being imposed in Europe. The most noteworthy 
articles were written for example by Hermann Tertsch, the opponent of 
disintegration of the Federation throughout the whole process, raising the issue of 
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the former Slovak State constituted with the support of the German National 
Socialists during W.W. II, looking for its parallels with current trends, and hoping 
that the readers will find the interconnection between the new Slovak state and 
the former (fascist) state on their own. A good example of this reporter’s aversion 
to the process of disintegration was his article published in the daily’s supplement 
under the headline “Eslovaquia, una, pobre y libre”215 (Slovakia, a single, poor and 
free country), in which he tried to invoke the links between the ideas of the 
developing democratic Slovak state and the fascist Spanish regime of  General 
Franco  whose slogan was quite similar: “one-single, great and free country", 
referring to Spain .Tertsch’s article is a par excellence case of journalist  xenophobia 
in describing Slovakia not infrequently with adjectives such as  “pobre, católico, 
antisemita”216 (poor, Roman Catholic, antisemitist), and designating the 
Federation  as a “progresista, fraternal”217 (progressive and brotherly) institution.  
Without any hesitation the daily often applies negative attributes 
commonly used in the Spanish politics, for example “separatist”, when relating to 
the Slovak side but never to the Czech side.  Vivianne Schnitzer, the El País 
correspondent in Vienna occasionally visiting Bratislava, does not hesitate to 
include catastrophic factors in her commentaries “una nueva división entre el este 
y el oeste en Europa”218 (a new division between the East and the West in 
Europe), as the only damaging outcome of the split-up of the country. 
Understandably, the Slovak embassy in Madrid voiced, internally, its concerns 
about these issues, proposing solutions promoting the interests of Slovak 
diplomacy219.   
                                                 
215 EL País, November 22, 1992, p. 42. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 
218 El País, June 8, 1992, p. 3. 
219 Such as in its note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, which raises concerns about 
the media coverage of Slovakia in Spanish print media, particularly in El País, where “[Schnitzer’s 
article] is the first such of its kind bringing unfavorable and non-objective information about 
Slovakia[…] To counter this, it is proposed to invite several Spanish journalists for a one-week 
stay in Slovakia, with a reasonable schedule, arrange their interviews with leading Slovak politicians 
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The daily’s editorials frequently make use of the terms raising negative 
attitudes and feelings towards the split-up process or towards the participants of 
this process, in particular one of the parties, to which most of the critical 
adjectives are being attributed. The split-up is associated with economic failure 
brought about by capricious autocrats as described specifically in the issue under 
the headline in the section opinion “Separación pacífíca”220 (Peaceful Separation). 
Numerous phrases and attributes appearing in succession predict bad and poor 
results caused by the split-up, evoking the ghosts of uncompromising Spanish 
nationalism.  La “inquietud europea ante la conmoción que sacude a 
Checoslovaquia”221 (European Concerns for Shuddering and Shaking  
Czechoslovakia ), “pérdida con el proceso de seguridad y estabilidad de 
Europa”222 (the great loss for the European Security and Stability), “los serios 
motivos de preocupación ante el proceso”223 (deep concerns  for the current 
development ), “la afirmación de que la separación solo puede empeorar las 
cosas”224 (contentions about  ‘the split-up only making the matters worse’), “que la 
población tenga que pagar un alto precio”225 (that  or about ‘the population that 
will pay a high price’), “las mentiras impresas como sobre, “la exigencia de que se 
hable sólo eslovaco”226 (haciendo referencia a la minoría húngara), (presentation 
of lies, such as the requirement of one official majority language is the proof of 
the  exclusion of the vernacular of the Hungarian minority), or comparisons with 
a permanent nightmare of reappearance of the Kosovo situation, with the process 
                                                                                                                                 
and a tour of places and sights of interest[…] This practice […] is common in countries such as 
Germany, in Spain itself and certainly Hungary, as clearly follows from articles by certain 
journalists.” See Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive  ref. no. 381/93 of 05 April 1993. For 
similar concerns, involving stances, see 380/93. 








serving the sole purpose of opening the topic of the “la revisión de fronteras”227 
(revision of the borders). All of these phrases and attributes, maintained by the 
daily  throughout the entire process of the split-up of Czechoslovakia, show the 
position, in which,  viewed from the present standpoint and seen in the historical 
perspective, any person  should be blushing with shame for supporting such 
visions. 
  
5.2. EL MUNDO 
 
Despite its conservative outlooks, the publishing line is against the 
changes of any borders in Europe, reporting and bringing factual information 
without any biased side-taking.  
However, in one of its issues, the opinion of the split-up was fully 
revealed. Under the headline “Checoslovaquia, un divorcio no deseado”228 
(Czechoslovakia, Undesired Divorce) the attention is drawn to unfavorable 
impact of the entire process. The reader is made to believe that it is necessary and 
useful to continue with the existence the common state, or otherwise the situation 
will result in skepticism and uneasiness in the divided nations. It may, however, be 
mentioned, that the author, although referring to peaceful divorce, stresses that 
the divorce was not desired by the people, anyway. This issue is marked with a 
generally pessimist accent of the resulting disadvantages prevailing over the 
advantages, also slowing down access to the European Union. The author blames 
Slovakia for being the initiator of the process, maintaining that even justified 
demands could bring unfavorable effects. It is also claimed that nationalistic 
demands may prove to be very harmful. And finally, in its conclusion, the article 
attacks the European politicians and the politicians in Czechoslovakia approving 
the division of Czechoslovakia for it may mean the end of any promising and 
optimistic future.  
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This daily also published an interview with a Moravian translator from the 
Spanish language Miloslav Uličný who places all the responsibility on the Slovak 
politicians for their preference of independence before insistence on the common 
state with the Czechs, considering the creation of the new state a “prueba de 




5. 3. ABC 
 
Conservative and monarchist ideology of the famous Madrid daily is no 
obstacle for criticism, found in the majority of its articles, of the entire process 
occurring in the Czech and Slovak Federation, emphasizing that the benefits will 
be scarce, calling the division a cold-blooded act. The newspaper had a permanent 
correspondent in the zone, Ramiro Villapadierno, well known among the 
European journalists by his polite and well-mannered articles, in which, despite 
reference to a “cold, merciless split-up” he was the first who dared to oppose the 
official theory of the split-up, maintaining that “Checoslovaquia desapareció 
también, demostrando en el fondo, la artificialidad de su concepto y en la forma 
educada la impronta de la alta civilización a la que checos y eslovacos 
pertenecieron una vez” 230, (Czechoslovakia showed the disingenuous and artificial 
nature of  the common state in a cultural manner adapted from the civilized  
world to which the Czechs and Slovaks justly belonged.) His statement “no habrá 
dos pueblos que, artificialmente obligados a vivir juntos, se lleven mejor al fin y al 
cabo que los eslovacos y los checos”231 (there are no other two nations bound to 
be living together in an artificial union terminating the existence of a common 
state in a way superior to what the Czechs and Slovaks did) is a lucid example of 
how to perceive the process also by the remaining parts of the Spanish press. The 
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author, however, continues that a possibility of uncertain effects of the process, 
still exist, “dada la imprevisibilidad de ciertos esquemas mentales heredados del 
totalitarismo individualista que invitan a no sentar nunca dogma sobre la compleja 
área centroeuropea”232 (bearing in mind unpredictability of some mental schemes 
of the heirs of individual totalitarianism and impossibility of creating any dogma 
applicable to the whole territory of Central Europe). The biography of and 
interview with this reputed journalist of European standards is included in the 
Annex, pages 166 and 160. 
According to another journalist, Francisco Eguiagaray, Czechoslovakia is 
described as “estado inventado al final de la 1ª. Guerra Mundial”233  (a state 
invented at the end of WW I). In the intentions of the majority of Spanish press, 
however, he underlines that the newly constituted states “no son sin embargo más 
viables, sobretodo Eslovaquia, por haber concluido su infeliz coyunda”234 (it will 
however, not be more viable, particularly Slovakia, because they have terminated 
their unhappy marriage), but its “ruina económica, ecológica y moral no se 
resuelve con la segregación”235 (ruins in economy and ecology and moral remains 
will NOT be fixed by a split-up). 
Another commentator and contributor of opinion articles for ABC is 
Alejandro Muñoz-Alonso. He is a university professor and politician belonging to 
the People’s Party. For many years he was an MP and since March 2000 he has 
been a senator. In the following article he held that the “los vencedores en 1918 
fueron extraordinariamente generosos con Checoslovaquia e incluyeron dentro de 
sus fronteras, trazadas arbitrariamente, una fuerte minoría húngara”236 (winning 
powers of 1918, acting with extraordinary generosity, implanted within the 
Czechoslovak borders, unlawfully demarked, a strong Hungarian minority), thus 
generating possible discords and conflicts in the given zone. The author presents 
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his view concerning Czechoslovakia, and now also Slovakia, which came into 
existence on unjust and unfair grounds, maintaining that neither in 1918 nor at 
present, the Slovaks alone ever tried to form a state of their own minority 
regarded insignificant at that time, and concluding by describing the new Slovakia  
“si Checoslovaquia era artificial, la nueva Eslovaquia no lo es menos”237 (being no 
less artificial than the former Czechoslovakia). 
 
5. 4. EL PERIÓDICO 
 
This Barcelona daily is characterized by summarizing the typical features 
of Catalonian and Basque dailies, in which the process of the split-up is perceived 
with understanding, or even with  compassion  in regard of to how this process 
occurred in the two nations (Czechs and Slovaks), and this is what distinguishes 
this daily from prevailing majority of the Spanish ideology. The Catalan and 
Basque dailies, and El Periódico in particular, stress primarily that the split-up 
occurred peacefully, mainly because, “los checos nunca hayan sentido una 
vocación serbia de dominio sobre los eslovacos”238 (the Czechs never had any 
inclinations to the Serb pattern of dominion over the Slovaks). Unlike the Madrid 
press, El Periódico offers the conclusions: “del sentido de la responsabilidad de los 
dos pueblos dependerá que el futuro sea positivo para los dos Estados vecinos“239 
(the constructive future of the two neighboring countries will depend on the 
responsibility of the Czechs and the Slovaks). The same reality is clearly presented 
from different standpoints. This may be best illustrated by a columnist. Joan 
Tudela, El Periódico co-worker, who opens his article by saying “El año 1993 no 
podía comenzar mejor. Acabamos de asistir a uno de esos raros acontecimientos 
capaces de reconciliarnos con al naturaleza humana. Dos pequeños pueblos 
centroeuropeos han decidido poner punto y final a la historia del Estado 
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común.”240 (There couldn’t be a better beginning of the year 1993. We are 
witnessing a very special occasion of humane conciliation. in how the two small 
Central European nations have resolved to terminate the development of their 
common state.)  
 
5. 5. EL DIARIO VASCO 
 
The Basque daily, dealing with the topic mainly in the last months of 1992 
and in January 1993, addressed the occasion under the headline “checos y 
eslovacos podrían unirse en el marco de unificación europea”241, (the Slovaks and 
the Czechs could meet again in the European Union). Similarly like other Catalan 
and Basque press, the article signed by Marc Fisher claims that “más de la mitad 
de la población – y probablemente más en Eslovaquia- creen que la independencia 
no es buena”242 ( the majority of the people, and probably more so in Slovakia, 
thinks that „independence is not good), supporting the idea based on non-
political motives, for example by showing that “uno de cada doce matrimonios 
checoslovacos están formados por un checo y un eslovaco y todo el mundo puede 
encontrar un familiar de la otra nacionalidad”243 (every twelfth marriage has been 
made between a Czech and a Slovak, i.e. it is mixed, or that each family has a 
member of another nationality). 
The process of separation may be well illustrated by the headline of the 
interview with a Slovak handball player Zoltán Bergendi, a member of a Basque 
club, who described the split-up as a “mania”244.  It is quite funny to see a 
statement made by a politically insignificant person reaching a headline.  
In another article of El Diaro Vasco , the attention is drawn to  
“preocupación en Eslovaquia por el interés (sic) de Hungría por revisar la 
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frontera”245 (Slovak concerns for the Hungarian interests in revising the borders). 
Just like the preceding article, also here an amusing detail is presented by a private 
interview with a Slovak pensioner traveling twice a month to Prague, calling the 
split-up  “una locura y un anacronismo que me causa una sensación de vergüenza 
y rabia”246 (crazy business, an anachronism, causing  lots of shame and anger). 
 
5. 6. DEIA 
 
The newspaper, typically reproducing the ideology of the dominating party 
Comunidad Autonóma Vascongada with pressing nationalist inclinations, shows 
consent and some sympathy with the events in Central Europe and the separation 
processes. In one of the opinion forming articles signed by José Luis Arriaga, 
there are several statements showing understanding, revived by similar processes 
in the Basque society, e.g. “los checos y los eslovacos han demostrado al mundo 
que la guerra no es la consecuencia inevitable de una desmembración estatal”247 
(the Czechs and Slovaks showed the world that a war is not the only and 
inevitable consequence of a division of the State), or “dos Estados nacen a la vida 
independiente porque así lo han querido, sin hacer uso de las armas”248 (the two 
states became constituted for independent existence based on their own 
aspirations and in absence of any weapons at all). The entire article shows a 
positive attitude towards the process growing from the will of the protagonists.   
 
5. 7. LA VANGUARDIA 
 
And finally, although conservative and monarchist, La Vanguardia brings 
the attitude of the majority prevailing in the Catalan society during the process of 
the split-up of the Czechoslovak Federation. The whole process was covered by 
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Ricardo Estarriol, the newspaper’s correspondent staying in the zone. The 
biography of and an interview with this outstanding Spanish journalist is included 
in the Annex, pages 157 and 145. His language was proper and tactful, reflecting 
authentically the situation and circumstances of the division without any reference 
to distorted historical and political judgments. 
Additionally, Ricardo Estarriol wrote separate articles and interviews with 
Slovak politicians, for instance, Ján Čarnogurský in Bratislava, on 29 April 1992, 
entitled ”Checoslovaquia, Entrevista con el jefe del gobierno eslovaco, Jan 
Carnogurski,”249 where he compared his politics, among other things, with 
Catalonian politics. Reacting  to one of Čarnogurský’s responses,  Estariol made 
the following comment: “Puede usted estar seguro de que, por lo menos en el 
noreste de la Península, pocos piensan que esto sea puro bizantinismo”250 (I can 
assure you that few people in the northwerstern part of our Peninsula would 
consider this trifles).251  
Observing Estarriol throughout his articles in La Vanguradia, it can be said 
that Estarriol does not “judge” the separation (he explains neutrally what is 
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jefe del gobierno eslovaco, Jan Carnogurski. 
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happening but does not give his opinion of whether it is good or bad). He rather 
critizes those leaders in the European Union who try to oppose the separation or 
speak out against it. He explains quite clearly that to a great extent the separation 
is more the product of the will of the Czechs rather than of the wish of the 
Slovaks.  While he avoids in his articles to critize openly anybody, he does 
mention the problems that a “centralistic mentality” of the Czechs and of Prague 
have created in Checoslovakia. He also mentions the risks and fears that the 
creation of Slovakia provokes in the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and in the 
Hungarian Government. 
 His approach to the many Czech and Slovak leaders is very diffrent from 
the one seen in El Pais. He speaks very correctly about Havel but without 
presenting him as an extraordinary man. Normally he refers to Havel as the 
“czech playwright president and former dissident” but rarely uses the kind of 
adjectives used in El Pais (prestigious, outstanding intellectual, etc). Also when 
speaking of Meciar he is much less critical. Only once does he mention  that he is 
a “former communist politician and former boxer” and characterizes him as 
having a “populist leadership”. Normally he just refers to Meciar as “leftwing 
nationalist” and says that he is rather “undefined” ideologically. 
  Overall, Estariol’s articles, including the interview cited above, clearly 
sought to provide a most close and authentic account of the split-up to Catalonian 
readers as closely and authentically as possible; at times, he even went as far as 












The quantity and the quality of information concerning the split-up of the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic covered by the Spanish press, may be 
considered in a positively way, despite some reservations, primarily in regard of 
the descriptions and explanations relating to that process. At the time of the split-
up, the information was clearly of high significance and relevance in the 
environment of the world of politics, considering that the processes of 
disintegration of that time occurred quite frequently also in other countries, but, 
unfortunately,  accompanied on many occasions with a lot of violence. The events 
in Yugoslavia clearly influenced Spanish newspapers anxious that something 
similar could happen also in Czechoslovakia, the very heart of Europe. This case 
of non-violent separation made it, however, an exceptional event, and therefore 
also the Spanish media handled the information concerning this process in an 
exceptional way. In addition, because of the specific features of the Spanish 
situation, this topic drew the attention of readers of diverse dailies, and the whole 
political community, all of whom frequently commented on these events during 
their visits to the then capital of Prague.  
It can, therefore, be concluded that the Spanish press paid sufficient 
attention, offering quite extensive reports to inform the readers about the process 
resulting in the two new Central European States being constituted. Although it is 
quite obvious that the Spanish periodicals did not use the same amount of pages 
or the funds to cover the topic, there was a broad spectrum of newspapers dealing 
with these matters almost on daily basis, starting for example EL País– having 
correspondents operating both locally (directly on the spot) and timely, and 
ending with the papers that started to bring the news only when the whole 
process was approaching its finale, often only by quoting the big press agencies. 
Thus, I relied in this  thesis on the commentaries published mostly in El País, 
giving a little less emphasis on the two other dailies bringing  adequate volume of 
information on the Czechoslovak processes, namely the Madrid ABC and the 
Barcelona La Vanguardia. The three periodicals represent a wide ideological range, 
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upon which I tried to focus in my analysis of how regularly and how adequately 
the information was delivered by the Spanish press to the Spanish majority. In 
addition, this work shows that different periodicals approached the process of the 
Czechoslovak split-up essentially from the one, and often the prevailing aspect – 
mainly in respect to the internal Spanish politics – i.e. aiming to keep the readers 
informed without any attempts to overestimate the causes leading the two nations 
to depart from their common state.  
Quite naturally the Spanish newspapers were concerned that the 
separation of the Czech and the Slovak Republic may become a precedent for the 
separation of some territories in Spain (Catalonia or the Basque Country) but 
eventually they realized the difference: in case of Czechoslovakia “both sides” 
accepted the separation, while in Spain the “central authorities” and other regions 
would never accept any separation. 
As for El Pais, I was quite critical to the ideas of one journalist named 
Hermann Terstch covering the topic, in my view, in a counterproductive manner 
and without sufficient explanations of the reasons resulting in such conclusion, 
and throwing pessimistic anticipations, especially with regard to the Slovak 
economic development. This however, has not been confirmed in the actual 
reality.  In fact the Spanish newspapers tended to portray Slovakia and its leaders 
as those who were responsible for the separation, while the Czechs were 
presented as if they were in the supporters of further development of the single 
Czechoslovakia, finally accepting the fact that the separation was the will of the 
Slovaks.  
In fact, in my view, one of the reasons for the support of El País to the 
continuation of Checoslovakia instead of the separation is this different 
appreciation of Havel and Meciar. Havel is considered a great intellectual and 
former dissident; Havel is against the separation; Meciar is a populist and former 
communist; Meciar is in favour of separation; so…the continuation of 
Checoslovakia must be good and the separation must be bad. 
        There is also a very little explanation of the reasons for the Slovak 
nationalism. It is sometimes presented as one more example of a “trend” in 
Europe but without analysing its causes.          
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It is also interesting that somebody like the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe 
Gonzalez (who was well known for being against the separation of Checoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and even the USSR), already in November 1991 recognises that the 
“exemplary peaceful coexistence –between czechs and slovaks- will not create 
instability in the region”. 
  Some other reporters of the same periodical (El Pais) treated the issue of 
the division of Czechoslovakia, similarly, being affected, quite naturally, by the 
publishing line of the daily exerting influence on the assessment of the split-up.    
 On the other hand, the other dailies already mentioned before, La Vanguardia 
(centre right, fom Barcelona) and ABC (centre-right) who placed significant 
correspondents in the relevant territories, used their knowledge of and  expertise 
concerning Central European circumstances, the nationalist, and border 
revisionist movements,  even though the two dailies’ strategies were similar to El 
País. It can be said that the articles that appeared in ABC and La Vanguardia are 
clearly more critical of the history of Checoslovakia. Referring to Checoslovakia, 
they used the terms of “non viable State”, “artifical State”, “only their common 
Slavic root unites them” and La Vanguardia even says that Checoslovakia was “a 
Czech State with a slovak province, more or less autonomous”. There is a firm 
criticism of the Treaty of Versailles (and the Czech nationalists in the US) as the 
origin of the problems encountered in 1992. So generally there is more reference 
to the grievances of the Slovaks towards the dominant Czechs. At the same time, 
there is praise to the political maturity and high level of civility of both Czechs 
and Slovaks in dealing with their separation. There are also many less criticisms of 
Meciar and they tend to point to the ultimate responsibility of the Czech 
authorities in opting for the full separation. 
The correspondents mentioned earlier showed much respect and 
understanding towards their readers when showing the processes of how the two 
emerging republics kept the door open to their own problems, as well as the 
issues of integrated Europe. Moreover, La Vanguardia, a Catalanian periodical, just 
like El Periódico, permitted differing views, too, more specifically observations 
made by the supporters of the peaceful solution, welcoming the non-violent 
resolution of the political arguments, as contrasted with the events occurring in 
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the former Yugoslavia. In La Vanguardia, I obtained the first-hand document 
containing an interview with Ricardo Estarriol, a reporter covering the 
development in Czechoslovakia. This interview was very important, because in 
addition to the facts, it also presented the journalist’s perception of the events, the 
facts seen through his own eyes, in the recollection of the circumstances evaluated 
after some years later.  
As mentioned above, ABC offered some historical surveys of the 
processes, relying, predominantly, on impartial views of a correspondent with 
superior knowledge of the issues of the region, Mr.Ramirez Villadapierna, whom I 
directly contacted via e-mail, and who was kind enough to provide many answers 
to my questions.  
I have also discussed the fact that most of the information came through 
the prism of some of the Prague politicians, meaning that the Spanish press partly 
sided with the Prague views,  trying, at least theoretically, to defend the 
continuation of the Federation. This, however was only a superficial impression 
not founded in the economic reality of the period, because the Prague leaders 
supported, in reality, to shake off the weaker Slovak “brother”. Very few Spanish 
journalists studied or reported on the situation concerning the Slovaks or the 
decision-making concerning the Slovaks taken in Prague. Vaclav Havel enjoyed 
great popularity and support among the Spanish newspapers, and there was very 
few criticism of his acts. By contrast, Vladimir Meciar, bever received positive 
appraisal.  
So, it is not surprising that the separation of the two countries was not 
criticized as something negative or adverse. Maybe due to the fact no notice was 
taken of the feelings and the mood of the general public in the given situation. 
Wouldn’t it be an example for Spain, if ordinary people were asked about the 
future they wished to choose for their nations/nationalities? The   criticism related 
purely to the fact that the country was divided. 
Even the language and the expressions used by the Spanish media, may 
serve as an illustration of fragile objectivity with which the journalists tried to 
describe the situation. As analyzed in one of the chapters of this work,   many 
articles and commentaries apply imprecisely defined terms in an effort to haze the 
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essence of the merit of the matters, making an impression that it was not their 
major task to come to clearly defined conclusions.  
  On the other hand, the inclusion of the chronology of the most important 
historical events occurring in the two Republics aimed to emphasize the global 
nature and significance of the approach to the topic of my thesis by making 
references to mutual links concerning the dates, published articles and responses 
to various significant actions.  
Finally I must say that I have not presented a detailed survey of the articles 
published by the EL MUNDO daily, because of its relative insignificance and 
trivial nature, and what is more, unlike in other Spanish periodicals, it lacked 
much of the independent or autonomous lines. In any case, I found the positions 
of El Mundo very similar to the ones of El Pais, in particular its “editorial” of 3 
January, 1993: the nationalist Meciar was presented as the main responsible of the 
separation;    
To conclude, the Spanish newspaper of the period concerned manifested 
often varied, but also quite similar idea, when viewed ideologically in an effort to 
do away with the label that the comments relating to the processes of the split-up 
of the former Czechoslovak Federation were mistaken, the resulting conclusions 
exaggerated, and the facts adjusted to the Spanish reality, which had and still has 
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8. Annex 1 
 
The following is the narrative chronology of events leading up to the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia beginning in 1991. In it, the relevant short 
correspondent reports from the Spanish press are attached to each event, also 
chronologically. Specific articles in the Spanish newspapers dealing with the issues 
as editorials (editoriales) and commentaries or opinion pieces (opiniones) are 
described separately further down. 
 
 
8.1. Chronology of the Czech-Slovak Conflict, 1991 - 1992252 
 
“18 January 1991 
Slovak Prime minister Mečiar tells journalists that Slovakia will try to 
expand its role and profile on the international scene, accusing two Prague papers 
of spreading misinformation about Slovakia. By presenting Slovakia as unstable, 
they might discourage investment from abroad.” 
 
“21 January 1991 
The federal government approves an emergency bill stipulating that a state 
of emergency can be declared by the president with the consent of the federal 
government or one of the two national governments. It includes provisions for 
limiting the freedom of assembly and the right to strike. A state of emergency 
could be proclaimed for a maximum period of ninety days if the constitutional 
system were endangered, in case of war, or other extraordinary circumstances.” 
 
                                                 
252 Directly quoted from Michael Kraus, Allison Stanger, Irreconcilable Differences? Explaining 





“22 January 1991 
The Slovak National Council rejects the state of emergency bill for leaving 
too much power in the hands of the federal government.” 
 
“3-4 February 1991 
President Havel gathers top officials in Prague to discuss the preparation 
of new constitutions for Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. On 
behalf of the KDH, Ján Čarnogurský demands that national parliaments first 
approve the constitutions of their respective republics, than agree to enter into 
a state treaty, and only then create a federal constitution.” 
 
“17 February 1991 
During the second round of constitutional talks, the Christian Democratic 
Movement (KDH) of Slovakia continues to insist that a state treaty be concluded. 
Moreover, the idea has gained the support of other Slovak political parties, 
including the Public Against Violence (VPN), presently the leading political force 
in Slovakia, and the Slovak Democratic Party, the coalition partner in the Slovakia 
government of both the KDH and the VPN. After the talks, Havel maintains that 
neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia could sign a state treaty, since neither has 
the status of a sovereign state, which is required by international law for the 
signing of such a document.” 
 
“27 February 1991 
The Federal Assembly approves the establishment of a constitutional 
court by a  215 to 7 vote. The court will settle disputes over the division of 
powers between the federal government and the Czech and Slovak republics.” 
 
“2 March 1991 
Tens of thousands of people rally in Brno, Ostrava, and Olomouc to 
demand that the government and other legislative bodies promptly settle 
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Moravia’s status within the federation. They call for autonomy and better 
treatment.” 
 
“5 March 1991 
Slovak Prime minister Mečiar and fourteen other members walk out of the 
meeting of the Public Against Violence council in Bratislava, saying they intend to 
draw up a new platform of their own.” 
 
“6 March 1991 
The Public Against Violence (VPN) splits into two groups: one advocating 
the movement’s original program, which emphasizes Slovak national concerns 
within the existing federal framework, and the other aiming at putting Slovak 
issues before all others.” 
 
“7 March 1991 
Five radical nationalist groups issue a Declaration of the Sovereignty of 
Slovakia. The declaration proposes steps leading to the full independence of 
Slovakia.” 
 
“8 March 1991 
Federal Prime minister Čalfa points out that the supporters of the 
declaration of Slovak sovereignty are primarily political forces that had opposed 
the current government. Havel and Mečiar meet. The Slovak prime minister 
assures the president that he is an advocate of the federation. Both politicians 
agree that a referendum on Slovak independence should be held soon, and Mečiar 
tells Havel that he believes the voters will choose to remain in Czechoslovakia.” 
 
“10 March 1991 
Responding to the possibility of demonstration, Mečiar says that the 
declaration’s demands will not be approved by the Slovak parliament, since the 
Slovak people do not support Slovak independence.” 
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“11 March 1991  
Thousands fill a large square in Bratislava, chanting slogans supporting 
Slovak independence and criticizing the federal government. 
Presidential press secretary Michal Žantovský proposes that both Czechs and 
Slovaks be given the right to say in a referendum whether they want to remain in 
one state. Federal Prime minister Čalfa declares that the Slovak National Council 
is not constitutionally entitled to adopt a declaration of sovereignty. 
Dagmar Burešová, the chair of the Czech National Council, announces that she 
does not believe that the majority of Slovaks want to break up Czechoslovakia. 
Arguing that such an important question should not be addressed in the streets 
but through constitutional means, she calls for a referendum. The leadership of 
the Public Against Violence repeats its call for a referendum. The presidium of the 
Czech government issues a statement that the future of federation is being 
decided. upon” 
 
“12  March 1991 
The call for a referendum receives support from the Slovak Heritage 
Foundation. Chairman Jozef Markuš says that his group favors a referendum on 
the sovereignty  issue. The group, however, also urges the Slovak National 
Council to issue an immediate declaration of sovereignty.” 
 
“13 March 1991 
Slovak nationalists honor the leader of the Slovak fascist state of World 
War II. Between 5, 000 and 10,000 people attend a ceremony in a Bratislava 
cemetery to consecrate a cross on the grave of Jozef Tiso.” 
 
“14 March 1991 
5,000 people gather in the center of Bratislava to celebrate the fifty-second 
anniversary of the founding of the Slovak state, which also signified the end of 
democratic Czechoslovakia. On a one day visit to Slovakia, Havel unexpectedly 
appears at the rally, accompanied by his supporters and bodyguards. Angry 
demonstrators scream at the president, and some attack him and his entourage. 
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Havel escapes unscathed, but several scuffles break out between nationalists and 
supporters of Havel. In a televised address to the Slovak nation that same day, 
Havel warns against attempts to attain independence by unconstitutional means 
but also declares that he would respect the decision of the Slovaks to live in an 
independent state if that decision were made in a referendum.” 
 
• EL PAÍS: Havel agredido en su visita a Bratislava 16-03-1991 Vivianne 
Schnitzer 
 
“16 March 1991 
Federal government issues a statement warning against the country’s 
disintegration.” 
 
“17 March 1991 
The VPN passes a vote of no confidence on Vladimir Mečiar.” 
 
“18 March 1991 
Despite losing the support of VPN, Mečiar says he will not step down. 
The charges against him include sympathizing with separatists and using the files 
of the former communist secret police to blackmail opponents.” 
 
“19 March 1991 
Under increasing pressure from the government coalition, Mečiar does 
not attend a Slovak cabinet  meeting, allegedly because of illness.” 
 
“22 March 1991 
At a press conference during his visit to the Netherlands, President Havel 
promises to hold a referendum on Slovak independence.” 
 
“23 April 1991 
The Slovak parliament votes to dismiss Prime Minister Mečiar and replace 
him with Ján Čarnogurský.” 
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“28 April 1991 
In his weekly radio address, President Havel describes the Slovak 
parliament’s ouster of Mečiar as a triumph for parliamentary democracy.” 
 
“1 May 1991 
The Public Against Violence formally splits in two. The new fraction, led 
by former Prime minister Vladimir Mečiar, is to call itself the Movement for 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS).” 
 
“21 May 1991 
In a closed session, the Czech National council discusses various scenarios 
drawn by the Czech government in the event of the disintegration of the 
federation.” 
 
“24 May 1991 
HZDS, the new political group led by former Prime minister Mečiar, asks 
the Slovak National Council to take steps similar to those taken by the Czech 
National Council on 21 May.” 
 
“5 June 1991 
Slovak Prime minister Ján Čarnogurský says Slovakia will seek separate 
membership in the European Community if Czechoslovakia becomes a member 
and „ if the time is ripe.“ Since EC members are required to yield part of their 
sovereignty, it would be just as easy for Slovakia to do so as for all of 
Czechoslovakia.” 
 
“17 June 1991 
At a meeting in the Moravian town of Kromeríž, leading federal, Czech, 
and Slovak politicians agree on the principles for adopting the state treaty and, 
subsequently, the federal constitution.” 
• EL PAÍS: Acuerdo Constitucional en Eslovaquia 19-06-91 AFT 
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“3 July 1991 
In a statement on the Yugoslav conflict, Slovak opposition leader and 
former Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar says that the struggle of Slovenes for their 
identity is a model for the struggle of Slovaks.” 
 
“7 July 1991 
Václav Havel says that the Czechs would not hinder the Slovaks if they 
want to secede from the federation, but if a referendum were held, it looked as if 
the majority of Slovaks would opt to remain in Czechoslovakia.” 
 
“19 July 1991 
The Federal Assembly approves the so-called Law on Referendums that 
enables referendums to be held on the constitutional setup of the country. It also 
provides for a referendum aimed at determining whether either or both republics 
wish to secede from federation, in effect ending the existence of Czechoslovakia.” 
 
“22 July 1991 
Slovak Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský says that he expects to see an 
independent Slovakia by 2000. 
Federal Assembly chairman Alexander Dubček leaves the VPN, which he has 
helped found in 1989, because it has abandoned its “centrist policy”. 
 
“5 September 1991 
Havel meets with Slovak Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský to discuss the 
future structure of the federal government and Slovak economic troubles. Havel 
promises to step up the process of working out a new government structure. 
Čarnogurský wants to guarantee the Slovak Republic’s sovereignty through a state 





“6 September 1991 
The presidiums of the Czech and Slovak national councils meet in 
Bratislava to discuss problems surrounding the preparation of the federal and 
republican constitutions. The meeting takes place amid growing tension between 
the Czech and federal authorities on the one hand and the Slovak representatives 
on the other. A communiqué is issued listing all of the issues on which the two 
sides have been able to agree, stating that by the end of 1991 all “basic 
documents” on the constitutional setup of Czechoslovakia should be completed.” 
 
“12 September 1991 
Mečiar and thirty- four other leading Slovak politicians and intellectuals 
sign a document under the title “Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia”. The 
document states that no progress has been made since the talks in Kromeríž and 
that the Slovak National Council should adopt the declaration of Slovak 
sovereignty issued in March and approve a “full” Slovak constitution, meaning 
one whose content and form are distinct from that of the federal constitution.” 
 
“16 September 1991 
No fewer than 1,000 prominent Slovaks issue a statement condemning all 
efforts aimed at presenting the division of the country to Slovaks as a fait 
accompli. The signatories also called for a referendum on the future of 
Czechoslovakia. Another petition (“A Call to Citizens”, calling for a referendum 
on whether Czechs and Slovaks should continue to live in a unified state), 
originating from the Bratislava headquarters of the magazine Kultúrny život and 
initiated by Havel’s adviser Pavel Tigrid, gathers 1,300 signatures in a few hours, 
including those of a number of prominent Slovaks. The petition asserts that 
dividing Czechoslovakia would cause irreparable economic and moral damage. By 
the end of October, more than half a million Czechs and Slovaks have signed it. 
Slovak Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský criticizes the Initiative for a Sovereign 
Slovakia, saying that the sovereignty of Slovakia is already anchored in the current 
Czechoslovak constitution. He also points out that the text of the declaration of 
Slovak sovereignty violates the current Czechoslovak constitution.” 
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“19 September 1991 
Some 30, 000 Slovaks demonstrate in Bratislava for Slovak independence. 
Federal president Václav Havel supports the call for a referendum but appeals for 
unity, saying a declaration of sovereignty would create enormous problems.” 
• EL PAÍS: Nacionalistas eslovacos se manifiestan en favor de la separación 
20-09-91 Vivianne Schnitzer 
 
“20 September 1991 
The Czech National Council adopts a resolution stating that the 
declaration of full sovereignty by one of the two republics would be an 
unconstitutional act. In such a case, the other republic would start taking 
immediate steps to “secure its own independent existence”. Such steps would be 
coordinated with the federal bodies. What remained of Czechoslovakia after one 
of the republics has seceded would be entitled to become Czechoslovakia’s 
successor in international affairs. This means that the republic that unilaterally 
takes steps ultimately leading to full independence will have to seek international 
recognition, including membership in international organizations.” 
 
“23 September 1991 
The Slovak National Council rejects a bid by a group of deputies to force 
a vote on a declaration of Slovak sovereignty. The motion for an immediate vote 
on sovereignty is supported by 61 of the 132 deputies present.” 
• EL PAÍS: El Parlamente de Eslovaquia aplaza la declaración de 
independencia 24-09-91 Vivianne Schnitzer 
 
“24 September 1991 
After opening the fall session of the federal parliament, Václav Havel says 
he wants a national referendum on the future relationship between Slovakia and 




“25 September 1991 
The Slovak National Council rejects yet another bid to force a vote on the 
declaration of Slovak sovereignty. 
The former Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar declares that a referendum is 
not the way to decide whether Czechoslovakia will remain a unified state.” 
 
“29 September 1991 
President Havel repeats his call for an early referendum on the country’s 
future setup.” 
 
“16 October 1991 
Slovak parliamentary chairman František Mikloško complains publicly that 
not a single step forward has been made during the eighteen-month discussions 
on the future setup of Czechoslovakia.” 
 
“28 October 1991 
At a rally in Bratislava commemorating the seventy-third anniversary of 
the united Czech and Slovak state, President Havel is booed offstage by Slovak 
pro-independence demonstrators when he calls for a moment of silence to 
commemorate the anniversary of a united Czechoslovakia.” 
• EL PAÍS: Nacionalistas eslovacos impiden hablar a Havel 31-09-91 
Vivianne Schnitzer 
 
“30 October 1991 
926, 000 Czechoslovak citizens have signed a petition urging the Federal 
Assembly to call an early referendum on the country’s future.” 
 
“1 November 1991 
At the founding meeting of the Moravian-Silesian Council, representatives 
of thirteen political parties and movements call for equal and independent status 
for Moravia and Silesia in the Czechoslovak federation. In the event of the 
breakup of the Czechoslovak federation, the Moravian and Silesian factions say 
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they will support a federative arrangement within the Czech Republic, which 
comprises Moravia, Silesia, and Bohemia.” 
 
“3 November 1991 
Havel invites leading Czech, Slovak and federal politicians to join him at 
his summer retreat in Hrádeček, northern Bohemia, to discuss outstanding 
constitutional issues. It is the twelfth such meeting called by Havel since the 
beginning of 1991.” 
 
“5 November 1991 
Alarmed by the lack of real progress in the talks between the presidiums 
of the republican legislatures, and after an emergency session, the federal 
government issues a statement asserting that both the federal government and the 
Federal Assembly will have to start playing a more active role in the constitutional 
talks.” 
 
“6 November 1991 
The Federal Assembly passes a bill setting procedures and guidelines for 
all referendums. The law requires referendum question to be answerable by a clear 
yes or no, a campaigning period of twelve days; and a span of at least twenty days 
between the calling of referendum and the actual vote.” 
 
“7 November 1991 
The Federal Assembly passes a bill finalizing procedures for laws to be 
reviewed by the country’s constitutional court. The law establishes procedures the 
court will follow when considering the constitutionality of referendums, power 
sharing disputes, and international agreements.” 
 
“13 November 1991 
The Federal Assembly fails to agree on the wording of a referendum 
question on the fate of the country, despite the fact that President Havel and the 
major political parties presented no less than six alternative questions for 
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consideration. The majority of Slovak and virtually all communist deputies bind 
themselves together to bring all six drafts to fall. 
In Bratislava, the Slovak parliament rejects (by just six votes) a proposal of 
a declaration on Slovak sovereignty.” 
• EL PAÍS: La disputa entre checos y eslovacos amenaza la unidad del país 
15-09-91 Vivianne Schnitzer 
 
“17 November 1991 
In response to the stalemate, President Havel proposes a number of 
constitutional and other changes on the second anniversary of the Velvet 
Revolution. The changes would empower Havel to call a referendum without the 
parliament’s approval and to dissolve the Federal Assembly if necessary; they 
would also give him special powers before new elections are called. Havel also 
proposes that the Federal Assembly have only one chamber instead of the current 
two. 
Gustáv Husák, former Communist Party leader and president, dies. Ján 
Čarnogurský, Slovak prime minister (and former prisoner of Husak’s secret 
police), attends the funeral.” 
 
• EL PAÍS: 40.000 personas se manifiestan en Praga a favor de una 
Checoslovaquia unida 22-11-91 Vivianne Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: Havel llama a la unidad checoslovaca en un mitin multitudinario 
23-11-91 Nilda Navarrete 
• EL PAÍS: El Gobierno checoslovaco aprueba un proyecto de Estado 
común 29-11-91 Nilda Navarrete 
 
“3 December 1991 
The president urges the federal parliament to grant him extra powers in an 




“31 December 1991 
“A Call to Citizens” petition in support of a referendum on the future of 
Czechoslovakia gathers 2,259,000 signatures.” 
 
“21 January 1992 
The federal parliament rejects two of five amendments proposed by 
President Havel: that a new constitution be adopted only after it has been 
approved by the Czech and Slovak parliaments and that a referendum be held on 
whether Slovakia should remain in the federal state.” 
 
“22 January 1992 
Havel withdraws a third proposed amendment whereby the bicameral 
federal parliament would have been reorganized into one chamber.” 
 
“28 January 1992 
The Federal Assembly rejects President Havel’s proposal that the 
president be given the power to dissolve the parliament.” 
 
“29 January 1992 
Slovak prime minister Ján Čarnogurský states at a political rally in Košice 
that Slovakia wants to achieve step-by-step the same sovereignty enjoyed by other 
European nations.” 
 
“9 February 1992  
After months of negotiations, an agreement is reached at Milovy on an 
accord defining the relationship between the two republics in the future 
federation. The treaty was drafted by a commission of experts formed by the 
Czech and Slovak parliaments. The draft will now be submitted to the republican 
and federal parliaments for discussion. President Havel hails the agreement as 




“12 February 1992 
The Slovak parliament’s presidium rejects by only one vote the Milovy 
accord aimed at keeping the country together.” 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Autonomismo e independentismo: Los parlamentos 
de la República Checa y Eslovaquia suspenden las negociaciones sobre el 
futuro de Checoslovaquia, 12-02-92, Ricado Estarriol 
 
“15 February 1992 
Federal Prime Minister Čalfa calls the Slovak parliament’s rejection of the 
Milovy accord the beginning of the separation of the Czech and Slovak 
republics.” 
 
‘18 February 1992 
The Czechoslovak Federal Assembly fails to approve amendments to 
three sections of the country’s constitution aimed at establishing new relations 
between the president, the parliament, and the government. The amendments 
failed to gain the necessary total of forty-five votes among the Slovak deputies in 
the Chamber of the Nations.” 
 
“19 February 1992 
Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský warns that the rejection of the draft treaty 
between the Czech and Slovak republics (the Milovy accord) by the presidium of 
the Slovak parliament has increased the danger of Czechoslovakia disintegrating.” 
 
“20 February 1992 
In a televised address, Čarnogurský calls on Slovakia’s parliament to avoid 
illegal moves toward independence.” 
 
“28 February 1992 
In an interview with Le Figaro, Slovak Prime Minister Čarnogurský says 
he wants Slovakia to enjoy the same international status as the former Soviet 
republics and to have its own representation in the EC. He adds, however, that he 
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would be willing to share a foreign affairs and defense ministry and a national 
bank with the Czech lands. In Čarnogurský´s view, there are two possible paths 
for Slovakia: (1) to immediately seize the opportunity for international recognition 
while it exists, or (2) to work for the same goal through gradual steps. He is in 
support of the latter.” 
 
“3 March 1992 
The presidium of the Czechoslovak parliament announces that general 
elections will be held on 5 and 6 June.” 
 
“4 March 1992 
In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Václav Havel 
criticizes those who advocate an independent Slovakia but oppose a referendum; 
they know that a clear vote for unity  would undercut separatism for a long time.” 
 
“7 March 1992 
The Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia splits into two factions 
because of differences over Slovakia’s position within the federal Czechoslovak 
state. Both parties announce they will remain in the Slovak ruling coalition to 
avert a government crisis.” 
 
“11 March 1992 
After more than a year of failed efforts to agree on Czechoslovakia’s 
future state structure, the leaders of the Czech and Slovak parliaments, Dagmar 
Burešová and František Mikloško, say that further Czech-Slovak talks should be 
suspended until new parliaments are elected in June.” 
 
“15 March 1992 





“20 March 1992 
The Czech parliament announces its decision to establish a Foreign 
Ministry for the Czech Republic on 1 June. The Czech Prime Minister denies, 
however, that the move is being made in reaction to the creation of the Slovak 
Ministry of International Relations some two years earlier.” 
 
“22 March 1992 
The HZDS draft election program is adopted. It outlines the following 
sequential post-election imperatives: (1) The sovereignty of the Slovak Republic 
will be declared unconditionally and without consultation with anyone at all; (2) 
a new Slovak constitution will be promulgated, with a president as the head of 
state; and (3) a referendum will be held on which form coexistence with Czech 
Republic should take – if the latter is really interested in coexistence.” 
 
“23 March 1992 
Slovakia´s parliament rejects another attempt to proclaim the republic’s 
sovereignty.” 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Dubcek con los socialdemócrata: Dubcek, el 
protagonista del “socialismo de faz humana” presenta su candidatura con 
los socialdemócratas eslovacos, 30-03-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
“ April 1992  
Vladimír Mečiar predicts that Slovakia will declare its sovereignty after the 
June parliamentary elections and will achieve it by the end of 1992.” 
• EL PAÍS: Bloqueada por tercera vez una moción de soberanía en 
Eslovaquia 04-04-92, Nilda Navarrete 
• LA VANGUARDIA: El conflicto de minorías entre Eslovaquia y 





“3 May 1992 
The twenty-three-day general election campaign officially begins in 
Czechoslovakia amid concern that the results could lead to a breakup of the 
federation.” 
 
• Los checoslovacos acudirán a las urnas con el destino del país en juego, 
21-05-92, Nilda Navarrete 
• Los nacionalistas de Eslovaquia proclamarán un Estado soberano si ganan 
las elecciones, 01-06-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: Cuenta atrás en Checoslovaquia 02-06-92 Hermann Tertsch 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Los partidos de la derecha son los favoritos en la 
República Checa, 03-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Havel pide el voto para los partidarios de la unidad de 
Checoslovaquia 03-06-92 Herman Tertsch 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Los eslovacos quieren ser dueños, Praga se llevará 
muchas sorpresas en Eslovaquia, 04-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
“5 – 6 June 1992 
In general elections, Václav Klaus´s Civic Democratic Party (ODS) wins 
in the Czech Republic, while Vladimír Mečiar´s movement for Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS) triumphs in Slovakia.” 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Inestable Parlamento Federal: las elecciones del 
viernes y sábado serán las últimas de la actual Federación Checoslovaca, 
05-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Temor de la minoría húngara al extremismo de Meciar, 06-06-
92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Durante las elecciones la cerveza no puede ser de 
más de 10 grados, 06-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Havel teme que el resultado de las elecciones en Checoslovaquia 
desestabilice Europa Central, 06-06-92, J.M. Martí Font 
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“7 June 1992 
Václav Havel asks Václav Klaus to form a new government, a move 
promptly criticized by Mečiar, who argues that talks between the political parties 
should precede negotiations on forming the government.” 
• EL PAÍS: El resultado electoral en Checoslovaquia pone en peligro la 
unidad del país. Meciar árbrito de la situación chcecoslovaca, 07-06-92, J. 
M. Martí Font 
• EL PAÍS: Profndas grietas en la Federación, 07-06-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Aumenta la polarización checa – eslovaca: La 
derecha gana con creces en los Países Checos y la izquierda nacionalista, 
en Eslovaquia, 07-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Separatismo en Centroeuropa: El resultado electoral en 
Checoslovaquia hace casi inevitable la división del país, 08-06-92, J. M. 
Martí Font 
• EL PAÍS: Separatismo en Centroeuropa: La república menos favorecida, 
08-06-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• LA VANGUARDIA: EL vencedor de Eslovaquia, Meciar, dispuesto a 
negociar con los checos, 08-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Meciar convocaré un referéndum sobre la independencia de 
Eslovaquia 08-06-92 Vivianne Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: Un jefe de Estado encargado de dar sepultura a su propio país 
08-06-92 Hermann Tertsch 
 
“9 June 1992 
After the first round of post-election talks between Klaus and Mečiar in 
Brno, Klaus maintains that the Slovak side perceives the future federal 
government as one of liquidation and that he is unwilling to become federal prime 
minister under such circumstances.” 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Václav Klaus retrasa el comienzo de las 
negociaciones para formar gobierno, 09-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Klaus admite, tras reunirse con el secesionista Meciar, que la 
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federación checoslovaca está perdida 10-06-92, Ilona Kovariková, V. 
Schnitzer 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Klaus no quiere negociar la separación y amenaza a 
su vez con un referéndum sobre la escisión de Checoslovaquia, 10-06-92, 
Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Retórica hecha realidad, 10-06-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: El lider eslovaco propone a los checos crear una comunidad de 
dos estados, 10-06-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
 
“11 June 1992 
The second round of talks between the winner of the Czech elections, 
Václav Klaus, and his Slovak counterpart, Vladimír Mečiar, takes place.” 
• EL PAÍS: El lider eslovaco Meciar se niega a hablar con Havel 11-06-92, 
Ilona Kovariková 
• EL PAÍS: Fracasan las conversaciones entre los eslovacos y Václav Klaus 
sobre la unidad de Checoslovaquia 12-06-92, Ilona Kovariková 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Klaus y Meciar alejan el fantasma de una rápida 
ruptura de Checoslovaquia, 12-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol x 
• EL PAÍS: “Carta de las Minorías” en Europa, 12-06-92, Vivianne 
Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: El eslovaco Meciar, a favor de la cohabitación con los checos, 
13-06-92, AFP 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Meciar, dispuesto a una "cohabitación" entre las 
repúblicas checa y eslovaca, 13-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol x 
• LA VANGUARDIA:  Los checos dictan las reglas de juego a los separatistas 
eslovacos, 14-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol x 
• EL PAÍS: El eslovaco Meciar se entrevista hoy en Praga con el presidente 
Havel 15-06-92 Ilona Kovariková 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Los partidos de Klaus y Meciar necesitan más tiempo 
para elaborar sus posiciones, 15-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
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“16 June 1992 
Mečiar tells reporters in Vienna that if Czech leaders continue to reject his 
call for a confederation of two sovereign states, Slovakia will have to go the way 
alone. The Slovak premier also states that public opinion polls show that 78 
percent of Slovaks want Slovakia to be a subject of international law, but at the 
same time they also want to maintain the common state.” 
• EL PAÍS: Discrepancias radicales entre Havel y Meciar sobre el futuro de 
Checoslovaquia. 16-06-92 Ilona Kovariková 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Havel no quiere ser el “liquidador” de 
Checoslovaquia, 16-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
“17 June 1992 
Vladimír Mečiar and Václav Klaus hold a round of talks on the future of 
the Czechoslovak state. As in the two previous rounds, the two leaders fail to 
agree on the fundamental principles of a new federation. They do, however, 
decide to form a caretaker federal government. Klaus tells the press that he would 
rather be Czech prime minister than head a federal government programmed to 
self-destruction. Mečiar says he plans to become Slovak premier.” 
• EL PAÍS: Entrevista con V. Meciar: En Checoslovaquia no existe la 
amenaza de una crisis yugoslava 17-06-92, Vivienne Schnitzer 
 
“18 June 1992 
President Havel shrugs off Klaus´s decision to turn down the post of 
federal Prime Minister and dismisses the claim that the incoming government will 
serve only long enough to dissolve the federation.” 
• EL PAÍS: El partido de Václav Klaus le propone como presidente de un 
Gobierno Checo, 18-06-92, Ilona Kovariková 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Klaus y Meciar centran sus negociaciones en la 
formación de un gobierno federal provisional, 18-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Las minorías de Hungría critican la ley preparada para 
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protegerlas 20-06-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Klaus y Meciar discuten en Bratislava el "programa 
de la liquidación", 20-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Václav Klaus y Vladimir Meciar firman un acuerdo para partir 
Checoslovaquia, 20-06-92 Ilona Kovariková 
 
“21 June 1992 
In his regular radio address, Havel insists that the future setup of the 
country should be decided by a referendum, but he welcomes the fact that both 
parties have agreed to form a temporary federal government. He also reaffirms his 
intention to stand for another term as federal president. In response, the former 
Slovak communists, now the democratic left, announce that they will act with 
Mečiar’s party to block Havel’s reelection.” 
• EL PAÍS: Checos y eslovacos acuerdan una participación pacífica, 21-06-
92, Ilona Kovarikova 
• EL PAÍS: Un triste recuerdo, 21-06-92, Ilona Kovariková 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Los húngaros de Eslovaquia se sienten amenazados, 
21-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: La CE advierte que la separación de Checoslovaquia es un gran 
error, 21-06-92, Ilona Kovariková 
• EL PAÍS: Havel califica como bueno el acuerdo de partición de 
Checoslovaquia, 22-06-92, Ilona Kovariková 
 
“23 June 1992 
At its opening session, the new Slovak parliament instructs Mečiar to form 
a new Slovak government. Mečiar tells reporters that he expects the new 






“24 June 1992 
The new Slovak government is sworn in, with Vladimír Mečiar as prime 
minister.” 
• EL PAÍS: Eslovaquia se proclamará república soberana en julio, 24-06-92, 
Vivianne Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: Meciar dice que la escisión eslovaca ha sido impuesta por los 
checos, 25-06-92, Ilona Kovariková 
• EL PAÍS: Havel dice que no será el enterrador de Checoslovaquia, 26-06-
92, Ilona Kovarikova / Vivianne Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: Havel denuncia un plan de Meciar y Klaus para dividirse el 
“aparato” estatal, 29-06-92 J. M. Martí Font 
• EL PAÍS: El caos engendra el caos, 29-06-92 J. M. Martí Font 
 
“1 July 1992 
Speaking in Bratislava, Václav Havel announces the composition of the 
caretaker federal government, which he acknowledges might have a limited term 
but should still be seen as a legitimate. Four right-of-the-center parties 
represented in the new Czech National sign a coalition agreement that Václav 
Klaus should become Czech prime minister.” 
• EL PAÍS: Una grave pérdida para Europa: Havel dimite como presidente 
de Checoslovaquia, 01-07-92, Hermann Tertsch 
 
“2 July 1992 
The new federal and Czech governments are sworn in. The growing 
significance of the republican bodies is reflected in both the composition and the 
structure of the republican governments. Not only do they have more ministries 
than the federal government, but they are also composed of the most prominent 
representatives of the parties that emerged victorious from the elections of 5-6 
June.” 
• EL PAÍS: Havel, Klaus y Meciar se ponen de acuerdo sobre el Gobierno 
checoslovaco, 02-07-92 J. M. Martí Font 
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“3 July 1992 
Havel fails in his bid to be reelected Czechoslovak president in two 
consecutive rounds of voting in the Federal Assembly.” 
• EL PAÍS: Los nacionalistas eslovacos bloquean la reelección de Havel 
como presidente, 04-06-92, J.M. Martí Font 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Havel no ha sido reelegido Presidente. Tiene la 
posibilidad de ser presidente interino hasta el próximo cinco de octubre, 
04-07-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
“7 July 1992 
Mečiar announces that his party wants Slovakia to elect its own president 
at the end of August, adding that the Czech Republic should do the same. The 
Slovak and Czech presidents, he argues, could then serve as Czechoslovak 
president and vice president.” 
 
“8 July 1992 
Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus announces that the Czech parliament 
will soon start to discuss a draft constitution, including plans to introduce the post 
of Czech president.” 
 
“13 July 1992 
Klaus presents his government’s program to the Czech National Council. 
It involves all necessary measures to enable the republic to exist as an independent 
state, including the adoption of a republican constitution and the creation of the 
post of Czech president. Klaus also vows to pursue radical economic reforms 
based on rapid privatization an to build a state based on the rule of law.” 
 
“14 July 1992 
Klaus´s program is approved by a vote of 105 to 60. Mečiar presents his 
new government’s policy statement to the Slovak National Council, outlining the 
sequence of constitutional steps that Slovakia will take: (1) declaration of 
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sovereignty, (2) adoption of a new constitution, and (3) a referendum on these 
measures.” 
 
“15 July 1992 
The Slovak National Council approves the program presented by the 
Slovak government.” 
 
“16 July 1992 
The federal government program, presented by Prime Minister Jan 
Stráský, is approved by the Federal Assembly. The document calls for the Czech 
and Slovak parliaments to reach an agreement on the future of Czechoslovakia by 
30 September; it is criticized by some deputies as being too provisional. Until the 
country’s fate is decided, the federal government will maintain control of foreign 
affairs, finance, defense, transport and communications, economic policy, and 
environmental affairs.” 
 
“17 July 1992 
The Slovak National Council overwhelmingly approves the Slovak 
Republic’s declaration of sovereignty. Opposition to the declaration comes only 
from former Slovak prime minister Ján Čarnogurský´s Christian Democratic 
Movement and from members of the Hungarian coalition. 
Within minutes of the close of the ceremony in the Slovak National 
Council, one of President Havel´s advisers delivers a letter to the Federal 
Assembly in Prague in which the president announces that he will resign on 
Monday, 20 July, at 6.00 p.m.” 
• EL PAÍS: Eslovaquia se proclama soberana y Havel dimite, 18-06-92 
Ilona Kovariková 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Havel presenta su dimisión como presidente de 
Checoslovaquia. La Dieta de Bratislava proclama la soberanía de Eslovaquia. 
18-06-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
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“19 July 1992 
In his last regular weekly radio address, Havel says that his decision to 
resign was not an “impulsive act of protest” against the Slovak declaration of 
sovereignty; he simply did not want to stand in the way.” 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: El gesto de Havel, 19-06-92 
 
“20 July 1992 
At 6.00 p.m. the presidential flag is lowered over Prague castle, as Václav 
Havel officially steps down from the presidency.” 
 
“22-23 July 1992 
Klaus and Mečiar meet in Bratislava and agree to submit a law entitled 
“On the End of the Federation“ to the Federal Assembly by 30 September. They 
also agree to split up the Czechoslovak Security and Information Agency and 
propose to privatize state radio and television and the official news agency 
ČSTK.” 
 
“24 July 1992 
Alexander Dubček, the former chairman of the Federal Assembly, says 
that a referendum is the only legitimate way to decide whether Czechoslovakia 
should be split into two states. Speaking to reporters he says hat this is his opinion 
but simultaneously notes that referendums have never been held at critical points 
in Czechoslovak history.” 
 
“30 July 1992 
In the third round of federal presidential elections, none of the three 
candidates is elected. The Federal Assembly cancels the fourth round of elections, 
which had been scheduled for 6 August, as no candidates have been proposed.” 
 
“5 August 1992 
Vladimir Mečiar tells the Slovak parliament that a referendum on the 
future of Czechoslovakia is now contrary to Slovak interests. At this point in time 
124 
a referendum will only complicate the question of the “successor rights” of the 
two new states.” 
 
“20 August 1992 
Speaking on television, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Jan Stráský says that 
there are indications that HZDS is retreating from its original separatist positions. 
Stráský points out that it is still possible to save the federation but suggests that 
splitting Czechoslovakia would be the best solution to the country’s problems. 
The ministers of internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic meet in Bratislava to discuss the transfer of the federal ministry’s powers 
to the republican ministries in the event of breakup. The ministers agree to set up 
seven commissions to solve legal issues associated with the transfer of powers. 
The commissions will also deal with cataloguing the federal ministry’s property, 
dividing its archives, and establishing the border between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.” 
 
“24 August 1992 
Czech Prime Minister Klaus announces that the Slovak prime minister has 
refused to participate in the HZDS/ODS talks on Czechoslovakia’s future 
scheduled to take place on 27 August in Prague. In a letter to Klaus dated 21 
August, Mečiar outlined his reasons, which include the ODS failure to apologize 
for recent statements suggesting that HZDS was orchestrating a left- wing 
putsch.” 
 
“25 August 1992 
The talks between Mečiar and Klaus on the breakup of Czechoslovakia 
will take place after all. The two leaders will meet in Brno on 26 August, and the 






“26 August 1992 
Meeting in Brno, Klaus and Mečiar agree that the Czechoslovak federation 
should split into two separate states by 1 January 1993. Their timetable calls for 
the Federal Assembly to adopt a law on the dissolution of the federation, division 
of property, and delineation of successor rights by the end of September. It also 
envisages that by the end of November each republic will have passed legislation 
on areas of future coexistence, including economic and political ties. The two 
sides agree to set up a customs union and a transitional monetary union; the long-
term goal, however, is to create two separate currencies.” 
 
“27 August 1992 
At a press conference in Prague, Klaus says he hopes that the federal 
parliament will approve of a constitutional amendment abolishing the 
Czechoslovak federation.” 
 
“31 August 1992 
A session of the Slovak National Council devoted to drafting the Slovak 
constitution opens in Bratislava.” 
 
“1 September 1992 
The Slovak National Council adopts a new Slovak constitution.” 
 
“2 September 1992 
Radio Budapest reports that Hungarian deputies in the Slovak parliament 
believe that the new Slovak constitution does not guarantee the protection of 
Slovakia’s national minorities.” 
 
“3 September 1992 
In a ceremony at the Bratislava castle Vladimír Mečiar and parliamentary 
chairman Ivan Gašparovič sign Slovakia’s new constitution. The constitution goes 
into effect immediately after the signing ceremony, but some of its provisions are 
frozen until 1 January 1993 to avoid clashes with federal law.” 
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• EL PAÍS: Eslovaquia suscribe su Constitución como país independiente, 
04-09-92, Ilona Kovariková 
 
“8 September 1992 
Speaking to reporters in Prague, the Czech Republic’s new foreign 
minister, Jozef Zieleniec, says that the Czech Republic and Slovakia will exchange 
ambassadors early in 1993. He also explains that the priorities of Czech foreign 
policy will remain the same as those of Czechoslovak foreign policy, but that the 
Czech Republic will wield less international influence and will consequently scale 
down some of the foreign policy projects initiated by former Czechoslovak 
foreign minister Jirí Dienstbier. Attaining membership in the EC, NATO, and the 
Western European Union will be his priorities.” 
• EL PAÍS: Sentencia de muerte, 13-09-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
 
“18 September 1992 
In an interview on Slovak radio, Mečiar reveals that the territorial principle 
has been adopted for the division of Czechoslovakia’s assets, assets will be kept 
on the territory where they presently reside.” 
 
“22 September 1992 
The Federal Assembly asks the government to submit to it by 15 October 
a program of steps to prevent an unconstitutional breakup of the federation, and 
by 15 November contingency plans for Czech-Slovak cooperation in the event of 
a constitutional split.” 
• EL PAÍS: El Parlamento debate la disolución de Checoslovaquia, 30-09-
92, Ilona Kovariková 
 
“1 October 1992 
The Czechoslovak Federal Assembly fails to pass a law on permissible 
ways of splitting the country. Currently, secession by one republic based on the 
127 
results of a referendum held in that republic is the only “constitutional” means of 
dissolving the country.” 
 
“3 October 1992 
After an emergency session of the Czech government, Klaus makes it 
clear that he has no intention of postponing scheduled meetings with the Slovak 
government to discuss further steps toward dividing the country, although Mečiar 
has urged him to do so. Klaus also says that Czechoslovakia will cease to exist on 
January 1993. 
Making his first public appearance since his resignation on 20 July, Havel urges 
acceptance of the breakup of Czechoslovakia (at news conference held at Divadlo 
Na zabradlí). He makes recommendations to the Federal Assembly for doing such 
in a civilized manner, reminding them that “states do not begin and end 
constitutionally“. 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Divorcio a la bohemia en Praga.  Klaus amenaza 
con saltarse el Parlamento Federal, 03-10-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
“4 October 1992  
At a press conference, Mečiar pronounces the federal government ´s 
proposals on the division of state property to be “unacceptable” to Slovakia. The 
federal government had proposed that all fixed property located on the territory 
of either republic should be awarded to that republic and that the result should be 
divided on a two-to-one basis in favor of the Czech Republic (whose population 
is twice the size of Slovakia´).” 
 
“6 October 1992 
After an eight-hour meeting of the leadership of ODS and HZDS in the 
Moravian town of Jihlava, Klaus and Mečiar sign an agreement, which confirms 
earlier agreements between the two parties stipulating that Czechoslovakia will 
cease to exist on 1 January 1993; a series of treaties specifying the relationship 
between the two new states will go into effect that same day. The agreement does 
not define specific terms for Czechoslovakia’s split.” 
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• EL PAÍS: Checoslovaquia se partirá en dos el próximo 1 de enero, 07-10-
92, Ilona Kovariková 
• LA VANGUARDIA: "Cumbre" entre Klaus y Meciar en Jihlava. Klaus:  los 
Países Checos, dispuestos a defenderse "con las armas en la mano", 07-10-
92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
“8 October 1992 
The Federal Assembly passes two constitutional amendments aimed at 
transferring federal powers to the Czech and Slovak republics. The first 
amendment reduces the number of federal ministries from fifteen to five (foreign 
affairs, defense, internal affairs, economics, and finance). The second bill gives the 
republics the power to investigate crimes against the state and jurisdiction over 
state media institutions; it also ends the federal monopoly on film.” 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Checos y eslovacos se comprometen a regular la 
escisión con decisiones parlamentarias, 08-10-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
“10 October 1992 
At a meeting near Prague, Klaus and Mečiar agree to introduce a customs 
union and to maintain temporarily a common currency following the breakup of 
the federation.” 
 
“19 October 1992 
HZDS announces that a referendum will be held in December 1992 to 
confirm the creation of an independent state (the referendum never takes place).” 
 
“26 0ctober 1992 
Czech and Slovak leaders, meeting in Javorina, Slovakia, conclude a total 
of sixteen agreements designed to govern Czech-Slovak relations after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993.” 
• EL PAÍS: Checos y eslovacos viven con miedo los últimos días del estado 
unitario, 23-11-92, EFE 
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“27  October 1992 
The draft law on the abolition of the Czechoslovak federation is approved 
by the federal government and submitted to the Federal Assembly.” 
 
‘29 October 1992 
Klaus and Mečiar sign the sixteen agreements defining relations between 
the Czech and Slovak republics after the breakup of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 
1993. The agreements include provisions for creating a customs union and 
retaining a common currency after 1 January 1993. The accords will be sent to the 
Czech and Slovak republican parliaments for ratification.” 
 
“7 November 1992 
Alexander Dubček dies.” 
 
“10 November 1992 
The Czech government submits a draft constitution to the parliament for 
approval.” 
 
“13 November 1992 
Federal Assembly deputies pass a bill on the division of federal property, 
laying the foundation for the “civilized“ separation of Czechoslovakia. Movable 
assets will be divided according to a two-to-one ratio, while fixed federal property 
will remain the property of the republic on which it is located. The division of 
some property, including the assets of federal television and radio, will be covered 
in separate legislation. The Czechoslovak parliament also adopts a law on the 
dissolution of the Federal Security and Information Agency.” 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Alexander Dubcek, enterrado con honores de jefe 
de Estado en su Eslovaquia natal, 15-11-92, AFP/EFE 
 
“16 November 1992 
Former Czechoslovak President Václav Havel announces that he will run 
in the Czech Republic’s presidential elections.” 
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“17 November 1992 
On the third anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, both the Czech and 
Slovak republican parliaments pass resolutions recommending that the Federal 
Assembly pass a bill on the dissolution of the federation.” 
 
“18 November 1992 
The Federal Assembly fails to approve legislation on the dissolution of the 
Czechoslovak federation. The bill had to be approved by a three-fifths majority in 
all three parts of the Federal Assembly. It gains the necessary majority in the 
Chamber of the People and in the Czech section of the Chamber of the Nations, 
but fails by three votes in the Slovak section. Passage is blocked by opposition 
deputies demanding that a retroactive “ratification referendum” on the split be 
held in December.” 
 
“19 November 1992 
The Czech National Council approves a resolution declaring that it is 
assuming “full responsibility” for the republic, falling just of a declaration of 
sovereignty. Most opposition deputies walk out before the vote. Klaus tells Czech 
Television that the declaration was needed to give the Czech government 
a stronger mandate.” 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Caos total en Checoslovaquia al rechazar la Cámara 
federal la separación, 20-11-92, EFE 
 
“23 November 1992 
Czech and Slovak government leaders meet in Bratislava to discuss Czech-
Slovak relations after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, including an agreement 
on army archives and one on cooperation in defense matters. The leaders sign 
nine agreements but fail to agree on how to divide immovable property belonging 
to federal institutions. The Czech side insists that such property remain in the 
possession of the republic on whose territory it is located-as stipulated by the 13 
November constitutional law on the division of the federation’s assets. But since 
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there is more than twice as much such fixed property in the Czech Republic, the 
Slovaks want financial compensation for the Czech share exceeds the stipulated 
two-to-one ratio.” 
• EL PAÍS: Checos y eslovacos viven con miedo los últimos días del Estado 
unitario, 23-11-92, 
“24 November 1992 
The Czech parliament approves fifteen and the Slovak parliament sixteen 
treaties governing relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1 
January 1993.” 
 
“25 November 1992 
After two unsuccessful attempts, the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly 
finally approves legislation providing the legal basis for the federation’s 
dissolution; the measure is passed by a very narrow (three-vote) majority.” 
 
“2 December 1992 
The Federal Assembly approves the dissolution of Czechoslovak 
Television, Czechoslovak Radio, and the Czechoslovak Press Agency (ČSTK) on 
1 January 1993. While Czechoslovak Television and Radio will continue to 
operate until 31 December 1992, ČSTK was abolished de facto in November, 
when its assets were divided between two newly established republican press 
agencies-the Czech Press Agency (ČTK) and the Press Agency of the Slovak 
Republic (TASR). The Federal Assembly also votes to dissolve the Czechoslovak 
Academy of Sciences as of 1 January 1993 and to transfer its assets to the Czech 
Academy of Sciences and the Slovak Academy of Sciences. The Czechoslovak 
Red Cross organization will be divided into the Czech Red Cross and the Slovak 
Red Cross following the split of the federation on 1 January 1993.” 
 
“4 December 1992 
The presidium of the Czech National Council releases a statement saying 
that the governing coalition and the opposition are unable to agree on a draft 
Czech constitution.” 
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“16 December 1992 
Lawmakers from the Czech Republic finally endorse a new constitution, 
which provides for a two-chamber parliament and a weak presidency once the 
Czechoslovak federation dissolves 1 January 1993. The final vote is 172-16 with 
10 abstentions. The constitution will go into effect 1 January 1993. Deputies vote 
on nearly ninety amendments to the constitution in one session, adopting about 
twelve changes on the floor. Not surprisingly, the final text is not immediately 
available to journalists. Among the key compromises are the addition of a bill of 
rights as an amendment to the constitution. Deputies will still have to resolve how 
the new upper house or senate will be created.” 
 
“17 December 1992 
The federal parliament holds its final session. 
In the first unanimous vote in recent memory, 151 deputies in the Czech National 
Council approve a law making the Czech flag identical to the flag of the 
Czechoslovak Federation. This violates the law on splitting the federation, which 
forbids either side from using any Czechoslovak state symbols. Slovakia has no 
official reaction to the Czech move.” 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Checos y eslovacos podrían unirse en el marco de 
unificación europea, 26-12-92, EFE 
• LA VANGUARDIA: La división de Checoslovaquia no desestabiliza 
Europa Central, 29-12-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• DEIA: Las repúblicas checa y eslovaca establecen el 1 de enero relaciones 
diplomáticas, 30-12-92, Agencias 
• EL PAÍS: Checoslovaquia muere a medianoche y se rompe en dos, 31-12-
92, Hermann Tertsch 
• LA VANGUARDIA: El fin de Checoslovaquia es fruto de la torpeza de la 
clase política, 31-12-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Desaparece un estado, nacen dos, 31-12-92, Hermann Tertsch 
• ABC: Checoslovaquia desaparece con el fin de 1992, 31-12-92, Agencias 
• EL MUNDO: El “divorcio de terciopelo”, las últimas horas de vida del 
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estado checoslovaco, 31-12-92, Agencias 
 
“1 January 1993 
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ceases to exist.” 
 
8. 2. Chronology of Slovak History in 1993253 
 
„1 January 1993 
The independent Slovak Republic came into being. The Deputies of the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic and the government of the independent 
Slovak Republic met together in a solemn session. The deputies took an oath of 
loyalty to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and accepted a declaration that 
stated: “On 1 January 1993 the Slovak Republic became an independent and 
democratic state. As a sovereign, independent, and legitimate state the Slovak 
Republic is one of two successor states of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 
Tha National Council of the Slovak Republic confirms ist will and readiness to 
become a regular member of the United Nations Organization... and  equally 
declares its interest in membership in the Council of Europe and the status as 
a contracting partner of the European agreement on the defense of human rights 
and fundamental liberties... The National Council of the Slovak Republic solemnly 
declares that the Slovak Republic is continuing in the democratic tradition and the 
humanistic legacy of our forefathers and is prepared to initiate and mainatain 
diplomatic relations with all democratic states of the world“. Already in the first 
hours of its existence the independent Slovak Republic was diplomatically 
recognized by 62 countries of the world. 
The Slovak Republic became a full member of the International Monetary Fund 
and the organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).“ 
                                                 
253 Directly quoted from Škvarna Dušan, Škvarna, Dušan, Slovak History, Chronology and 




• LA VANGUARDIA: Checoslovaquia ya no existe, 01-01-93, Ricardo 
Estarriol 
• LA VANGUARDIA: La desaparición de Checoslovaquia crea dos nuevos 
estados europeos, 01-01-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Checos y eslovacos, escépticos ante la partición del país, 02-01-
93, Hermann Tertsch 
• EL PAÍS: La triste resaca de Año Nuevo, 02-01-93, Hermann Tertsch 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Se consumó el divorcio checo-eslovaco, 02-01-93, 
Marc Fisher 
• DEIA: Checoslovaquia desapareció del mapa europeo con el Año Nuevo, 
02-02-93, Agencias 
• EL PERIÓDICO: Checoslovaquia consuma su ruptura, 02-01-93, Juan 
González Yuste 
• ABC: Checoslovaquia: la fría separación que no pudo abrigar el terciopelo, 
02-01-93, Ramiro Villapadierna 
• ABC: Checos y eslovacos, más primos que hermanos, 02-01-93, Ramiro 
Villapadierna 
• EL MUNDO: Adiós a Checoslovaquia, 02-01-93, Freddy Valverde / 
Charo F. Cotta 
• EL MUNDO: Checoslovaquia se partió en dos, 02-01-93, Freddy 
Valverde 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Pulso del día: Checoslovaquia ya no existe, 02-01-
93,  
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Checoslovaquia, tras 74 años, se transforma en dos 
estados, 02-01-93, EFE 
• EL PAÍS: La oposición eslovaca deberá confirmar su lealtad al nuevo 
estado, 03-01-93, Hermann Tertsch 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: Absurdo divorcio, 03-01-93 
• EL PAÍS: Final de Trayecto, 03-01-93, Hermann Tertsch 
• EL PERIÓDICO: Editorial: Checos y eslovacos, 03-01-93 
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• ABC: Separación, 03-01-93 Francisco Eguiagaray 
• EL PERIÓDICO: La pesadilla del “capitalismo salvaje” – Checos y 
eslovacos despiertan del sueño independentista con importantes subidas 
de precios en los productos básicos, 04-01-93, Juan González Yuste 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Preocupa en Eslovaquia el interés de Hungría por 
revisar la frontera, 05-01-93, Agencias 
• EL PAÍS: Relevado el director del principal periódico eslovaco, de 
propiedad estatal, 06-01-93, REUTERS 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Meciar culpa a Havel de la división checoslovaca, 
06-01-93, Agencias 
 
„12 January 1993 
The French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, arrived for an official visit to 
the Slovak Republic. It was the first visit of a representative of a foreign 
government to the independent Slovak Republic.“ 
 
„16 January 1993 
The Slovak Republic became a member of the World Bank.“ 
 
„19 January 1993 
At a session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, 
the Slovak Republic was accepted as the 180th member-state. The Slovak state 
flag was ceremonially raised in front of the United Nations building.“ 
 
„22 January 1993 
The Slovak Republic was accepted as a special observer in the Council of 
Europe.“ 
• EL MUNDO: Los parlamentos checo y eslovaco eligen mañana a los jefes 
de ambos Estados, 25-01-93, Freddy Valverde 
• ABC: Eslovaquia y la República Checa eligen hoy a sus primeros jefes de 
Estado de la Historia, 26-01-93, Ramiro Villapadierna 
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• LA VANGUARDIA:  Havel, elegido presidente checo en una sesión llena 
de incidentes , 27-01-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: El cambio que pudo haber sido y no fue, 27-01-93, Hermann 
Tertsch 
• EL PAÍS: Havel, elegido presidente checo tras una jornada de insultos de 
la ultraderecha, 27-01-93, Ilona Kovariková 
• EL PAÍS: El candidato de Meciar a la presidencia de Eslovaquia fracasó 
en el primer intento, 27-01-93, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• ABC: Seis meses después de su renuncia, Havel regresa al Castillo de 
Praga, 27-01-93, Ramiro Villapadierna 
• EL MUNDO: El Parlamento checo nombra a Havel nuevo presidente de 
la República, 27-01-93, Freddy Valverde 
• DEIA: Václav Havel, elegido primer presidente de la República Checa 
independiente, 27-01-93, Agencias 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Václav Havel fue elegido primer presidente de la 
República Checa, 27-01-93, Agencias 
• LA VANGUARDIA: La elección del Presidente provoca una crisis 
política en Eslovaquia, 28-01-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Eslovaquia sufre su primera crisis al no lograr el Parlamento 
elegir presidente, 28-01-93 Vivianne Schnitzer 
• ABC: Havel: „Estrechar las relaciones con Eslovaquia será mi labor 
preferente“. 28-01-93, Ramiro Villapadierna 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: El drama de presidir, 28-01-93 
 
„2 February 1993 
The National Council of the Slovak Republic adopted a  law concerning 
the separation of the currencies of the Czech and Slovak republics.“ 
• EL PAÍS: Havel jura como primer presidente checo, 03-02-93, Ilona 
Kovariková 
• ABC: La frágil unión monetaria checa y eslovaca, condenada 
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a desaparecer, 03-02-93, Ramiro Villapadierna 
• ABC: Cumbre centroeuropea sin Meciar en la investidura de Havel, 03-02-
93, Ramiro Villapadierna 
 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Havel jura fidelidad a la Constitución checa, 
fracaso en Eslovaquia, 03-02-93, B. Iraburu 
 
„8 February  1993 
A new currency, the Slovak crown (SK), began to be used in Slovakia.“ 
 
„9 February 1993 
The Slovak Republic became a memebr of UNESCO.“ 
• LA VANGUARDIA: La oposición no consigue presentar un candidato 
común para la Presidencia de Eslovaquia, 09-02-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
„15 February 1993 
In a secret ballot, 106 of the deputies of the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic voted for the candidate of the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia, Michal Kováč, to become president of the Slovak Republic.“ 
• EL PAÍS: Kovac, el candidato de Meciar, primer presidente de 
Eslovaquia, 16-02-93, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Un funcionario de banca, nuevo presidente de 
Eslovaquia, 16-02-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
• ABC: Michal Kovac, elegido primer jefe de Estado eslovaco, 16-02-93, 
Ramiro Villapadierna 
• ABC: Chequia se convierte en la nación más floreciente y estable del 
antiguo Este, 24-02-93, Ramiro Villapadierna 
 
„8 March 1993 
President Michal Kováč named Milan Čič as the president of the 
constitutional court of the Slovak Republic.“ 
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• LA VANGUARDIA: Meciar pierde su único aliado en el Parlamento, 19-
03-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
• EL PAÍS: Vladimir Meciar hace frente a su peor crisis de gobierno desde 
la creación de Eslovaquia, 20-03-93, Vivianne Schnitzer 
• EL PAÍS: El enfrentamiento entre Chequia y Eslovaquia puede llegar a la 
guerra comercial, 22-03-93, Ilona Kovariková 
 
„2 April 1993 
In Bratislava an options and futures exchange, the first in central or 
eastern Europe, began to function.“ 
• EL PAÍS: Eslovaquia inquieta a la minoría húngara, 02-04-93, Vivianne 
Schnitzer 
 
„12 April 1993 
At the 89th session of the Inter-parliamentary Union in New Delhi in 
India, the Slovak Republic became a member of the organization.“ 
• EL PAÍS: El error checoslovaco, 11-05-93, J. M. Martí Font 
• EL PAÍS: Pugna por el reparto de bienes, 11-05-93, J. M. Martí Font 
 
„23 June 1993 
The Slovak Republic signed an agreement of association with the 
European Community in Brussels.“ 
 
„30 June 1993 
The Slovak Republic became the 31st memebr of the Council of Europe.“ 
• EL PAÍS: Ultimátum húngaro a Eslovaquia para que respete a la minoría 
magiar, 30-06-93, J.M. Martí Font 
 
„10 July 1993 
The National Bank of the Slovak Republic devalued the Slovak crown by 
10 percent.“ 
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• LA VANGUARDIA: Meciar congela la nueva ley sobre las minorías, 20-
07-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
„8 August 1993 
The remains of the writer Jozef Cíger Hronský, which had been brought 
from Argentina to Slovakia (3 July 1993), were burried in the National Cemetery 
in Martin in the presence of President Michal Kováč and Prime Minister Vladimír 
Mečiar.“ 
 
„9 August 1993 
The trade balance of the Slovak Republic concluded with a surplus of 2.9 
bilion Sk.“ 
 
„17 August 1993 
The goverment of the Slovak Republic accepted an agreement of 
association with the European Community. The agreement was signed in the 
Kirchberg European Center in Luxemburg on 4 October 1993. The European 
parliament ratified it on 27 October 1993 and the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic ratified it on 15 October 1993.“ 
 
„29 September 1993 
The National Council of the Slovak Republic adopted a law for mitigating 
some of the property injustices inflicted upon churches and religious societies 
during the communist regime.“ 
 
„September 1993 
During the first nine months of its existence the Slovak Republic had been 
recognized by 122 states of the world. Diplomatic relations with Slovakia were 
maintained by 106 states. The Slovak Republic opened embassies and consular 
offices in 53 states of the world.“ 
• EL PAÍS: Arena y cal, los checos adoptan el mercado libre a ritmo de 
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bajos salarios y precios elevados, 12-12-93, Jay Branegan 
 
„22 December 1993 
The National Coucil of the Slovak Republic adopted a law on the state 
budget allowing a deficit of 14 bilion Sk.“ 
 
 
8.3. UNCLASSIFIABLE ARTICLES 
 
EL PAÍS: González pide sensatez a checos y eslovacos para preservar su 
federación 12-11-91, Ignacio Cembrero 
 
• EL PAÍS: Checoslovaquia se abre a España para no depender de 
Alemania, según González 13-11-91, Ignacio Cembrero 
 
• EL MUNDO: Cuaderno de Cultura BABELIA: Eslovaquia, fascismo 
„made in USA“. Entrevista con Milolslav Ulicny, traductor y poeta, 04-01-
92, Miguel Bayón 
 
• EL PAÍS: Un moralista en la política, 06-02-92, Jorge Edwards 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Entrevista con el Jefe de Gobierno eslovaco, Ján 
Carnogursky/ Perfil, 29-04-92, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
• EL PAÍS: El Nacionalismo en Centroeuropa: Eslavos y Magiares, 03-06-
92, Carmén González Enríquez 
 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: Dudas en Praga, 08-06-92 
 
 




• EL PAÍS: Entrevista con Vladímir Meciar, Lider del Movimiento para 
Eslovaquia Democrática „En Checoslovaquia no existe la amenaza de la 
crisis yugoslava“, 17-06-92, Vivianne Schnitzer 
 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: El gesto de Havel, 19-06-92 
 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: Separación pacífica, 22-06-92 
 
• EL PAÍS: La unidad de Europa, 23-06-92, Martín Balboa Fernández 
 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: Proteger a las minorías, 24-06-92 
 
• EL PAÍS: Tribuna: Václav Havel: ¿La impotencia de los poderosos?, 24-
06-92 
 
• EL PAÍS DOMINGO: Otra raya en el mapa. 28-06-92, J.M. Martí Font 
 
• EL PAÍS: Checoslovaquia y Europa, Ralf Dahrendorf 
 
• EL PAÍS: Europa y el nacionalismo, 22-07-92, Miroslav Hroch 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Opinión: El último Dubcek, 10?-11-92 
 
• EL PAÍS Suplemento: Eslovaquia, Una, pobre y libre, 22-11-93, Hermann 
Tertsch 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Transición en el Este, Lluís Foix, 28-11-92 
 




• LA VANGUARDIA: La separación checoslovaca da origen a dos nuevas 
televisiones, 28-12-92, Rodrigo Morales 
 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Análisis: País rico, país pobre, 02-01-93, Mario 
García 
 
• DEIA: Opinión: Checoslovaquia ha muerto, 02-01-93, José Luis Arriaga 
 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: Absurdo divorcio, 03-01-93 
 
• EL MUNDO: Editorial: Checoslovaquia: un divorcio no deseado, 03-01-
93 
 
• EL MUNDO: Opinión: Nueva frontera, 03-01-93, Jaime Pastor 
 
• EL DIARIO VASCO: Deportes: El eslovaco Zoltan Bergendl califica de 
„aberración“ la división de su país, 03-01-93, Alberto Echaluce 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Editorial, Dos Checoslovaquias, 04-01-93 
 
• ABC: Opinión: Estados artificiales, 04-01-93, Alejandro Muñoz-Alonso 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Opinión: Chequia y Eslovaquia, 05-01-93, Norbert 
Bilbeny 
 
• EL PERIÓDICO:  Opinión: Eslovacos y Checos, 09-01-93, Joan Tudela 
 
• DEIA: Nacionalismo y atraso, 17-01-93, Xabier Arzalluz 
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• EL PAÍS: Chequia, 22-01-93, Xabier Zabaltza Pérez-Nievas 
 
• EL PAÍS: No vamos a andar a tiros. 25-01-93, Iva Horák/ Ludmila 
Čechová 
 
• EL MUNDO: EL papel del futuro presidente checo, 25-01-93, Václav 
Havel 
 
• EL PAÍS: Editorial: El drama de presidir, 28-01-93 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Ideas, Cuaderno de Cultura: El ángel de la historia, 
16-02-93, Monika Zgustová 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: La fractura discreta, 16-02-93, Josep Ramoneda 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Cultura: Entrevista a  Petr Fidelius, filósofo checo: 
„El comunismo cultivó el odio como el máximo valor moral“, 16-02-93, 
Monika Zgustová 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Responso para Dubcek, 21-02-93, Bohumil Hrabal 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Hungría busca su lugar entre el polvorín de los 
Blacanes y la Comunidad Europea, 22-02-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
• EL PAÍS: Entrevista: Václav Klaus: “Nadie puede acusarme de contribuir 
a dividir a Checoslovaquia”, 09-05-93, J.M. Martí Font 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA:  Entrevista con el Presidente de Eslovaquia, Michal 
Kovac, 20-09-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Entrevista con el Ministro de Defensa eslovaco, 
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Imrich Andrejcak, 22-09-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Los Sudetes, entre Praga y Bonn, 29-10-93, Ricardo 
Estarriol 
 
• LA VANGUARDIA: Entrevista con el viceminsitro de defensa checo Jiri 
Popisil, 21-11-93, Ricardo Estarriol 
 
• EL PAÍS: Dos caras de Eslovaquia: entrevista com Michal Kovac, 
Presidente de Eslovaquia y Vladimir Meciar, ex primer ministro eslovaco, 
04-01-94, Ángel Santa Cruz 
 
• EL PAÍS: República Checa, el „milagro“ poscomunista: Fascinados por el 
dinero, 17-04-1994, Ángel Santa Cruz 
 
• EL PAÍS: Eslovaquia, la tentación vive al lado, 21-04-94, Ángel Santa 
Cruz 
 
• EL PAÍS: Dos heridas abiertas con Hungría, 21-04-93, Ángel Santa Cruz 
 
• EL PAÍS: El arte de regar la historia, 08-11-94, Václav Havel 
 
• LA VENGANZA DE LA HISTORIA: La Suiza malograda; La historia 
de Maria Poda, Hermann Tertsch, 1993 
 
• EL PAÍS: Dos países a la sombra de un imperio. La europa de los 25, los 
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     9. 1. Evelina Mäsiarová’s Interview with Sr. Ricardo Estarriol on April   





1. ¿Qué relación tiene usted con la antigua Federación Checoslovaca? ¿Fue Usted 
alguna vez corresponsal en Praga? 
 
 En 1964 empecé a trabajar como corresponsal de “La Vanguardia” en 
Viena con especial centro de atención en los países del Pacto de Varsovia. En 
abril de 1967 viajé por vez primera a Checoslovaquia y desde entonces hasta la 
separación estuve 40 veces y alrededor de 170 días en Checoslovaquia. Mi última 
estancia en la Checoslovaquia unida tuvo lugar en diciembre de 1992 para 
entrevistar al ministro de asuntos exteriores Zieleniec. Estuve acreditado sólo 
temporalmente en Praga. Después de la separación he hecho naturalmente 
bastanbtes viajes tanto a Chequia, como a Eslovaquia. 
 
2. ¿Puede explicarnos su relación personal con la República Checoslovaca? 
 
Lógicamente, muy estrecha, tanto en los países checos como en 
Eslovaquia. A pesar de la vigilancia del SB y de las represalías que solía tomar la 
policía, tuve y continúo teniendo  no tan sólo relaciones profesionales, sino 
también muy buenas relaciones personales. Debo añadir que he conocido muy 
bien la policía política de todos los países comunistas y los peores (para nosotros, 
los periodistas) eran los checos y los serbios. Durante la época comunista, en las 
dos naciones (Chequia y Eslovaquia) he conocido personas inteligentes, generosas 
y valientes. El problema para mí era evitar que estas personas fueran luego 
sometidas a represalias. Imborrables son mis recuerdos de las entrevistas que tuve 
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con el Cardenal Tomasek, por ejemplo, o con Jiri Hajek, con intelectuales de 
Brno, con bastantes personas de Eslovaquia. Durante la larga crisis polaca 
después de 1980/1981 viajé numerosas veces a Varsovia a través de Moravia: era 
evidente el terror que tenían los agentes del gobierno al “virus polaco”, un terror 
que se manifestaba en la forma en que nos trataban. 
 
3. ¿Cómo situaría el proceso de división checoslovaco en la Europa posterior a la caída 
del sistema socialista y del muro de Berlín? 
 
Fue un proceso lógico y Europa debería estar agradecida a las dos 
naciones y a las respectivas minorías en el territorio de ambas naciones de que la 
separación hubiera sido pacífica. Fue un proceso necesario, debido a que uno de 
los dos socios (Chequia) nunca abandonó la idea de una 
unión/federación/comunidad asimétrica. No voy a darle a usted una clase de 
historia, pero sí decirle que estoy convencido de que la unión de ambas naciones, 
dictada por la Entente después de la segunda guerra mundial, no tenía nada que 
ver con el romántico y pasajero deseo de algunos checos y eslovacos de fomentar 
la “solidaridad, hermandad y unidad de los pueblos eslavos”, sino que era el 
producto del deseo de los vencedores de la primera guerra mundial de cerrar un 
cordón sanitario alrededor de Austria. Los que conozcan un poco los regímenes 
comunistas conocen la táctica comunista de no permitir nunca “estructuras 
horizontales”. La creación de estructuras horizontales en el partido fue uno de los 
caballos de batalla de los reformistas en el pc polaco cuando “Solidarnosc” les 
estaba quitando la clientela. Muy pocos se han detenidos a pensar cómo era 
posible que nunca hubiera existido un comité central del partido checo, o del 
partido ruso, o del partido español no catalán. La razón es muy sencilla: el método 
leninista no permite que el que manda esté al nivel de los mandados. Por lo tanto, 
los armenios, los usbecos, los catalanes, los tasajos, los eslovacos etc. podían tener 
un comité central propio de carácter más o menos cosmético, pero por encima de 
sobre ellos estaba jerárquicamente el comité central del partido a nivel de todo el 
estado (el cc soviético, el cc checoslovaco, el cc español). Pero los rusos, los 
checos y los espanoles no catalanes no necesitaban un comité central propio, sino 
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que se servían del comité central a nivel de todo el estado, con lo cual se 
colocaban automáticamente por encima de los comites centrales “nacionales”. Sé 
que es difícil de entender, pero me imagino que una eslovaca me entiende. 
 
4. ¿Cómo valora el proceso checoslovaco? ¿Realmente no había otra salida? ¿Por qué 
cree que no se preguntó a la población? 
 
Seguramente había otra salida, pero los hombres que hicieron la historia 
entonces no pudieron o supieron dar con ella. No consideré nunca que hubiera 
sido imposible llegar a algún tipo de unión confederada. Si Vaclav Havel y Jan 
Carnogurski hubieran podido negociar por su cuenta, seguramente hubiera sido 
posible encontrar una solución pragmática. Tenga en cuenta que la Unión 
Europea es de hecho una especie de confederación, que en algunos aspectos 
ejerce a veces funciones soberanas que los eslovacos no hubieran querido ceder 
tan fácilmente a los checos, pero en cambio han cedido a la UE. Pero Havel tuvo 
que dejar las negociaciones en manos de Klaus y en Eslovaquia Carnogurski, que 
tenía muy poca habilidad para mantenerse en el poder, dejó el poder en manos de 
un ambicioso nacionalista y populista. Creo que fue Carnogurski quien me dijo un 
día algo así como: “mire usted, lo que nosotros no queremos es que las decisiones 
que afectan a Eslovaquia se tomen fuera de Eslovaquia”, en todo lo demás 
estamos dispuestos a colaborar. Klaus en cambio, había dicho con mucha claridad 
que “mir ist der permanente Konsens zweier Nationen bei der Regierung zu 
unsicher: so kann man weder arbeiten, noch regieren“. En su día entendí que no 
se preguntó a la población, porque la pregunta no hubiera aclarado nada: la 
mayoría de los checos hubieran votado contra y la mayoría de los eslovacos 
habrían votado a favor. 
 
5. ¿Cuál es su opinión personal sobre la postura de la delegación checa y la eslovaca en 
los encuentros entre Klaus y Meciar? ¿Cree que los eslovacos buscaban la independencia, o más 
bien considera que los checos expulsaron a los eslovacos de la federación? 
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Yo no pienso ni una cosa (que los eslovacos quisieran la independencia), 
ni otra (que los checos les echaran de la federación), sino que la inconsciente 
arrogancia de Klaus y la necesidad que tenía Meciar de ampliar (con decisiones 
populistas) la base popular de su poder fue lo que condujo al resultado actual. No 
puedo decir que los eslovacos hubieran negociado mal, pero en estas 
negociaciones tenían poco espacio de maniobra. Recuerdo que, cuando los dos 
países y Polonia iban a entrar en la OTAN hice una serie de entrevistas con los 
respectivos ministros de defensa. Un viceministro checo que contó que, antes de 
las negociaciones sobre la distribución del patrimonio del ejército federal, Klaus le 
dijo al viceministro una directiva: “nosotros queremos dinero: deje las armas a los 
eslovacos”. Y así surgió la absurda situación de que Eslovaquia se quedó con unos 
fantásticos caza-bombarderos soviéticos MIG-29 que no le servían de casi nada y 
para los que no tenían ni campos de aviación, ni servicio, etc. de tal forma que el 
nuevo ejército eslovaco tuvo que alquilar aparcamientos en los campos checos… 
 
6. ¿Cuál fue, para Usted, el tratamiento que recibieron los políticos implicados en el 
proceso: Havel, Klaus y Meciar, en la prensa española? ¿Considera que alguno de ellos hizo el 
papel de bueno, y otro el de malo? 
 
Nunca me extrañó el trato que recibieron en la mayor parte de los medios 
españoles. La prensa española reflejó la forma de pensar de la nación dominante, 
que prefiere por principio la asimetría: es la constante de todos los estados 
europeos, desde Rumanía a Francia, pasando por Italia. No creo que los medios 
espanoles piensen que Klaus había hecho el papel de bueno, sino que hizo el 
papel que convenía a su nación. Pienso que Meciar perdió prestigio fuera de su 
país, no con la independencia, sino más tarde, cuando empezó a hacer más 
tonterías, como por ejemplo el intento de “filetear” en franjas de sur a norte las 
zonas de población húngara, para evitar que la población magiar pudiera disponer 
de distritos o zonas en los que ellos fueran la mayoría. Recuerdo muy bien una 
visita de Solana en la que avisó a Meciar de los peligros que entrañaba su 
populismo nacionalista. 
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7. Imagino que usted ha seguido con posterioridad el proceso de ambos estados. 
¿Considera que se han cumplido las previsiones: el enriquecimiento rápido de Chequia y el 
hundimiento eslovaco? 
 
No. Lo único que yo pensé entonces es que los eslovacos lo tendrían algo 
más difícil que los checos, pero nunca pensé en que fueran a hundirse. Y hoy 
basta con mirar los Eckdaten del país (Eslovaquia) para darse cuenta de que 
progresa mucho. 
 
8. ¿Cuál ha sido para Usted el proceso que han seguido los problemas nacionales y las 
reivindicaciones autonomistas en los dos nuevos estados: los checos con los moravos y los eslovacos 
con la minoría húngara? ¿Considera cerrado el proceso? 
 
Pienso que entre checos y moravos no habrá nunca grandes problemas. 
En cambio sí creo que todavía no ha sido superado el problema de los húngaros 
en Eslovaquia. Pero pienso que quizás el tiempo será la mejor fórmula. No veo 
ningún movimiento irredentista en Hungría y además, si lo hubiera, ya se 
encargaría la UE de que desapareciera pronto: hay demasiados estados en la 
Unión Europea que tienen sus propios problemas de minorías que podrían re-
explotar. Pero Eslovaquia debería ser más abierta. Sólo a modo de ejemplo, creo 
que cualquier eslovaco que haya viajado algo por el mundo se avergonzará de que 
sus autoridades obliguen a los húngaros a declinar sus apellidos magiares de 
acuerdo con una declinación eslava. En cambio, pienso que tanto Chequia como 
Eslovaquia están cometiendo un error al mantener la vigencia de la legislación de 
Benes: los alemanes han sido expulsados y ya no regresarán, pero hay que 
reconocer los errores del pasado, aunque – en comparación con los que hicieron 
otros - sean de menor cuantía. Incluso, yo aconsejaría a los eslovacos a dar un 
paso por su cuenta, sin necesidad de acordarlo con los checos, de la misma forma 
que Benes tampoco consultó sus decretos a los eslovacos. 
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9. ¿Cuál fue, según su punto de vista, el tratamiento que se dio al proceso en la prensa 
española? ¿Predominó el hecho de que fuese una separación pactada e incruenta, o bien se hizo 
hincapié en el hecho de que con ello se rompía otro estado europeo, un mal ejemplo por tanto? 
 
Pienso que la prensa reflejó la forma de pensar de sus lectores. Recuerdo 
que, bastantes años de que cayera el régimen yugoeslavo, participé en un debate 
televisivo (“La Clave”) en Madrid y defendí el punto de vista de que el Occidente 
debería empezar a darse cuenta de que Yugoslavia era un proyecto de estado 
inviable, etc. Uno de los televidentes hizo un comentario telefónico live diciendo: 
“no es de extrañar que Estarriol defienda la desintegración de Yugoslavia, puesto 
que es catalán…”. Lo mismo me hubiera dicho alguien seguramente, si el debate 
versado sobre Checoslovaquia. En 1990/1991 nuestro ministro de asuntos 
exteriores, Fernández-Ordóñez, era incapaz de imaginarse que la URSS se 
desintegraría. Respondiendo a su pregunta de usted, predominó la segunda 
versión, pero ahora ya en vista de la positiva experiencia pienso que los juicios 
negativos ya no existen o existen en mucha menor medida. 
 
10. ¿Considera que el punto de vista de la prensa española fue unitario? ¿Cuál fue, a 
su entender? ¿Se posiciono a favor o en contra de la separación? ¿Cree que el mensaje que se 
estaba lanzando era contrario a la creación de nuevas fronteras? 
 
No, no fue unitario. Pienso que la prensa catalana (por lo menos el diario 
para el que yo trabajé) enjuició positivamente la separación. Un un país con una 
ETA que no para de matar y con seis millones de catalanes que –a juicio de los 
nacionalistas del centro-- continuamente ponen dificultades al gobierno central, 
los medios del centro en general eran opuestos a la separación. Efectivamente 
entonces todavía se consideraba que el principios de que las fronteras no pueden 
modificarse como un sacrosanto principio de derecho natural, cosa que se ha 
demostrado no ser cierta. Pienso que cuando llegó a reunificación alemana, el 
entusiasmo de nuestros políticos por la “sacralidad de las fronteras” fue 
disolviéndose. 
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11. ¿Recuerda alguna diferencia entre la prensa estatal (El País, El Mundo, ABC, 
La Vanguardia) con la prensa catalana y vasca, especialmente (AVUI, Deia, El Diario 
Vasco) en el tratamiento de esta separación? 
 
Hay una gran diferencia, sí, y le agradezco que coloque a “La Vanguardia” 
en el capítulo de la prensa “estatal” (entiendo que usted designa con este adjetivo 
lo que en alemán llamaríamos ‘”bundesweit”), pero mi periódico se vende poco en 
Madrid y tiene una línea muy diversa de los periódicos de Madrid. Pero tampoco 
pueden establecerse paralelismos entre las naciones no castellanas: los vascos se 
ocupan de la autodeterminación y de la independencia, mientras que los catalanes 
quisiera para Cataluña algo semejante a lo que hubiera querido hacer Carnogurski 
en Eslovaquia. El hecho de que haya un partido separatista en el gobierno catalán 
es la mayor paradoja política que uno puede imaginarse en Europa: para que el 
partido mayoritario gobernante en todo el país (PSOE), pueda también gobernar 
en la autonomía catalana, han necesitado no tan sólo una alianza con los 
comunistas (lo cual hasta cierto punto es comprensible), sino una alianza con el 
único partido verdaderamente separatista que existe en Cataluña. 
 
12. ¿Llegó a España la información de la que se habló también sobre la injusta 
repartición de los bienes federales en beneficio de la República Checa y en contra de la Eslovaca? 
En ningún artículo he leído ningún comentario al respecto. 
 
No, seguramente, porque los mismos eslovacos no quisieron. Aparte de 
anécdotas, como la que le he contado del ejército, yo personalmente no investigué 
el asunto, porque partí de la base de que la parte objeto de la injusticia hubiera 
tenido que decirlo. Y, si no lo decía el gobierno, hubira tenido que tomar la 
palabra la oposición. Personalmente, tengo la impresión de que esto de repartir el 
patrimonio nacional es algo muy difícil, sobre todo cuando la mayor parte de la 
propiedad productiva es estatal. Yo tuve un amigo croata que formó parte de una 
comisión fomentada por la apoyada por la Comunidad Europea encargada de 
repartir el patrimonio estatal entre la ex Yugoslavia y las repúblicas. Era un trabajo 
de Sísifo, porque no había forma de ponerse de acuerdo ni en el método, ni, por 
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ejemplo, en la propiedad de inversiones hechas en común, como centrales 
eléctricas y autopistas,o en la amortización de inversiones hechas asimétricamente, 
etc. etc. 
 
13. ¿Por qué es tan pobre el conocimiento que tiene la juventud española sobre 
Eslovaquia, o sobre la misma división de la Federación Checoslovaca? ¿Qué piensa usted al 
respecto? 
 
El día en que la juventud (y la senectud) española empiece a distinguir 
entre Eslovaquia, Eslovenia y Eslavonia lanzaré las campanas al vuelo. No es una 
falta de los eslovacos, sino de mis compatriotas. De todas formas, permítame que 
le pregunte: ¿que es lo sabe la juventud eslovena sobre Cataluña? Pienso que si el 
gobierno eslovaco inicia una buena campana turística, quizás las cosas cambien 
poco a poco. Con ello quiero decir, que en primer lugar hay que arreglar la 
infraestructura que tendría que recibir los turistas, porque sólo con una 
propaganda no se consigue nada. Yo pienso siempre que ustedes tienen unas 
zonas fantásticas en el centro del país (por ejemplo, toda la parte de Spis, pero 
también los Tatra, etc.) que muy pocos conocen. Desgraciadamente, les ha tocado 
a ustedes tener la capital en una zona del país que es poco atractiva, pero 
Eslovaquia en su conjunto es un país bellísimo y la población es hospitalaria y 
generosa. 
 
14. ¿Tiene alguna información sobre cómo observaron el proceso de división checoslovaco 
los países vecinos a España, por ejemplo Francia y Portugal? 
 
No, lo siento, pero no me cuesta imaginar que Francia -- que con su 
jacobinismo y en aras del centralismo ha destruido prácticamente todas las 
estructuras geográficas y históricas no orientadas al centro -- nunca habrá sentido 
un especial interés por una Eslovaquia independiente. Francia fue además la 
vanguardia de la Entente que en 1918 quitó Eslovaquia a los húngaros para 
dársela a los checos. 
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15. ¿Piensa que seria posible aplicar el modelo checoslovaco de división también en el 
marco de solucionar los respectivos problemas con las nacionalidades existentes en el Estado 
Español? 
 
No lo creo. En España son las regiones ricas las que se sienten más o 
menos maltratadas por las más pobres, en Checoslovaquia eran los ricos quienes 
hostigaban a los pobres. En España hay quien utiliza el terrorismo para reclamar 
la independencia, cosa que nunca se registró en Checoslovaquia. España era un 
estado desde el siglo XV, mientras que Eslovaquia de hecho fue independiente 
por vez primera el siglo XX. Me cuesta mucho imaginar que un país miembro de 
la UE pueda llevar a cabo una separación. 
 
16. ¿Cómo compararía la separación de Checoslovaquia con la de Yugoslavia? Usted 
ha pasado muchos años en Belgrado. ¿Cuál fue el proceso yugoslavo, hasta que empezaron las 
declaraciones de independencia de Eslovenia y Croacia? 
 
Los paralelismos históricos proceden del siglo XX. Anteriormente el 
paralelismo era relativo: en ambos hay eslavos es cierto, pero unos son eslavos del 
sur y otros eslavos del norte. Ambas creaciones eran artificiales. En el caso de 
Checoslovaquia hay que hacer una diferencia: mientras que los checos dependían 
de la corona imperial, los eslovacos dependía de la coronal real. Y esto fue 
culturalmente y socialmente muy importante. Los Habsburgos tenían una 
concepción del Estado de la nación muy distinta de la que tenían los húngaros: los 
Habsburgos no “germanizaban” su imperio, mientras que los húngaros (aún bajo 
los Habsburgo) intentaban “magiarizar” los territorios que dominaban. Los 
emperadores distinguían perfectamente entre Estado (estructura política y jurídica 
de una o varias naciones) y nación (concepto étnico, religioso, lingüístico, 
cultural), cosa que hoy día todavía no acaban de distinguir españoles, italianos y 
franceses. Para un español de lengua castellana España es un Estado nacional, y 
por ello teme que aquellos grupos que se califican de nación dentro del estado 
cometen un atentado contra el Estado, cosa que no sucedía en Austria. Otro 
ejemplo: cuando los húngaros maltrataban a los rumanos en la Transilvania, los 
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representantes rumanos recurrieron (pasando por encima de los húngaros) al 
Emperador, quien atendió sus ruegos e intentó frenar a los nacionalistas húngaros. 
Esta es la razón por la cual la cuna de la independencia del estado de los rumanos 
fue precisamente la Iglesia greco católica (ortodoxos re-unidos a Roma), 
generosamente creada y apoyada por el Emperador: ésta es la razón por la cual 
sólo en Transilvania hay grecos católicos (los que hay en el resto de Rumanía son 
diáspora). El paralelismo entre Checoslovaquia y Yugoslavia procede del deseo de 
las potencias de la Entente de crear un “cordon sanitario” que fuera capaz de 
detener el supuesto apetito hegemónico habsbúrgico. 
El proceso yugoslavo fue distinto. La creación del estado fue obra de 
Wilson y de la Entente. El “Reino de los serbios, croatas y eslovenos” duró sólo 
diez años y acabó con una dictadura del rey serbio (1929). Los croatas, que (como 
los eslovenos) habían sufrido el régimen húngaro nunca se sintieron en su casa en 
aquel estado tan extraño, en el que había muchas naciones que no eran en 
absoluto yugoslavas o sud-eslavas (fundamentalmente, alemanes, albaneses, 
italianos). Un paralelismo muy importante con Eslovaquia. Tanto Croacia como 
Eslovaquia se entregaron en manos de los nazis, cuando pensaron que les 
permitiría conseguir una independencia nacional (fue penoso, pero es también 
fácil comprenderlo). Los que trabajamos en Yugoslavia a partir de los años setenta 
sabíamos que aquello no podía durar. A medida que mejoró el nivel de vida, 
disminuyó la presión policíaca y resurgieron los sentimientos nacionales (en 1970 
en Croacia, por ejemplo). A partir de 1974 Tito reconoció una auténtica 
autonomía a Kosovo y la calidad de “nación” a los bosníacos musulmanes. Al 
comenzar los años noventa Yugoslavia era sólo una fachada, pero nuestros 
diplomáticos y políticos occidentales no querían reconocerlo. Invocaban el 
principio de la inviolabilidad de las fronteras como si se tratara de un derecho 
fundamental. En 1990 el gobierno de Belgrado no podía ejercer su soberanía fiscal 
(la repúblicas se quedaban con los ingresos fiscales), ni monetaria (los bancos 
llevaban a cabo emisiones monstruosas para financiar la administración, la 
corrupción y el ejército sin avisar al gobierno), los diputados en el parlamento 
federal se auto-prolongaban sus mandatos, el ejército modificaba su estructura sin 
preguntar al gobierno federal, etc., etc. De manera que la disgregación de 
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Yugoslavia sólo sorprendió a los que llevaban gafas oscuras. Naturalmente, la 
mayoría de los estados europeos tenían mala conciencia con sus naciones: España 
con los catalanes y vascos, Francia con todas las naciones asimiladas que tienen 
disimuladas, Inglaterra con los irlandeses, Bélgica con las dos naciones que todavía 
hoy día están a punto de destruir el estado, Italia, con los sudtiroleses, etc. etc. 
Nadie quería tomar noticia de que en la entreguerras en Yugoslavia mandaban los 
serbios disfrazados de monarquía, y en la postguerra eran los mismos serbios 
disfrazados de comunistas (en Bosnia, gobernaba una fascinante coalición de 
comunistas y musulmanes). Puesto Europa no fue capaz de ayudar solucionar el 
problema de la desmembración de Yugoslavia, tuvieron que intervenir finalmente 
los americanos en Bosnia 81995) y la OTAN en Kosovo (1999). Y ahora nadie 
quiere tomar responsabilidades. 
El paso de Eslovaquia a la independencia fue distinto como explico en la siguiente 
respuesta. 
 
17. ¿Cómo se explica el hecho de que en los artículos de algunos periódicos españoles, a 
diferencia de los publicados en la Vanguardia, se afirmaba que a Eslovaquia le esperaba un 
„mal“ futuro y, por el contrario prosperidad y éxito para los checos? La mayoría pintan a una 
Eslovaquia retrasada, haciendo vaticinios de una mala situación económica? 
 
Porque desgraciadamente los eslovacos (debido a la estructura asimétrica 
del Estado) nunca había tenido ocasión de manifestarse de forma clara y de dar a 
conocer la realidad de su país. Y los que explicaban a los occidentales lo que eran 
los eslovacos eran precisamente los checos. O, algunos eslovacos que trabajaban 
en Praga y que no querían tener conflictos con los checos. Tenga en cuenta que 
Eslovaquia no tenía tradición de estado (a no ser que regresemos al Reino Gran 
Moravo…). Es muy difícil aprender a ser estado: yo lo he visto bastante 
directamente con los eslovenos, que me pedían ayuda y recuerdo que todo era 
nuevo para ellos: ¿Cómo se emite moneda? ¿Qué hace un banco nacional? ¿Cómo 
se crea el servicio diplomático?, etc. etc. 
En cuanto al trato diferenciado de la prensa, yo tenía la suerte de tener 
lectores que, cuando yo me equivocaba en alguna cuestión geográfica, por 
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ejemplo, me escribían enseguida para corregir. Era lógico que los catalanes 
tuvieran interés y simpatía por conocer el desarrollo de una nación como la 
eslovacaa que luchaba por su independencia. Cada vez que doy una conferencia 
para explicar a los catalanes lo que son los ucranianos del este de Eslovaquia, les 
describo lo que Eslovaquia perdió después de la guerra y les hablo de Uzhgorod o 
de Muchacevo, les hablo de que esta última ciudad tiene un nombre distinto en 
once lenguas distintas, y se lo pasan en grande. 
 
18. ¿Qué le parece la actual situación de Eslovaquia, y la de la República Checa, 
después de 15 años? Cree que sigue habiendo diferencias o se han igualado. ¿Se cumplieron los 
pronósticos de la prensa española? 
 
Naturalmente que sigue habiendo diferencias después de 15 años. Y ahora 
son más claras. Pienso que los dos estados se han comportado de una forma muy 
racional y que constituyen un ejemplo muy importante para el futuro de Europa. 
La UE, que hubiera tenido dificultades para digerir un estado con tensiones 
internas como en un estado checoslovaco, ha podido digerir con facilidad dos 
estados sin tensiones. Además, lo importante es que no han necesitado los 
consejos de ninguna troica europea de ministros inútiles, como el italiano De 
Michelis que prefería las discotecas a las meses de conferencias durante la ofensiva 
del ejército yugoslavo/serbio en 1990/1991. 
 
19. En la parte final de su respuesta a la pregunta número 4 de mi anterior 
cuestionario se refiere a que no se preguntó a los ciudadanos porque no se hubiera aclarado nada, 
ya que los checos hubiesen votado en contra, y los eslovacos a favor. ¿Puede aclararme esos datos? 
Hasta ahora, todas las encuestas conocidas indican que también la población eslovaca, al menos 
en aquel momento, estaba en mayoritariamente contra de iniciar un proceso de división de la 
federación. ¿Tiene datos más concretos al respecto? 
 
No puedo aclararlo, tengo mi archivo en Viena, pero pienso que los 
resultados electorales parlamentarios indicaban que la mayoría de la población 
tendía a votar a los políticos partidarios de la independencia. Usted debe saberlo 
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mejor. Tengo la impresión de que entonces nadie se preocupó mucho por la 
cuestión del referéndum. He mirado por encima mis crónicas y veo que en junio 
de 1992 “el jefe del gobierno saliente, el cristianodemócrata Carnogurski, declaró 
el viernes en una conferencia de prensa que él estimaba que la separación llegaría 
dentro de unos meses. A su modo de ver, si ahora se llevara a cabo un referéndum en 
Eslovaquia, la mayoría de los eslovacos votaría contra la salida de la federación”. 
No recuerdo que este asunto hubiera desempeñado ningún papel decisivo en todo 
el proceso, pero a lo mejor me equivoco. Tendría que repasar las fuentes de que 
yo disponía entonces y no tengo tiempo. Todo depende seguramente de cómo se 
hubiera hecho la pregunta. Yo pienso que si entonces hubiéramos preguntado a 
los eslovacos si querían organizar su propia defensa, determinar su política 
exterior, que los asuntos de Eslovaquia se decidieran en Bratislava, etc. hubieran 
dicho que sí y esto significa que, en realidad, querían la independencia, porque 
estas funciones soberanas sólo las puede ejercer un estado independiente. Al nivel 
político, es cierto que Klaus (con su intransigencia) empujó a Meciar a la 
independencia. Pero no lo hizo Havel. En privado le diré que con su forma de 
actuar Klaus hizo un gran favor a los eslovacos. 
 
 
9. 1. 1. Curriculum vitae of Ricardo Estarriol254 
 
Born the 27 of February of 1937 in Girona (Spain). Middle School in 
Gerona. 
He studied Journalism in Barcelona and Madrid and graduated 1958 from 
the Official School of Journalism. During his studies he was volunteering in “Los 
Sitios de Gerona” and in “Diario Regional” (Valladolid). Later Licenciado en 
Derecho by the University of Valladolid in 1960. 
Immediately after finishing his studies he was correspondent in Vienna of 
Europe-Press Agency until 1964. From 1964 correspondent of "La Vanguardia" 
in Vienna for the East of Europe. From 1968 to 1989 he was co-accredited in the 
                                                 
254 As submitted by himself. 
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Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. More than six 
hundred trips to these countries with alternative residence in Vienna, Moscow and 
Warsaw. Also he has been special correspondent in Belgium, Spain, Italy and 
China. Estarriol was the first Spanish journalist who covered a regular political 
information from the countries within the Soviet socialist block during the time in 
which Spain still did not have diplomatic relations with these countries. From 
1989 to date he has been working in all States arising from former Yugoslavia, 
where it has made numerous trips. 
He has interviewed almost all most important politicians of the zone: 
Gromyko, Walesa, Jaruzelski, Iliescu, Kucan, Gligorov, Bartoszewski, 
Mazowiecki, Havel, Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Boban, Cervenkowski, Bulatovic etc. 
He has covered the most important events with the zone from 1964: intervention 
of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia (1968), almost all the congresses of the 
communist parties of the Warsaw Pact and the world-wide conferences of the 
communist parties, the Russian-Chinese war in the Ussuri (1969), the nationalist 
revolutions in Yugoslavia (1970 and 1971), the end of the Cultural Revolution in 
China (1973), the preparations of the Conference of Helsinki (1975), the death of 
Tito (1980), the birth of Solidarnosc in Poland (1980), the martial law in Poland 
(1981), the ascent to power of Gorbachov in the USSR (1985), the social pact in 
Poland (1989), the fall of the communist regimes in Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria (1989 and 1990), trips of the Pope John 
Paul II to Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 1991 he 
covered the declaration of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia. From 1991 to 1995 he covered the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina. In 1998 and 1999 he was in Kosovo during the Serb repression. On 
April 13, 1999, during the NATO bombing of Serbia, Estarriol was expelled from 
Belgrade. After the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, he came in Prishtina 
with the first British NATO convoy on the 12 of June 1999. 
He has written several monographic studies: "Shade in the horizon of the 
international Communism" (“Nuestro Tiempo”, Pamplona, October of 1962), 
"Fifteen years of religious policy in Czechoslovakia" (“Ius Canonicum”, 
Pamplona, 1964) and "The Soviet approach to the Polish crisis" (Russian 
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Research Center of the Harvard University, Cambridge, December of 1982) and 
"Communist Europe 1945 1990" (Publishing History Actas, Madrid, 1990), ¿ 
¿Quien is Slobodan Milosevic? (“Nueva Revista”, Magazine, Madrid, June 1999). 
“L’allargamento a Est dell’Unione europea” (“Est-Overst”, ISDEE, Trieste 2002). 
Conferences and seminaries: He was professor of Sciences of Information 
in the University Internacional Menéndez Pelayo of Santander (1974 and 1999), of 
the Seminary on Eastern Europe of the Institute of Superior Studies of the 
Company (Barcelona, 1981) and of the Program of Latin American Graduados 
(PGLA) as the University  of Navarre in February of 1986. Visiting fellow in the 
Russian Research Center of Harvard University during the winter semester 1982. 
Member of the Spanish delegation in the Forum of Information of the CSCE in 
London (May 1989). 
In 1982 it received in Barcelona the Prize Godó de Periodismo. In 1985 
the President of the Republic of Austria, Rudolf Kirchschläger, awarded him in 
Vienna the "Silbernes Ehrenzeichen für die Verdienste um die Republik 
Österreich". In 1996 he received in Zagreb the Medal of Merit of ECTF 
(European Community Task Force) of the European Union. In 1999 July 22 he 
received in Madrid the Prize of Journalism of the Funcación Rafael Calvo Serer, 
and in December 1999 His Majesty King Juan Carlos II awarded him the Cross of 











9.2. Evelina Mäsiarová’s Interview with Sr. Ramiro Villapadierna 




1. ¿Qué relación tiene usted con la antigua Federación Checoslovaca? ¿Fue Usted 
alguna vez corresponsal en Praga? 
 
Fui destinado a Praga en 1990 para abrir la primera corresponsalía de ABC 
en los antiguos países del Este. Permanecí en Praga hasta 1997, siendo trasladado 
luego a Viena, pero seguí a cargo y visitando la República Cehca.  
 
2. ¿Puede explicarnos su relación personal con la República Checoslovaca?  
 
Fue mi puerta al desconocido mundo, primero eslavo, y luego socialista, 
ambos muy desconocidos para los occidentales. Una gran experiencia cultural y 
social.  
   
3. ¿Cómo situaría el proceso de división checoslovaco en la Europa posterior a la caída 
del sistema socialista y del muro de Berlín? ¿Cómo compararía la separación de Checoslovaquia 
con la de Yugoslavia? 
 
Checoslovaquia tuvo, gracias a la Revolución de Terciopelo y a la 
singularidad de Havel y Dubcek, un “plus” de atención y aprecio mediático 
internacional muy importantes. La división rompió un poco ese encanto, pero su 
ejemplaridad política incluso en un proceso doloroso y difícil, frente al desastre 
nacional-golpista yugoslavo, mantuvieron pese a todo la admiración de muchos.  
Luego la “gran Checoslovaquia” pasó a ser dos países pequeños, más auténticos 
pero con menor interés y peso.  
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4. ¿Cómo valora el proceso checoslovaco? ¿Realmente no había otra salida? ¿Por qué 
cree que no se preguntó a la población? 
 
Pienso que sí había salida, pero las ruedas de la historia habían empezado a 
girar ya en dirección a la ruptura y, cuando Havel, Carnogursky y otros lo 
comprendieron, se retiraron para no participar del proceso.  
 
5. ¿Cuál es su opinión personal sobre la postura de la delegación checa y la eslovaca en 
los encuentros entre Klaus y Meciar? ¿Cree que los eslovacos buscaban la independencia, o más 
bien considera que los checos expulsaron a los eslovacos de la federación? 
 
La relación de equilibrio no existía, pero no era tan imporante. Cuando los 
eslovacos exageraron su victimismo, los checos también se sintieron víctimas y 
echaron sus cuentas. El desarrollo golpista en Yugoslavia llevó a Klaus y Meciar a 
pisar el acelerador y declarar el fin con el menor coste posible. Las dos cosas son 
verdad, una inercia empujó a la otra y al revés.  
 
6. ¿Cuál fue, para Usted, el tratamiento que recibieron los políticos implicados en el 
proceso: Havel, Klaus y Meciar, en la prensa española? ¿Considera que alguno de ellos hizo el 
papel de bueno, y otro el de malo? 
 
Havel se beneficiaba de una imagen intocable y además siempre 
desempeñó un papel honroso. Klaus y Meciar quedaron como una mezcla de 
“malos pero listos y pragmáticos”. La hábil resolución de la ruptura les ganó un 
crédito que, no obstante, luego dilapidaron con sendos nuevos nacionalismos; aún 
lo empeoraron luego, en el caso de Meciar, por su deriva autárquica; y, en el de 
Klaus, por su antieuropeísmo.  
 
7. Imagino que usted ha seguido con posterioridad el proceso de ambos estados. 
¿Considera que se han cumplido las previsiones: el enriquecimiento rápido de Chequia y el 
hundimiento eslovaco? 
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Los primeros cinco años casi hunden a Eslovaquia, pero el gobierno de 
Dzurinda logró el milagro de reconducir al país a la UE y a la OTAN. Creo que 
Eslovaquia debe mucho de su éxito posterior a ese gran giro. Los Países Checos, 
por el nacionalismo de Klaus, no se recuperó bien del fin del Obcanské Forum, y 
han tenido que sufrir luego malos gobiernos socialdemócratas. Su economía se ha 
visto así retrasada.  
 
8. ¿Cuál ha sido para Usted el proceso que han seguido los problemas nacionales y las 
reivindicaciones autonomistas en los dos nuevos estados: los checos con los moravos y los eslovacos 
con la minoría húngara? ¿Considera cerrado el proceso? 
 
No me considero capaz de opinar sobre los últimos cinco años, pero 
tengo la idea de que los Chequia llevó a cabo por fin una regionalización más 
racional, y también los gobiernos de Dzurinda lograron una descentralización y 
mejorar mucho las relaciones con Budapest y la participación política magyár.  
 
9. ¿Cuál fue, según su punto de vista, el tratamiento que se dio al proceso en la prensa 
española? ¿Predominó el hecho de que fuese una separación pactada e incruenta, o bien se hizo 
hincapié en el hecho de que con ello se rompía otro estado europeo, un mal ejemplo por tanto? 
 
El único diario que siguió detenidamente el proceso fue ABC, porque era 
el único con corresponsal permanente sobre el terreno, aunque La Vanguardia 
también se ocupó bien. Se vio: con pena el fin de un país funcionante, por una 
decisión tomada por la élite y de espaldas al público; pero con lógica, también, 
como resultado de un estado artificial y del fin del comunismo; y con alivio, por 
fin, al ver la sensatez con que se procedió. 
 
10. ¿Considera que el punto de vista de la prensa española fue unitario? ¿Cuál fue, 
a su entender? ¿Se posicionó a favor o en contra de la separación? ¿Cree que el mensaje que se 
estaba lanzando era contrario a la creación de nuevas fronteras? 
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Creo que no se hicieron ningunas comparaciones con los nacionalismos 
en España y se evitó hablar de “nuevas fronteras”. Aunque no seguía la prensa de 
la competencia, no creo que hubiera posturas contrarias sino sólo un tratamiento 
más profundo o más superficial.  
 
11. ¿Recuerda alguna diferencia entre la prensa estatal (El País, El Mundo, ABC, 
La Vanguardia) con la prensa catalana y vasca, especialmente (AVUI, Deia, El Diario 
Vasco) en el tratamiento de esta separación?       
 
Sí ví un interés particular y algo distinto por parte de medios de regiones 
fuertes, como Cataluña, como también sucedió con la desintegración yugoslava, 
pero no por parte de los medios de Madrid y, desde luego, no por parte de ABC.   
   
12. ¿Llegó a España la información de la que se habló también sobre la injusta 
repartición de los bienes federales en beneficio de la República Checa y en contra de la Eslovaca? 
En ningún artículo he leído ningún comentario al respecto. 
 
Sí, ABC lo abordó, ya digo que era el único diario permanente, pero 
también reconozco que sólo como planteamiento y no como conclusión final.  
 
13. ¿Por qué es tan pobre el conocimiento que tiene la juventud española sobre 
Eslovaquia, o sobre la misma división de la Federación Checoslovaca? ¿Qué piensa usted al 
respecto? 
 
El desconocimiento es enorme, tanto sobre Eslovaquia, como sobre la 
mayoría de los pueblos de Europa que no salgan en la MTV, incluidos los propios 
pueblos de España. La gente joven no suele leer, ni prensa ni casi nada.    
 
14. ¿Tiene alguna información sobre cómo observaron el proceso de división checoslovaco 
los países vecinos a España, por ejemplo Francia y Portugal? 
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No puedo contestarle, aunque sé que Francia tenía una postura claramente 
en contra y sentía a Checoslovaquia casi como una hija suya (de Clémenceau) y los 
periodistas franceses solían estar influidos por esa idea y un “anti regionalismo”.  
 
15. ¿Piensa que seria posible aplicar el modelo checoslovaco de división también en el 
marco de solucionar los respectivos problemas con las nacionalidades existentes en el Estado 
Español? 
  
Si –sólo si- un día llegara una separación: a) yo desearía un modelo checo-
eslovaco de separación; b) no lo creo posible, porque la rabia, odio y frustración 
que se crearía entre unos y otros pueblos no permitiría una lógica de “reducción 
de daños” y un arreglo tan “amable”. 
 
16. ¿Cómo se explica el hecho de que en los artículos de algunos periódicos españoles, 
a diferencia de los publicados en la Vanguardia, se afirmaba que a Eslovaquia le esperaba un 
„mal“ futuro y, por el contrario prosperidad y éxito para los checos? La mayoría pintan a una 
Eslovaquia retrasada, haciendo vaticinios de una mala situación económica. 
 
Eslovaquia tenía una situación industrial, agrícola y energética muy distinta 
a la Rep. Checa. Algunos cálculos de reconversión y paro, así como el proceso 
nacional-autoritario emprendido en los primeros años, y el enfrentamiento con 
Budapest, prometían un mal futuro. Pero desde 1998 se produjo un cambio difícil 
y valiente, con un éxito que mi diario siguió de cerca y elogió en todo momento.  
 
17. ¿Qué le parece la actual situación de Eslovaquia, y la de la República Checa, 
después de 15 años? Cree que sigue habiendo diferencias o se han igualado. ¿Se cumplieron los 
pronósticos de la prensa española? 
 
Respecto a los últimos años, no puedo opinar. Creo que ambas situaciones 
y niveles de vida se han igualado “grosso modo”, tal vez como antes de la 
separación; pero Eslovaquia ha tenido que sufrir también una emigración, por el 
alto nivel de paro.  
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18. En sus artículos se hacía hincapié, básicamente, en la situación checa. ¿Cuál era la 
razón? Un mayor interés de los lectores españoles por la situación política en ese nuevo país? 
Una cuestión sencillamente demográfica o de proximidad sentimental a España? O el hecho de 
que para los lectores españoles, podía ser considerada más próxima –ideológica y 
sentimentalmente hablando- la nación checa, como “vïctima” de las veleidades nacionalistas que 
dividían la federación? 
 
Informaba más de la República Checa porque vivía la mayor parte del 
tiempo en Praga; no creo de ningún modo que los españoles sientan más o menos 
cercanía con unos u otros. Tal vez sólo Eslovaquia es un concepto más nuevo 
para ellos que “checo”, aunque a veces no sepan bien cuál es el nombre del país 
de los checos. A veces es tan simple como que, en España, “checo” suena un 
poco más conocido, porque se entendía como diminutivo de “checoslovaco”; 
mientras tal vez “eslovaco” se confunde con “eslavo”, “esloveno”, “eslavón”, etc.  
 
19. A menudo utiliza el término “Países Checos” que ningún medio de prensa española 
de la época utilizaba.. ¿Puede explicarnos por qué razón? ¿Lo interpreta como una traducción 
del término checo “?echy”? 
 
Como digo, durante años no había un nombre oficial claro para “el resto” 
de Checoslovaquia que no era Eslovaquia. “Chequia” no les gustaba a los checos, 
porque era el nombre usado por los nazis (“Tschechei” o “Tschechien”) Había un 
nombre antiguo que era Ceské Zemie y yo, mientras decidían un nombre oficial, 









9. 2. 1. Curriculum vitae of Ramiro Villapadierna 
 
“Ramiro Villapadierna255 (Madrid, Spain, 1964) is the Berlin based Central 
Europe Bureau Head for the Spanish national daily ABC and long time flying 
Eastern Europe and Balkan Correspondent.” 
“Born in Madrid, 1964. University Degree in Communication Arts (Universidad 
Complutense) Working languages: Spanish, French, English, German, Italian, 
Serbo-Croat and Czech.” 
“In 1990, at the time of the collapse of communist regimes and the 
beginning of democratic transition, he was assigned to open the Eastern Europe 
ABC office. Based in Prague, Vienna and since 2002 in Berlin, as well as 
eventually residing all over the Balkans, he has been one of the most long-
standing European reporters travelling through the eastern regions where he 
consistently accounts among the most knowledgeable.” 
“He has continuously reported on the political, social and economic 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe, including historical processes like the 
split of Czechoslovakia and the collapse of Yugoslavia, the subsequent wars in the 
Balkans (where he was shot at, wounded, arrested and robbed at different times). 
As for a change he was exceptionally assigned to touring the USA, in the year 
2000, for a series on American society, between the Clinton and the Bush eras.” 
“Over 4,000 reports, articles and analyses on the Central European and the 
Balkan peoples, interviewing dozens of heads of State and Government, 
ministers, intellectuals and artists, through more than 300,000 km toured in the 
region.” 
“Formerly he was a cultural reporter and music and jazz commentator 
with ABC (where he was staff writer since 1986) as well as other outlets.” 
“Articles published by the local Press in the Czechlands, Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria 
and Poland. Travel writings and special country reports published in Spanish 
magazines and Encyclopediae.” 
                                                 
255 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramiro_Villapadierna, last visited September 19, 2008.  
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“Requested correspondences and comments for the BBC, CNN, 
Deutsche Welle, Radio France International, Radio Nederland, Radio Nacional de 
España.” 
“Lectures on Europe and the Balkans at the end of Communism, 
Nationalism, War reporting and confict resolution, at events and meetings like the 
International Balkan Correspondent Congress; Prague NATO Atlantic Club; 
International Summer University - Menéndez Pelayo; Foro Formentor; 
Fondazione Giorgio Cini de Venecia; Universidad de Alicante; Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid; Academia de la Guardia Civil and Escuela de Guerra. 
Commenting guest to special TV broadcasts on the region.” 
“At Diván Este-Oeste he keeps one of the very few spanish language 
blogs on old Mitteleuropa issues as well as non-typical stories from Germany, 
Austria, Poland, Czechlands, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Serbia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania.” 
“A selection of articles regularly appear in the internet at Visiones desde 
Berlín. He has written or taken part on several collective books and projects on 
nationalism, Central Europe, and journalism in conflict areas, as well as a literary 












































In der Arbeit, die zum Teil während eines Studienaufenthaltes in Alcalá de 
Henares verfasst wurde, werden diverse Aspekte der Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Teilungsprozess der ehemaligen Tschechoslowakei in der spanischen Presse 
besprochen und analysiert. Eine Frage war die nach den Reaktionen der 
spanischen Druckmedien auf die Auflösung eines Landes, mit dem Spanien 
verhältnismäßig wenig gemeinsam hatte. Die beiden Länder hatten nie besonders 
enge wirtschaftliche oder kulturelle Beziehungen, was sich auch nun, da die 
Slowakische Republik selbständig ist, nicht zu ändern scheint. 
Der Schwerpunkt der Analyse liegt auf Artikeln, die sich mit dem 
Aufteilungsprozess der Tschechoslowakei in den bedeutendsten Mainstream-
Tageszeitungen beschäftigten. Die in El País, ABC und La Vanguardia 
veröffentlichten Artikel werden detailreich analysiert, während EL Mundo als 
weniger repräsentativ und ohne deutlich autonome journalistische Linie als eher 
„trivial“ außer Acht gelassen wurde. Darüber hinaus wurden auch Periodika der 
spanischen Minoritäten – wie El Periódico de Catalunya, El Diario Vasco und DEIA 
– herangezogen. 
Nach der Besprechung der jeweiligen Risiken oder Vorteile einer Teilung 
für die beiden Neustaaten und aus allgemeiner europäischen Perspektive wird 
auch diskutiert, wie sich die spanische Presse mit dem Teilungsprozess der 
Tschechoslowakei in Hinsicht auf den innenpolitischen Separatismus in Spanien 
beschäftigte. In diesem Sinne hat die Auflösung der Tschechoslowakei in der 
spanischen Presse eine gewisse Auseinandersetzung mit den politischen 
Angelegenheiten der regionalen Minderheiten im Baskenland und in Katalonien 
bewirkt. 
Eher bemerkenswert ist auch die Tatsache, dass sich selbst die 
tschechische und die slowakische Historiographie mit diesem Thema bislang eher 
am Rande auseinandergesetzt haben. Dabei werden vor allem zwei grundsätzliche 
Werke der zeitgenössischen Geschichtsschreibung konsultiert: die umfang- und 
detailreiche Studie Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989-1992 
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(Auflösung der Tschechoslowakei: Tschecho-Slowakische Beziehungen 1989-
1992) des tschechischen Historikers Jan Rychlík und die auch auf Slowakisch 
verfasste Diplomarbeit(!) Rozdělení Československa: Nejvyšší představitelé HZDS a ODS 
v procesu rozdělováni ČSFR: Česko-slovenské soužití v letech 1989-1993 von Vladimír Srb 
und Tomáš Veselý, die u.a. nützliche und interessante Einsichten über die Haltung 
der Hauptprotagonisten des Aufteilungsprozesses inkludiert und von 
tschechischen und slowakischen Historikern positiv anerkannt wurde. 
In weiteren Kapiteln werden die politischen Hauptfiguren des 
Aufteilungsprozesses Václav Havel, Vladimír Mečiar und Václav Klaus und derer 
Rezeption in der spanischen Presse dargestellt. Dieser personalisierte Rahmen ist 
von Gewicht, da der Aufteilungsprozess normalerweise – und auch in der 
spanischen Presse – als Wechselbad von teilweise antagonistischen und teilweise 
kompromissorientierten Bemühungen seiner Hauptprotagonisten angesehen wird. 
Die eigentlichen Wünsche der Bevölkerung werden von diesem „Dreieck“ nicht 
hinterfragt, wie das Fehlen eines Referendums über die Auflösung des 
gemeinsamen Staates zeigt. 
Von der spanischen Presse werden besonders zwei weitere Faktoren von 
internationaler Bedeutung angesprochen: die Lage der ungarischen Minderheit in 
der Slowakei und die Auswirkungen des Krieges im ehemaligen Jugoslawien. Es 
verwundert nicht wirklich, dass die spanische Presse die Lage der ungarischen 
Minderheit im Zusammenhang mit der spanischen Politik gegenüber dem 
baskischen bzw. katalanischen Nationalismus sah. Die von der spanischen Presse 
oft zitierten und grundsätzlich missverstandenen „Schreckensvisionen“ bezüglich 
eines „jugoslawischen Weges“, also eines möglichen kriegerischen Konfliktes 
zwischen Tschechen und Slowaken, wurden letztendlich abgelöst von der 
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